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Chapter 9 
Iran: Internal Security Threats and Challenges 
1. Political System 
Introduction 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 
published without the prior written 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
The purpose of this and the next chapter about Iran is to highlight the convergence of 
Iran's policy towards PG security from 1962 to 1997. Although Iran's political 
regime's pre-revolution and post-revolution differed, there remained fixed factors 
which concerned Iran as a country. These included the geopolitics of Iran, the 
countries' geostrategic situation and the significance of stability and security of the 
PG as a subsystem of international system for the country's process of development. 
Its foreign policy towards the PG shows Iran's continuing aim and need to establish 
stability and security within the region and cooperate with its neighbours. Particularly 
emphasising the necessity that PG security should be provided by the regional 
countries implying a desire to see the removal of all foreign presence in the region. 
In regard to Iranian pronouncements on the issue of PG security, which expose Iran's 
deep-rooted sense of its own strategic importance, there were two key concerns for 
Iran: the first was its economic dependence on the Hormuz Strait as its only means of 
exporting oil. Iranians sought to ensure free passage of oil while preventing others 
gaining control of the PG. The second is that Iran sees itself as playing a central role 
in PG security. 
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The main reason for choosing 1962 as the starting year of this study is the significant 
effect the successes and failures in Iran's foreign policy towards the PG have had on 
the stability and security of the region. A further, and important, reason is that at that 
time the ME was acquiring a new role in international relations, especially due to the 
great decrease of intensity of the bipolar system manifested in the Cold War, and that 
Iran was becoming a major power in the ME. According to the international system 
there was more possibility for smaller countries to manoeuvre. The evolution of Iran's 
role for the US and the USSR combined with its intentions and the opportunity to play 
a greater role on a regional and intention lever meant that it placed greater attention to 
the PG, in line with its own interests of security. ' During this period up until 1997 this 
thesis will study Iran's failures and successes in its policy towards the PG in three 
different phases'of; 1962-1979 under the Muhammad Reza Shah's rule and within the 
Cold War as a successful period; two periods of 1979-1989 and 1989-1997 in post- 
revolution within the bi-polar and also uni-polar system of international system. 
While the first phase in post-revolution was a failure'in the second phase Iran could 
regain much of its regional and international legitimacy, which included the adoption 
of a pragmatic and active policy in the PG to manage affairs in this region. 
Drawing upon the level of analysis framework in international relations, the task of 
this chapter is also twofold: first, to study the power-structure and decision-making 
process with relation to security in the pre and post-Revolutionary Iran; second, to 
examine the internal threats during the study period of 1962-1997 including socio- 
political issues and also economic and military development. Also, the task of the 
next chapter is to present an empirical analysis of external threats and Iran's trends in 
its foreign relations concerning security of the PG with key countries including the 
Great Powers and its PG neighbours from the 1960s to 1990s. 
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Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 
Iranians are known as "proud nationalists, seeking independence, equality and a 
greater role, voice and status internationally"2 and there is a possibility that Iran 
intends "to return to its pre-Islamic revolution stage of regional hegemony in the 
Persian Gulf (... ) [while it] continues to see itself as a powerful Middle Eastern state 
which has the right to manage affairs in the Persian Gulf'. 3 Therefore, "religion, 
nationalism, ethnicity, economics, and geopolitics all are important in explaining 
Iran's goals and tactics in its relationship with the outside world, as are the agendas of 
key security institutions and the ambitions of their leaders (... ) [Hence], politics and 
even basic structure of government are in flux. "4 In this regard, there have been a 
rigid linkages between domestic, foreign, and security policies in all part of political 
history of Iran. As Ramazani in 1975 observed, "there is little doubt that the twin 
goals of autonomy abroad and authority at home are the most salient features of 
interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics in Iran (... ) [In other words] 
every major foreign policy objective and decision of Iran has its domestic counterpart. 
5 Also as Chubin and Zabih remarked in 1974, 
Because the security of the Shah's regime and the state as a whole were equated, 
foreign policy was expected to strengthen the internal and external requirements for 
stability and survival of the regime. This meant a concerted search for external 
sources of military support from those powers which accepted this equation of regime 
security and were able and willing to support it. 6 
Iran's post-revolutionary major policies also included "a complex calculus of Iran's 
overall vulnerability, its need to ensure the regime stays in power, and its commitment 
to revolutionary ideals. Iran's leaders weigh all these factors when making their 
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decisions. "7 Hence, notions, perceptions, attitudes, and individual characteristic of 
every policy- makers are influential in Iran's foreign policy as much as in other 
developing countries which unlike developed countries with different foreign policy 
making institutions, are dependent on direct decisions of the states' leaders. 8 In this 
respect, while some Iranian policies seem difficult to comprehend and unpredictable 
to the outside world, this paper gives consideration to the different systemic sources 
of input into Tehran's foreign policy decision-making. It studies internal elements as 
well as the global and regional variables and their interaction, and treats them as 
contributors to Iranian foreign policy. 
The theoretical basis is established by acknowledging the policies of a small power, 
and also the linkage between national and international systems. In other word, a 
state's foreign policy, within a system of international politics, can be analysed by 
comparative foreign policy, and its public policy formation and political structure can 
be analysed with particular attention to the link between domestic and foreign policy 
decision-making. In this regard, James Rosenau's theory is concerned with two 
factors, the political link between national and international structures, and the 
penetration of domestic policies of political systems that are affected by external 
affairs. 9 Also, if we focus on the policies of a small power and the evolution of Iran's 
foreign policy there is a question about how to survive during the Cold War when 
situated next to a superpower reputed for its aggressive behaviour and expansionist 
attitude, in an area with entrenched power struggles. 1° Under such circumstances, 
Iran's long term security depends largely on the persistence of those external and 




For a more clear understanding of Iran's policy, the impact of the type of decision- 
making system and leadership factor on the policy process is essential. The major 
theme of this part of the study deals with domestic sources of Iran's foreign policy, 
which explains the impact of domestic elements' priority over international variables 
on foreign policy, as well as domestic uses of foreign policy. 
The decision-making system of the pre-revolution era was a hierarchical structure, 
with the Shah's at the top, with his decisions and orders being imposed from above. 
As Chubin and Zabih note, 
It is recognized that the Shah is the sole and ultimate source of decisions affecting 
foreign policy, in all its manifestations (... ) the penetration of Iran's political system 
and the interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign alignment have 
diminished in the course of the decade, although the influence of the West, and 
particularly the United States, remains pervasive in Iran's politics. ii 
As Ramazani also mentions, after the fall of the Mosadegh government, the Shah's 
personal control became supreme and unchallenged. He was the central player in 
foreign policies even more than domestic, as evidenced by his influence in 
establishing and implementing all major decisions from oil agreements and the 
Baghdad Pact to the Irano-Soviet negotiations and the Bahrain dispute, climaxed by 
his frequent foreign goodwill visits to countries in both political blocs as well as the 
superpowers. These visits were also made by the royal family and even the prime 
minister to direct and support the Shah's decision when the Shah himself preferred 
not to get directly involved; this was also the role of Parliament. 12 The impacts of the 
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type of decision-making system on Iran's foreign policy during the Shah's rule as 
Chubin and Zabih observe were the following. 
1- Iran's foreign policy in broad terms was remarkably stable, where foreign 
policy was personal it reflected the leader's wish to demonstrate his stability 
and consistency. In this regard, the foreign policy was formulated by 
pragmatism rather than ideological attentions. 
2- This type of state would have been both less and more adaptable. In the first 
instance the prestige of the leader would be at stake and in the second the 
Shah's acknowledged, almost total control would provide an immeasurably 
strong negotiating hand and decisiveness that comes from the lack of serious 
economic, political or social constraints; e. g. between 1970-71 the dropping of 
the Bahrain claim and the pursuing of the claim to PG islands. 
3- Foreign policy controlled by one person manifests a person's temperament. 
The world is viewed from their viewpoint and sees other government's as 
equally personal; for example an insult to the state is a personal slight and 
government's views are represented by its newspapers. Iran's evidenced this 
hypothesis in its insistence that Nasser "apologise", especially regarding its 
confronting the Iranian government in the PG politics, before diplomatic 
relations could be resumed. The emphasis on personality is a dangerous 
feature in a state's foreign policy that can cause misunderstanding and 
confusion. 
4- The temptation arises, when personal control of foreign policy aligns with the 
domination of internal affairs, to enhance the leadership's prestige 
internationally to legitimise and strengthen the regime. Such domestic uses of 
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foreign policy can be seen in the celebration of 2500 of monarchy, 
emphasising military sophistication, the sensitivity to the naming of the Gulf, 
the regular discussions on Iranian responsibility in the PG, and encouragement 
of sloganeering to mobilise the populace on regional issues. However it cannot 
be a substitute for policy. It can be seen in Iran's hurriedly prepared and 
aborted 1965 continental shelf agreement with Saudi Arabia, its short-run 
issues in international politics, and its reluctance to establish long-range 
polices are characteristic of the diplomacy of a small state. 
5- This type of system would have retarded the professionalism of foreign policy. 
Although this theory has not really been tested, the absence of continuous 
policy direction, the unavailability of diplomats who can authoritatively state 
Iran's position, the absence of expertise evident in Iran's regional relations 
particularly with the Arab world, its personalised and improvised decisions, 
and hesitation reflected in its failure to prepare for Britain's withdrawal with 
no active initiative suggested until the leadership returns to the issue 
demonstrates this danger and the potential of a bottleneck arising at times of 
great foreign affairs activity. 
6- The merger of pure diplomacy and pure coercion, with a greater reliance on 
the latter, tends to occur wherever the same individual dominates both foreign 
and military affairs. In dealing with the superpowers Iran relied on diplomacy 
while in local relations it preferred to emphasise its might, e. g. the Arvand 
Roud dispute. Its reaction to Jamal Nasser's campaign in Yemen was to 
increase arms purchases. When Britain withdrew it emphasised military 
preparation rather than seeking complementary diplomatic options. However, 
it had not been proven that Iran's reliance on military solutions or its 
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underestimation of diplomacy in its foreign policy aroused from the decision 
making structure. Although it can be seen that military inputs into foreign 
policy were considered more significant than those of its diplomatic 
equivalent. 
7- The only learning process that could take place was a personal one, requiring a 
change in the decision-makers' own attitudes, as there was no formalised 
foreign policy process. This brought with it inherent long-term disadvantages 
including an increase in the strain on the Iranian leadership, particularly 
considering the increasing diversification of Iran's foreign relations, the many 
technical features of diplomacy at that time and Iran's desire for a wider 
regional role. 13 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
Iran's post-revolutionary complex political system combines elements of a modern 
Islamic theocracy with democracy. Its decision-making system is a compromise of a 
kind. Its vital decisions are usually made by consensus rather than decree. 
Despite constitutional law detailing the different institutions of government, their 
makeup and their duties, individuals still substantially influence the final decisions, 
attempting to use the institutions as merely instruments to implement them. Despite 
the existence of different councils and institutions, there is no formal or routine policy 
process; instead, a complex system of compromises between institutions and 
individuals has been accepted. Hooshang Amirahmadi praises the decentralising 
process of Iran's power structure, suggesting it is a step towards greater pluralism, 
and goes on to explain that the structure of "the Iranian government is not pyramid- 
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like [but] (... ) it is a structure of power comprised of many inter-connected and 
autonomous rings. " The central ring is made of a group of elite individuals, mostly 
clergymen of great influence that rarely hold official government positions because 
who they are is more important than the positions they occupy. The second ring 
contains those elite with senior posts, composed of clergymen and civilians, and then 
beyond that the forces that manage the various elements of the system described as 
the "roots of power", including revolutionary foundations and religious security 
forces. 14 Under such circumstances, it is not unusual to see many senior posts 
exclusively given to close relatives of those in power who, as Amirahmadi also 
remarks, in turn appoint their, own relatives and friends to sensitive positions. " As 
Nourbakhsh comments, this complex network of patronage, both personal and 
patrimonial, established and controlled everything, including the government. 16 
With regard to this, the foreign policy decision-making process in Iran is extremely 
complex, involving interfacing between many official and unofficial forces. Policy 
outcomes are difficult to predict owing to the varied and varying composition of these 
institutions, the personal influence of their members and the manoeuvrability of 
pressure groups associated with them. Although there is general agreement that 
observers know most of the significant players the actual process of decision-making 
remains vague, 17 uncertainty surrounds the rules by which the state and non-state 
players decide objectives and more importantly reach final decisions. 18 The chaotic 
impression this system gives to external observers hides what is described by Daniel 
Byman [et all as a "highly stylised and ritualised mode of interaction. " According to 
the authors, this interaction is based on the impromptu trading of support, information 
and unspoken approval, preserving solidarity and consensus. However, the 
consequence of such a system is that decisions are subject to a back-and-forth process, 
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with individuals withholding support and the differing objectives and enthusiasm of 
institutions result in inconsistent policy, policy slippage and policy setbacks, all 
leading to mixed signals in Iran's foreign policy, Byman [et all add. 19 Byman [et all 
however observe that the institutions and organisations in Iran play important political 
and military roles with many duties, beliefs and aims overlapping considerably. 
Although they do acknowledge that most institutions are weak while the personal net- 
works of leaders are strong and thus power shifts according to the fortunes of the 
individual leaders rather than by the scope of the institution. Decision-making is 
characterised by both seemingly chaotic complexity and consensus; no one institution 
or individual has complete control so a majority of institutional and non-institutional 
actors, family ties, personal relationships, overlapping institutional authority and the 
mixture of religion and politics must be gained to reach one's end, Byman [et all 
conclude. 20 
Nourbakhsh attempts to describe the process of decision making as follows: an 
opportunity or threat is discovered; the message passes through all the different 
institutional sources to the president, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), ' 
the Majlis (Parliament), the Guardian Council (GC), the Expediency Council (EC) 
and the Supreme Leader. (See, figure 9-1) Even though, he explains, the ultimate decision 
may be the Leader's choice, through official and unofficial means, all the institutions 
and individuals would be able to influence it to a certain extent. Also, the Leader may 
choose to delegate or simply be influenced by the victor of a factional debate; in this 
regard it is not always the Leader who is the final decision-maker. 21 Despite the 
explanation of Kamal Kharrazi, the head of the new Strategic Council for Foreign 
Relations (Shora-yi Rahbordi-yi Ravabet-i Khareji) which was created by a June 25 
decree from Supreme Leader, that such a lack of coherence in foreign relations 
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strategy was the reason for the foundation of this council, 22 this council does not seem 
to be able to offer a more coherent and organised foreign policy decision-making 
process. The reasons for this analysis are that, on the one hand there are some 
uncertainties regarding the new council's purpose given that there are various political 
bodies oriented toward foreign policy decision-making. On the other hand, despite 
Kharrazi's emphasis on the consultancy dimension of the council's purpose and the 
impossibility of its interference in other foreign policy organisations, according to his 
explanation of the obligation laid on executive organs to obey the approved strategy 
presented to Ayatollah Khamenei, such a situation would provide a more tangible 
influence for the Supreme Leader in the foreign policy decision-making process. 
Figure 9-1 
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According to Byman [et all when it comes to decisions about Iran's security policy 
formally the Supreme Leader simply oversees while the President handles the daily 
decision-making, however informally the Leader manages considerable control over 
day-to-day implementations. Also, concerning Iran's security policy several 
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institutions are of particular significance, including the intelligence services, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh (regular armed forces). 
The first two organisations are concerned with the defence of the revolution against 
domestic enemies while the Artesh concentrates its efforts on potential attacks from 
the outside or other traditional threats. Hence, the sharing of responsibilities' and 
overlap of duties and beliefs often creates duplication and rivalry. 23 
Iran's strategies and its foreign policy's orientation and goals have been not only a 
reaction of the revolution to the Shah's regime, but these have been influenced by the 
revolutionary leaders too. Houman Sadri categorises Iran's revolutionary leaders in 
two groups of idealists and realists. As he explains, the revolutionary idealists believe 
that in time the revolution would spread everywhere. They desired to focus resources 
in support of movements abroad, they held on to an anti-status quo belief, and used 
their revolutionary values in foreign relations, all of which seemed to pose a threat to 
the national security of other states, especially its PG neighbours, and consequently 
would lead to the isolation of Iran. This is evidenced by the support of Arab states in 
the PG given to Iraq for its invasion of Iran a year after the revolution. Although, he 
continues, the revolutionary realists had the same aim as the idealists - to export the 
revolution - their methodology differed. The realists dealt with problems of national 
rather than international concern, prioritising the building of a model revolutionary 
state in their own country. However, they understood real politics, the limits of their 
country's revolutionary powers, the country's need for external assistance for 
modernisation, and concerned themselves with the reaction the revolution had on the 
international stage. They were also pragmatic enough to realise the importance of 
good diplomatic relations and that internationally isolating the country would not pay 
off. As Sadri also mentions, an example of a revolutionary realist is Ali Akbar 
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Hashemi Rafsanjani, who worked against the isolationist tendencies within the new 
leadership. Despite such differences a common belief on both sides was that the new 
regime needed a fresh approach to foreign relations. 24 
After 1989, the evolution of Iran's foreign relations was implemented by Hashemi 
Rafsanjani. He began confidence building, established detente policy and 
strengthened Iran's regional position. Also, by managing PG relations and by 
adopting a pragmatic and active regional policy, he began rebuilding a lot of Iran's 
international credibility. Despite the tendency of revolutionary states towards a close- 
knit relationship between domestic and foreign polices, when its state security was at 
risk ideological Iran managed to temper its ideology with pragmatism. 25 However, the 
primacy of foreign policy in Iran's scheme continued, even during the Hashemi 
Rafsanjani period, who preferred to deal with national rather than international 
concerns, maintaining the same problems as in the period of the Shah. It was not until 
1997 that this policy was altered. During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, as 
Chubin also observes, the clear urgency of domestic issues brought with it the 
realisation that foreign policy could no longer replace domestic performance and the 
needs of internal crisis could not be met by foreign-policy activism. However, they 
also realised that by ending isolation and increasing access to external resources, Iran 
could alleviate some of the pressures on the regime through foreign policy. 26 
As Byman [et al] mention, Iran's security policy is seen as a combination of Islamic 
and nationalist objectives. However, in recent years the necessity of preserving 
regional stability and improving Iran's economy has dictated the influence of 
geopolitics, economics and even ethnicity in shaping Iran's security policy. 27 Also, 
from 1997 the presidency of Khatami added to the elements of the regime's security 
policy a clearer superiority and urgency of domestic issues. These additional 
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influences lead to developing better relations with regional neighbours as Byman [et 
al] describe, at the expense of revolutionary principles and follows more cautious 
policies than its Islamic and nationalist ethos might otherwise dictate. 28 However, 
since the presidency of Ahmadinejad, the IRI once again has returned to its previous 
radical priorities. 
Conclusion: In sum, Iran's foreign policy is infused with the desire for autonomy as 
well as for influence on its regional and even on the international stage. Therefore, the 
concept of `national interests' as a guide for foreign policy has been missing from 
Iran's policies, whether under the Shah's regime or the IRI. 29 Iran's relation to the 
international environment is described by Chubin as follows, "like those of other 
small states Iran's security and ability to manoeuvre largely depends on an 
international environment which it can little affect. 00 Both national interests and the 
international environment have, from the period of the Shah, continued to present a 
real challenge to Iran's foreign policy. 
2. Imperial Iran's Security Challenges 
Introduction 
The modern Iranian State is the product of many very complex and long-term social 
relations, deep-rooted political interactions and socio-economic processes. 
A. Ehteshami (2000)31 
Domestic, foreign and security policies are not divided issues. It must be recognised 
that the major threat to Iranian society comes from within, which is evidenced by the 
revolution. However the Iranian political regimes' endeavour has been characterised 
mainly by two factors;. either by ignoring or being unaware of national interests, and 
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laying blame on other internal or external events. An examination of the real domestic 
threats, particularly during the study period of 1962-1997, will involve consideration 
of the major socio-political issues and the economic and military development both 
pre and post-revolution. 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Regime 
There are two specific analyses about the internal threats to the security of the 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime (1941-1979), which was ended by the Islamic 
revolution, as Abrahamian explains: 
One interpretation - accepted by supporters of the Pahlavi regime - claims that the 
revolution occurred because the shah modernized [1963-1977] too much and too 
quickly for his traditional-minded and backward-looking people. The other - 
favoured by opponents of the regime - argues that the revolution occurred because 
the shah did not modernize fast enough and thoroughly enough to overcome his initial 
handicap of being a CIA-installed monarch in an age of nationalism, neutralism, and 
republicanism. 32 
However, according to Abrahamian both interpretations are only half right. The 
revolution began because the Shah modernised the socio-economic level, increasing 
both the middle and industrial working classes, but he did not modernise the political 
level. This unbalance created strained links and blocked communications between the 
political system and the general population. The few bridges that had connected the 
traditional social forces, particularly the bazaars and the religious authorities, 
collapsed. By 1977, the widening gulf between the two levels meant that an economic 
crisis was able to pull the whole regime down. The revolution took place not because 
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of over or underdevelopment but because of uneven development. 33 Subsequently, 
under the Shah's rule, Iranian society was plagued by the following four major crises: 
1) The crisis of justice which was rooted in social relations, the living conditions of 
the people, the unjust distribution of wealth, social discriminations and the gap 
between the poor and the rich. The gap was created by the modernisation plan and 
social development, which was made possible by increasing oil revenues. It was also 
true, as Abrahamian remarks, that substantial amounts of money were wasted on royal 
extravagances, bureaucratic consumption, outright corruption, nuclear installation and 
ultra-sophisticated weapons. However, greater amounts were channelled into the 
economy and into the government-subsidised Industrial and Mining Development 
Bank of Iran too. 34 
2) The participation crisis emerged because of the Shah's own fear of the people 
demanding to play a more active role in determining their own fate, which went 
completely against his totalitarian and autocratic regime. Consequently, although he 
modernised the structure of socioeconomics, he made little effort to develop the 
political system, thus preventing the formation of pressure groups and other social 
forces. 
3) A moral and spiritual crisis shook the legitimacy of the regime to its foundations in 
the public opinion and conscience. The prevailing notion that `modernisation brings 
secularity', or `modernisation is a fundamental break of spirituality', together with the 
Shah's efforts to foster a Western-oriented culture, his glorification of pre-Islamic 
Persia (like the 2,500a' anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire, which was 
held at the site of Persepolis in 1971, or the imposition a new calendar dating from the 
pre-Islamic monarch Cyrus the Great instead of from the prophet of Islam's higra), 
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the presence of thousands of Westerners in Iran, the increasing number of cinemas 
showing `decadent' Western films, as well as discos, bars and casinos for gambling 
(all against Sharia law), represented an ascending perfidious culture. These 
developments were against the beliefs of most Iranians and were construed by Ulema 
as destructive to Shiism. Such circumstances were perceived by many as an effort on 
the Shah's part to destroy Islam and they seemed inextricably bound to a decline in 
Islamic practices. 35 
4) The prevailing security atmosphere that controlled the opposition groups and the 
media was mainly led by a new secret police named Sazman- e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e 
Keshvar (National Security and Information Organisation, SAVAK). This 
organisation was set up by the Shah who, after the Mosadegh experience, wanted an 
effective internal security service. However, he also maintained additional 
intelligence services partly to check on each other. 
The regime's modernisation was unlike what was successfully experienced in other 
societies. The Shah's main motivation was his dream of developing Iran into a `Great 
Civilization' and making it one of the most powerful nations of the world: not only 
secure, but self-sufficient via oil money. However, by late 1974 the oil boom brought 
a completely different result than the `Great Civilization' promised by the Shah. The 
moderate decline of oil revenues in 1974-1975, which was followed by a sharp 
decline in the final year of the Shah's regime, brought an alarming increase in 
inflation and a widening gap between the rich and poor. By mid-1977, an economic 
recession, with high government deficits and high inflation, urban overcrowding, 
government policies that damaged the bazaar classes, and the lack of political 
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freedom contributed to the widespread perception that the `Great Civilization' was 
just a hollow dream without firm buttresses. 36 
Howsoever, his modernisation had three shortcomings: The modernisation of Iran was 
forced upon the people from above, without allowing them to participate because of 
the lack of political development, creating expansive dualism between the traditional 
beliefs and the modern secular ideas. This dualism was seen in the economy, in the 
culture, in the forms of thinking and particularly with regard to religious beliefs. The 
lack of an overarching ideology meant that the Shah failed to attract the population to 
the process of modernisation. The second problem was the uneven development of the 
economic and political systems as explained above. The third shortcoming was the 
lack of one unique ideology to reconcile the people's beliefs and the Shah's 
modernisation. This absence was partly because the modernisation package was 
designed by America enabling the introduction of American capitalism into Iranian 
society, which encouraged secular ideas. 37 
Political Policy 
The far-reaching political, social, and economic reforms, known as the Shah's White 
Revolution (1963), were encouraged by the US, who desired to support the Shah 
placing great emphasis on reinforcing Iran's internal security. Consideration of the 
Shah's agricultural and oil policies, which can be found in Appendix-8-A, 
demonstrates how the regime politically alienated the population and increased its 
dependency on the West to survive, which ultimately destabilised the regime. 38 The 
consequences of his economic strategy, especially in these two major areas of 
development may, as Keddie notes, be seen as: 
262 
(... ) contributing to a capitalist type of agricultural and industrial growth, with a 
natural emphasis on state capitalism, given the autocratic nature of the regime and its 
monopoly control of the ever-growing oil income. (... ) The years 1962-77 may be 
seen as a unit in this building up of a predominant state capitalism, undermining of 
semifeudal forms of landownership seen as a bar both to development and to central 
government control of the countryside, and encouragement and subsidy to private 
capitalists. 39 
In the decade after the 1953 coup d'etat, the Shah worked to consolidate his power 
and became increasingly interested in modernising the Iranian economy and society in 
a Western manner and developing its military strength. In this regard he carried to the 
extreme displays of ultra-sophisticated and expensive weaponry, which combined 
with his economic policy that had turned Iran into a huge consumer of Western goods, 
made Iran substantially dependent on the West; specifically the US. So to achieve his 
goals the Shah needed financial aid, which he received from America. He was able to 
solve his oil dispute with Britain and form a contract with a British consortium, which 
resulted in an increase in oil revenues. All theses events assisted the Shah in gaining 
control of most of Iran's economy and the state itself. The additional revenues also 
ao increased Iran's military strength, which was necessary for the regime's survival 
Economic Development: There were two different views about the Shah's socio- 
economic policies. Some, especially those outside Iran, thought that they were a great 
success for Iran as evidenced by the increase in Iran's GNP, the impressive industrial, 
agricultural, and infrastructural projects, and the number of social welfare activities. 
However, opponents of the regime saw the policies as artificial and fraudulent as the 
development had only benefited the regime and its Western supports. The opponents 
also proclaimed that there were no structural changes, and that the social and 
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economic projects undertaken by the Shah's regime were only contributing to a 
capitalist type of agriculture and of industrial growth emphasising state capitalism, as 
evidenced by the autocratic character of the regime and the monopoly it held on the 
oil income 41 
The increased oil revenues simply increased the disparity between the rich and the 
poor because the Shah's over ambitious fantasy led to association with multinational 
corporations, which left the day-to-day needs of most Iranians unfulfilled. The 
government did not even try to use taxation to its advantage, as this would more justly 
have distributed income and implied that the people should have had a role in the 
government they paid for. 2 
Although the Shah's first major programme of modernisation ended because of 
economic difficulties, his later plan resulted in major transformations in the Iranian 
society and economy such as economic expansion, unequal distribution of wealth, 
profound changes in the class structure, and a decline in the agriculture sector. These 
transformations were the result of the focus on an industrialisation programme that 
depended heavily on Western technology and managerial skills 43 
As Milani explains, when the Shah introduced the Land Reforms in 1963 as a part of 
his White Revolution, the coalition, which was made up of landlords, rich merchants, 
some top clergy, armed forces and the US that overthrew Mosadegh in 1953, began to 
disintegrate. (Details in Appendix-8-A) The subsequent establishment of the Triangle 
of Fortune or Triple Alliance, which was made up of the combined forces of the 
Iranian State, the industrial bourgeoisie, and foreign capitalists, particularly the US, 
was necessary to ensure the survival of the Pahlavi regime and its modernisation plan 
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for Iran. The drive behind each group was the desire for the speedy development of 
Iran's economy and an "open-door" policy, especially towards the West as 
However, a major pernicious consequence of such economic expansion which was not 
seriously considered was the shifting of Iran's focus from agriculture to industry, 
which resulted in an increased labour force, with all its disadvantages such as rapid 
urban migration as well as excessive inflation. However this massive movement of 
mainly young people, from a very religious and political culture in the country, 
actually assisted the ultimate downfall of the regime. This was because in the end the 
strength of the revolution came from the urban areas where the political culture of the 
masses was Islamic so they could easily lend their support to Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini 45 
Such a significant change from landownership for agricultural production to 
investment in commercial and industrial projects also resulted in the allocation of a 
considerable amount of the state's resources for the development of industries, as well 
as encouraging involvement in the private sector. Official records show that in 1980, 
out of 5,288 industrial units, more than 89 percent were owned by the private sectors 
while only 409 (around 7 percent) were state controlled 46 Unsurprisingly, the Pahlavi 
family benefited the most from the economic boom and by the early 1970s they had 
established a huge financial empire and were controlling nearly everything. They 
invested great amount of funds, borrowed from state banks and often on very 
favourable terms, in various commercial and industrial businesses. Their other source 
of wealth was the oil income. According to Washington Post, in the last few years of 
the Shah's regime significant amounts (possibly about $2 billion), with no trace in the 
state treasury, were transferred directly from the state's oil income into the royal 
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family's secret foreign bank accounts. 7 As long as the royal family remained in 
control the strength of the private sector increased, due to extravagant financial 
incentives and the fact that Iran was introduced to foreign capital, the foreign banking 
industry, and various economic agreements between Iran and the West, specifically 
the US. 48 The consequence of all this, as Milani notes, was that: 
As the role of the state and indigenous industrialists increased, so did that of foreign 
capital. (... ) The foreign role in the banking industry also increased. (... ) 
Concomitant with increased foreign involvement was the deepening of Iran's 
dependence on the West. The imports of capital and intermediate goods rose from 
$89 million in 1963 to $886 million in 1977. The dependent industrialists of Iran had 
become the junior partners of elites in the metropolis countries. They identified with 
and emulated the West to such an extent that they became alienated from their own 
culture. This created a ubiquitous cultural gap between his small portion of the 
population and the bulk of Iranians. 49 
The Shah's power was based on the three pillars of the armed forces, the court 
patronage network, and the vast state bureaucracy, which enabled the state's control 
to expand into the day-to-day lives of its citizens. In the towns they hired 50% of the 
full time employees giving the state control of a vast percentage of the populations' 
salaries and benefits. Although this network did not yet include the bazaaries it did 
penetrate the countryside. It managed to supplant the local khans (landowners), 
demolishing the barrier that had once prevented absolute government authority over 
the rural population. Now the government could reorganise the whole countryside. so 
As the final step, in 1975, the Shah established the additional and fateful fourth pillar 
of the one-party state. Giving way in the late 1950s to growing pressure for more 
democracy, the Shah created two parties: the Melliyun (Nationalist) party and the 
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Mardom (People) party. However both parties were simply for appearances' sake and 
with little difference between them they remained under the control of their creator. It 
was not until over 15 years later that the Shah dissolved these existing two parties and 
created the Resurgence party (Hizb-i Rastakhiz) - headed by Amirabbas Hoveyda, 
the Prime Minister - whose main aim, as Abrahamian expresses, was to turn the old 
fashioned dictatorship into a modern totalitarian state. 51 
Military Development: another part of the Shah's effort to consolidate his power was 
his efforts to increase his regime's military strength. His ambition was for Iran to 
become a leading military power, which would also provide the means to subdue 
domestic political opposition. To achieve his goal the Shah obtained US aid. The 
military relationship between the US and Iran began in the late 1940s. However the 
real increase in Iran's dependency on the US occurred after the 1953 restoration of the 
Shah to power. This dependency was not only military but also financial, and lasted 
up until 1967 when Iran's oil revenues increased. The consequent increase in wealth, 
as well as the US's political agenda and the Shah's eagerness to buy sophisticated 
weapons, resulted in the US ignoring previous attempts to prevent domestic or 
regional instability through the build up of Iranian arms. Instead it established a new 
interdependent partnership. 
After the British withdrawal from the region, the US was reluctant to involve itself 
directly. Consequently it needed a powerful and friendly state to protect US interests 
in the PG. Hence US strategic interests led to the creation of a regional security 
system and a strong Iran that remain independent of the USSR which was increasing 
its military potential. Therefore, in May 1972, as a result of the Nixon-Kissinger 
decision, Washington allowed the Shah to buy any conventional (non-nuclear) arms. 
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This evidences that the US-Iran relationship was beneficial to both countries and did 
not require a direct US military role or great American expense. However it did mean 
that the US had changed from being what Chubin described as a "restraining patron to 
acquiescent partner. " This bound the US interests to the fate of the Shah's regime - 
even the Carter administration continued the US agreements with Iran. 52 Even from 
1973, when the price of oil began to rise, the West found it convenient to recycle 
Iran's petrodollars and thus allowed the Shah to purchase large amounts of up-to-date 
and sophisticated military equipment which led to Iran's role as the policeman of the 
PG. 53 
The one main strain on the relationship was the Shah's desire for more and newer 
military equipment, which led the US to forcibly encourage greater economic reforms 
to ensure stability and prevent upheaval or revolution. However, this was unbalanced 
by the Shah's insistence on spending more of Iran's growing oil revenues on 
weaponry rather than on Iran's economy. 
Dimensions of Iran-US Military Ties 
Advantages: Iran's military build-up, Chubin remarks, "held the potential for a 
regional equilibrium less susceptible to disturbance by outside powers. " This, as he 
explains, was because Iran's arms were supplied by the US and thus the US ability to 
react quickly in this area was improved because of the compatibility between the US 
military equipment and that of Iran. In addition, the relationship meant that the US 
could use Iranian territory to gather intelligence and monitor Soviet missile testing. 54 
Although the Shah's ambition was for Iran to gain influence and become a leading 
military power, not just in the PG but also all of the ME and the Indian sub continent, 
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the deployments of its ground forces had the character of being almost solely 
concerned with defence and internal security. In this regard, as Canby remarks, a full 
three-fifths of its army was deployed near the borders with Iraq, and half of the 
remainder was located in the capital. The air force was made up of only one brigade 
that could provide domestic reinforcement or be of use in the rest of the PG region. 
This meant that the Shah would only really have been effective in intervening in areas 
near his own borders. This concentration of forces near the borders, particularly the 
Iraqi frontier, with nearly all the Iranian army's armour oriented towards Iraq, 
reflected both the obvious need to face the Iraqi threat and the American belief that 
such forces would be able to contain and delay any Soviet threat until the arrival of 
US reinforcements. Forces were not placed any closer to the Soviet border because 
they would only be lost early on, and may have appeared confrontational during times 
ss of peace. 
So a relative political stability was brought to the PG for about ten years due to the 
intensification of the US-Iran military relationship. The closeness of this relationship 
was promoted by Iran's desire to assume the responsibility neither the UK nor the US 
wanted, combined with the increase in the significance of the political developments 
of this region, especially in the context of the Cold War. 56 Moreover, as there were no 
other states besides Iran that could ensure the region's security, a close military 
relationship was essential. 57 
Disadvantages: The close military ties between the US and Iran had some 
disadvantages for both the Shah's regime and Washington, such as: 
- An unwelcome number of foreign technical advisers, instructors and their families, 
who contributed to inflation and often caused justified indignation among Iranians. By 
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1976 there were some 25,000 military-related personnel (and their dependents) in 
Iran, and it was estimated that by 1980 there would be 50,000 to 60,000. One rise led 
to another and in industry the lack of training in Iran meant that the Iranian population 
lost out again as more foreigners were brought in to deal with the bigger, more 
technical and complex projects. This further contributed to overcrowding, shortages, 
inflation, and an anti-American feeling. 58 
- The aid and technical assistance given by the US, together with Israel, to the 
SAVAK, which was the most dreaded internal security agency, increased popular 
resentment toward the countries that helped the SAVAK. 
- The socio-economic consequences of the Shah's insistence on spending more of 
Iran's growing oil revenues on weaponry rather than on Iran's economy. 
- During Iran's revolutionary period, the close military ties between the two countries 
become a disadvantage for the Shah while it was a domestic advantage for his 
regime's stability, in a peaceful era. Moreover, during this period of crisis a 
demonstrative use of US force as a deterrent against external intervention in Iran 
could have backfired, as it could have been construed as an indication of opposition to 
the revolution 59 
- Regarding the possibility that purchasing arms from the US were among the causes 
of the revolution, Chubin remarks that it is uncertain whether the purchases of arms 
actually contributed to the economic problems which led to the revolution. However, 
if the Shah had been refused the weapons it would have weakened the Iranian-US 
relationship. This in turn would have created a weaker, unstable Iran, which was 
eventually the case after 1976. It became clear that a weaker Iran was a greater 
destabilising regional force as well as a threat to the US interests. 
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Opposition Groups 
The Shah, with its dictatorial character and no tolerance, which had alienated all 
different social groups and classes, with the possible exception of the upper layer of 
bourgeoisie, perceived the opposition groups as a threat to its regime. Their demands 
of expecting the regime to observe the constitution, free political prisoners, and 
respect freedom and human rights were ignored and they were even severely 
oppressed by the regime, especially in the post-1953 coup d'etat. 
SAVAK had the main responsibility for identifying and destroying all who opposed 
the Shah's dictatorship in any way. It had headquarters in London, Geneva and 
Washington and developed ties with the intelligence agencies from America, Britain 
and Israel. They were particularly suspicious of groups of intellectuals, students and 
religious clerics both at home and abroad. Under such circumstances and despite the 
activities of the opposition groups, the Shah's regime was stable and was able to 
control the discontent for a time. However it could not last long; via a strong 
revolutionary movement started in 1978 the regime was overthrown within months 
and the Shah had to face the real impact of his oppressive policy. 
The first problem for the regime was the problem of legitimacy, which for Iran was 
linked to the form and nature of governance of a Muslim society. The regime had 
alienated the masses. The growth of the discontent increased when the promised 
decentralisation of the political and economic systems failed to be realised. However, 
rather than destroy the roots of the dissention the regime's oppressive policies actually 
resulted in the radicalisation of the opposing groups. The response to the regime's 
oppression varied greatly from passive to violent. Many remained silent, not in 
support of the regime but because of the benefits to the economic developments of 
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country, regardless of the negative impacts of rapid changes. Susan Siavashi explains 
other reasons, including the pessimistic and hopelessness of the National Front's 
traditional leaders' ability to confront the regime, combined with the massive losses 
of the 1963 uprising, which exposed the Shah's greater power, as well as the lack of 
opportunity for mobilising people and forming political gatherings. All this paved the 
way for militia activities and the establishment of small secret groups, ranging from 
Nationalist to Marxist to Islamist, to carry on the struggle against the regime 
politicising a generation of Iranians both at home and abroad to shake the foundations 
of the Pahlavi rule. 60 
In order to understand the Islamic led revolution in Iran the tactics and aims of the 
opposition groups needs to be studied and a discussion of this can be found in the 
Appendix-8-B of the thesis. However, generally speaking several groups were 
opposed to the regime, including both secular and religious entities. Those that held 
Islamic ideology desired to replace the Pahlavi regime with an Islamic system through 
political and cultural activities. In -contrast those 
from secular backgrounds only 
rebelled, with the aim of opposing the political participation crisis. They believed that 
an armed struggle was the path to political freedom. The opposition groups, with 
secular backgrounds, included the National Front, the Tudeh and the Fadaiyan-e 
Khalq. These groups were not interested in replacing the regime with an Islamic 
system. 61 Even the Mujahedin-e Khalq with religious backgrounds and demand for 
overthrowing the regime was not looking for an Islamic system. However, the regime 
had alienated these groups by centralising power and ceasing to act in accordance 
with the institutionalised rules, which resulted in parties being replaced by movements 
as an alternative form of political organisation. 62 Lack of influence and 
communication with the majority of people whose political culture was Islamic, and 
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also the adoption of strategies of leftist leaders in Latin-America which focused on 
armed action and ignored the potential or exploration of non-violent political 
channels, resulted in the failure of these leftist guerrilla movements. 63 This strategy 
brought them in direct conflict with the regime, which damaged their networks and 
organisations. 
Therefore, a growing number of oppositionists voiced their views in Islamic terms 
and many opposition groups had ties with the Islamic opposition. This was because 
the Islamic ideology was linked to the political culture of the masses in such a way 
that the Shah could not easily contain them. The clergy had significant influence on 
the masses and had been a political voice, for example in 1964 Grand ' Ayatollah 
. 
Khomeini's opposition against capitulation or diplomatic immunity granted by the 
Shah to American military personnel. 
In addition, the failure of the Fadaiyan-e Islam, the major Islamic armed opposition, 
led the Islamic groups to recognise the need for cultural and political tactics rather 
than military ones when mobilising the people against the Shah's regime. Although 
there were some other secret groups led by Ayatollah Beheshti and Ayatollah 
Taleghani, the major work and communications were taking place within religious 
places. Using the religious places like Mosques (there existed 100,000 Mosques and 
200,000 clerics) guaranteed more chance to mobilise the masses without the 
interference of the security forces. Consequently, there were many reasons for a new 
coalition which included almost all different social classes and political forces, 
whether related to the Islamists or around a non-religious leadership outside the 
control of the regime. Among the most important ones were: a prevailing ideology, 
Islam, the continuing political-cultural activity to mobilise the masses and a 
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charismatic, unique and popular leader in the form of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini for 
all the different groups, especially "emerging before the Shah was overthrown". 
64 In 
addition, as Abrahamian notes, the new leader's promise to bring social justice in 
contrast with the regime's inability to satisfy the people's increasing expectations, 
also his "timely statements to woo the secular opposition and to assure all that the 
autocracy would not be superseded by a theocracy" were important elements of 
forming the new coalition against the shah's regime. 65 
Although it was obvious that the regime would end sooner or later, the human-rights 
policy enunciated by President Carter, in hopes of making US foreign policy more 
benevolent post-Vietnam, helped to bring the downfall about sooner. Under some 
domestic and international pressures the Shah began to make gestures in favour of 
public opinion, although they were late and less than what people expected. He eased 
the pressure on political prisoners, cancelled the censorship of the writings of Dr. Ali 
Shariati, an influential modernist Islamist leader, and in 1977, after the economic 
crisis became great, replaced the Prime Minister. His new choice, Jamshid Amuzegar, 
was meant to be the solution to Iran's growing economic problems with his 
background in economics and oil. However, the economic crisis continued and the 
discontents increased. 66 In 1978 the opposition continued to grow, with widespread 
street protests, and the Shah was confronted by an unexpected opposition leader. The 
revolution was spontaneous but was not led by the armed opposition of the 1970s or 
by a political organisation backed by the Soviet Union, both of which were under the 
eye of the SAVAK. The revolutionaries were led by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, an 
exiled religious leader who lived for 14 years in Iraq and later in France, who could 
gather a unique coalition of opposition against the Pahlavi monarchy. 
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Conclusion: In sum, the significance of the Shah's regime was that it was 
economically and politically stable both internally and externally, particularly in its 
regional and international position. However, because this security was achieved 
through a system of oppression and fear the regime was ultimately undermined from 
within. The Shah's regime was not considered a threat to regional security of the PG 
because it had the same political orientation towards the West, which it lost after the 
revolution ignited the anti-status quo rhetoric and policies. Revolutionary Iran's 
problem was seen as a security matter for its neighbours. Although the post-revolution 
system, especially through the first decade, had more political legitimacy it was faced 
with many different problems which resulted in the political and economic instability 
of Iran. 
3. The Islamic Republic's Security Challenges 
Introduction 
A revolution by its very nature as a significant change in a relatively short period of 
time, causes instability which within a political system appears as insecurity. In this 
regard the focus of the new regime in Iran, despite its efforts to manage the 
revolutionary fever, was on the struggle for survival against both external and internal 
causes of opposition. Similarly, such insecurity was felt by the neighbouring countries 
and also the ultra regional players because of the new regime's anti status quo and 
revolutionary polices. 
The main factors of internal threats as the cause of instability after the revolution were 
the political and economic unsteadiness. These encouraged both internal and external 
threats because the regime was considered at its weakest position and as such the 
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opposition saw a way to achieve their goals, e. g. the Mujahedin-e-Khalq armed 
struggle and Iraq invasion. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran * (IRI), despite 
suffering many looses, has more or less been able to overcome all those threats. 
However, despite the general stability of the regime since the revolution, the IRI has 
been strategically and structurally quite vulnerable. Such vulnerabilities will be 
investigated in this section, through the study of Iran's most significant internal 
challenges during the first two decades of the revolution: 1979-1988 and 1989-1997, 
and both will be considered from a political, economic and military point of view. 
The First Decade of the Islamic Revolution; 1979-1988 
Political Issues 
In the first decade of the revolution the IRI followed the `neither East nor West' 
policy. It was an independent power and had significant regional influence, 
particularly politically, affecting from the East to the West of Iran, including the Arab 
world. The revolution was widely popular and there was no real domestic threat nor 
has there been any serious opposition since. However this does not mean that none 
existed; many of those who once supported the political system ultimately came to 
oppose it but it was not enough to amount an effective offensive. 67 
According to many observers it is incredible that the IRI has survived so many 
attempts, both Iranian and foreign, to destroy it. This survival has been credited to a 
mixture of social elements, economic control, and fear. There was a social base that 
supported the regime and its Islamic programme. This support was motivated partly 
by a feeling of insecurity in the supporters, which arose from the belief that the US 
was particularly committed to the elimination of the Islamic Republic, a strong 
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ideological commitment powered the continuation of the revolution. An element 
which promoted resistance to any foreign-inspired change or interference was a strong 
undercurrent of nationalistic feeling amongst Iranians. 68 
The economic system was the other foundation for the regime, as it enabled direct 
control of employment. This control mechanism was strengthened by an increasing 
dependency on government subsidies. This was made possible by recruiting new 
supporters of the revolution into the government administration for civilian and 
military purposes, and also by using the oil revenues to influence Iran's economy. 
Finally it is supposed that the regimes' survival was also owed to fear because of the 
ideological confrontation against dissent. The combination of all three elements 
prevented the expression of open political opposition, and narrowed the options of 
resistance to either internal exile or armed action. 69 
The most serious internal threat to the regime in this period was the Mujahedin-e- 
Khalq group. This organisation started an armed uprising in June 1981, which later 
attracted several small leftist parties. Although immediately after the revolution they 
were widely popular with Shiite youth, eventually they lost their popularity and were 
known as traitors to the Iranian people as a result of their support for Iraq in its war 
against Iran. Masoud Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahedin, failed in his attempt to 
achieve the sharing of political power through the pressure of street demonstrations. 
So he joined forces with Bani Sadr, who was then president, and declared war on the 
Islamic regime, initiating a three-step strategy: destabilisation of the Islamic 
leadership; pressuring the government through street demonstrations; and finally 
creating a mass uprising. 70 The Mujahedin spread wide terror throughout the 
population, from officials to the ordinary people. Even six of the seven well-respected 
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elderly religious deputies Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had put in charge of different 
regions of the country were killed or seriously wounded. The Mujahedin claimed in 
the summer of 1982 that they had killed over 1,000 members of the state security 
forces. Rajavi claimed that the organisation had assassinated over 2,000 top political 
and religious leaders in 1981 the year before they went underground. However, these 
tactics proved to be counter-productive and, by 1982, too many members had been 
killed or imprisoned, which enabled the regime to easily tear down the group. 
1 Apart 
from the underground activities they left the country and began cooperating with 
Saddam in 1986, and in 1988 accompanied Iraqi forces on their offensives into Iran. 
In July 1988 after IRI had announced its acceptance of UN Resolution 598, several 
hundred of the Mujahedin remained behind to occupy the town of Islamabad in 
Bakhtaran (Kermanshah) province, however Iranian forces of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in an operation named Mersad destroyed a 
significant number of them. Hooglund alludes to the fact that the local population 
assisted IRGC in defeating the Mujahedin and concludes from this action that: 
Most Iranians, whether they are fanatical supporters of the Islamic Republic, 
indifferent to politics or even opposed to the regime, including monarchists and 
leftists, consider the actions of the Mojahedin [Mujahedin] as unforgivable treason. 
2 
The regime faced other opposition including Kurdish resistance, who supported the 
Mujahedin forces in the western mountains until the regimes' biggest attack in 1982. 
There were also some plots that attempted to overthrow the regime, for example 
former Foreign Minister, Sadegh Ghotb-zadeh, was accused and executed for plotting 
a coup and working for the US. The other opposition came from the leftwing. After 
the rise of Hojjatieh, an extreme secret organisation which opposed Communism and 
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Bahaism, the leftwing forces that supported the regime appeared to lose their 
influence. Tudeh members were removed from the civilian and security forces, even 
though left wing support continued for the regime's anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist 
policies. However with the exception of Bazargan, the former Prime Minister, no 
prominent personality spoke out against the regime. 73 
After the regime consolidated itself it was facing other emerging issues. These issues, 
according to Halliday, included the absence of any political parties because of the 
resistance against establishing representation for the people. 4 Even the Islamic 
Republic Party (IRP), established by Ayatollah Beheshti and some other official 
members, never served as a cohesive ruling party and was disbanded by its prominent 
members and at the consent of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini in 1987.75 
Another problem that emerged was the result of the continuation of previous political 
institutions, including the parliament, ministries and armed forces. Even the titles of 
the main newspapers remained the same, although with different orientations. 
Furthermore only certain issues of specific interest to Islamist ideology were 
addressed, such as the status of women, who were asked to wear religious clothing in 
public and the harmonisation of the judicial system with Islam by removing all 
secular laws. Little attention was spared for other pressing matters, specifically civil 
rights. According to Halliday this was mainly an attempt to win back support from the 
middle classes. These policies were criticised by Bazargan who attacked the 
corruption, inefficiency, demagogy and violations of human rights in Iran. 76 
However, despite these problems the regime, according to Halliday, was working 
because it attracted new workers to the old administration, and used the system of 
Friday prayer leaders, the IRGC and the Basij mobilisation forces. This network was 
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to all intents and purposes fulfilling the role of a ruling party and it was through 
mosques and associated institutions that forms of popular mobilisation and ideological 
strategy were being carried out 77 Although the regime was not facing any internal 
threat to its power and the Kurdish and Mujahedin-e-Khalq opposition were weaker 
than before, other problems were arising. 
Economic Problems 
The Islamic regime had little to show for its monopoly of power; there were major 
unemployment figures, the urban population was increasing, the rate of literacy was 
decreasing and the non-oil sectors of the economy were stagnating. Also corruption 
within the regime was growing. All these factors were combined with the difficulties 
of Iran's foreign policy. 78 These internal issues significantly affected the survival of 
the regime. 
Furthermore, people's frustration about the continuation of war with no major 
conqueror, no successful international peace delegations, mounting casualties on both 
sides, and growing anti-war sentiment particularly among the young combined with 
addition to the 1988 attack of the USS Vincennes against an Iranian civilian passenger 
plane in the PG (which killed all 290 people on board) persuaded Iranian authorities 
to look more towards the domestic affects of the war and a political solution. By 1988 
most of the top leaders believed that continuation of the war posed a serious threat to 
the stability, even survival, of the IRI. So suddenly on July 18,1988, Iran notified 
UN's Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar that it accepted the Security Council's 
document of Resolution 598 for cease fire without reservations 79 As such to enable 
Tehran to respond to the demands of the people, ease the international situation and to 
escape from isolation it had to start economic and social reforms. 
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The consequences of the eight-year war, which started immediately after the 
revolution, had resulted in the deceleration of some major economic plans. The 
economic situation and people's expectations of the revolutionary leaders to do what 
they had promised pushed Iran to turn its energies to the enormous task of rebuilding 
the agricultural, commercial, cultural, industrial and social infrastructure destroyed 
during eight years of war. Iran's economy was a key issue in this reconstruction. The 
government desired to release the economy from the hold of foreigners, especially the 
West, however it realised that whilst Iran's economy relies on its oil supply this goal 
will continue to be just a dream. Also the Iranian goal to build an Islamic model by 
increasing the standard of living, helping the poor and increasing the agricultural 
system presented a dilemma to the regime and still remains unfulfilled. 80 
Over the first decade IRI was confronted with several major economic difficulties, the 
details of which can be found in Appendix-8-D. However, since everything depended 
on the balance of internal forces the post revolution reforms were by no means 
smooth or organised. This weakness and the continuing internal debate meant that 
Iran was so occupied with its own problems that it could not possibly have been 
perceived to be a regional threat. 
The Second Decade of the Islamic Revolution; 1989-1997 
As the regime entered its second decade it did not face any serious threats, just the 
challenges of reconstructing the war damaged industrial and social infrastructures and 
keeping the promises made before the revolution, particularly those concerning 
greater economic and social justice. However, there was enormous disagreement 
within the country over Iran's domestic and foreign policy. The two major events of 
the second decade were the end of the 8-year war with Iraq and the death of Grand 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder and dominant personality within the IR, in 1989. 
Both events disturbed the balance of the existing social, political and economic order: 
Economic Problems 
The economic problems ranged from high inflation, unemployment, mass migration 
to the cities, growing corruption within the administration, underproduction, too 
inefficient utilisation of industrial capacity, and lack of basic foods (especially wheat 
and rice). Also the fall in oil prices and decrease in oil exports from the pre- 
revolutionary level resulted in low foreign exchange earnings. These problems were 
only made worse by the dramatic population increase. However it was believed that 
the greatest challenge was the ad hoc management of the wartime economy and the 
regime's inability to decide on a method for the development of economic and social 
policy and whether the policy should be centralised and state-run, or left to the 
decision of the private sector, or to both. However, the major issue was the level of 
integration of Iran into the international economy. Long-term survival of the regime 
hinged upon its success in rationalising the economy and improving living standards. 
After the death of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini a new team was quickly put in place led 
by Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei, which enacted several constitutional 
reforms aimed at strengthening the executive to the determinant of a multitude of 
competing centres of power. They also eventually formulated an economic agenda in 
the form of a five-year (1989-1993) development plan. These reforms marked a new 
phase in the revolution called the Second Republic, which according to Kaveh Ehsani 
abandoned the dream of an Islamic development model. 81 
0 
The discussion about rebuilding Iran and the roles of both the government and the 
private sector was really a continuation of the ideological struggle between 
282 
interventionists and the laissez-faire proponents from the IRI's early days. However 
the current debate had more to do with political decisions of the future concerning the 
economic role of the government. Another key factor in the debate, from as early as 
September 1988, was the inclusion of foreign involvement offered from both Eastern 
and Western Europe and also Asia. 
Moreover, this debate was closely bound to the discussion over national 
reconciliation, where some believed an offer should be made to the Iranian opponents 
of the regime not just other countries, in order to encourage them to contribute their 
talents to rebuilding Iran. The most important issue was the financing of 
reconstruction and whether it should be done by the government, the private sector or 
both. As the private sector did not have sufficient resources the government relied 
heavily upon oil revenues. But as other OPEC members were over producing this 
lowered oil prices, which meant that Iran's oil revenues averaged less than $10 billion 
for the year, which was where 90% of the state budget came from. 82 The solution was 
for Iran to align its foreign policy with its economic needs. This meant it had to gain 
influence over the limiting of output in OPEC, which would increase oil prices. To 
achieve this it was necessary to re-establish relations with the GCC and particularly 
Saudi Arabia. 
A long-term industrialisation strategy was needed to reduce this dependency as was 
the persistent need to court the private sector for its resources, to enable 
reconstruction and reduce the size of the public 'and services sectors, as well as to 
expand the productive sectors, especially industry. To achieve a real structural 
transformation it was necessary to embark on comprehensive political and legal 
reforms that would allow Iran to replace oil as the income generating basis of the 
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national economy. Hence, as well as importing technology and hardware, building a 
social consensus necessary to mobilise available resources was important. This would 
have required the establishment of greater pluralism, national reconciliation, and some 
form of participatory democracy. 83 However as Ehsani also observes, in the early 
1990s Iran had no luck applying a long-term strategy; the resulting economic crisis is 
confirmation of this view. The economic crisis was the result of applying a selective 
version of a `mixed' economy on the basis of the Five Year Plan and the policies 
recommended by the International Monetary Fund. This version rhetorically stresses 
the leading role of the private sector but did not include any real economic reform 
especially regarding tax system and privatisation process. 84 
Iran's torpid economic performance has continued up to the present. Even despite 
reemphasising the importance of privatisation by the Fourth Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan (2005-2010), it has only been since 2007, and by the Supreme 
Leader's request, that government officials have begun to speed up the 
implementation of the policies outlined in the amendment of Article 44, though there 
have been some efforts to apply privatisation more widely. 
Also, the `Second Republic' did not hesitate to seek international loans and direct 
foreign investments, however these international efforts in the early 1990s were 
counteracted by the negative image of Iran held abroad for assassinating its 
oppositions, countenancing the death sentence of Salman Rushdie and continued 
support given to certain movements e. g. Hizballah in Lebanon. 85 
Other economic features of the `Second Republic' were, a) the significant effect of 
favourable international circumstances on Iran's economic performances (e. g. access 
to capital and technology for growth and development during 1988-1991 as an 
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effective element in achieving many targets of the Plan, and, in contrast, Iran's failure 
to gain access to such facilities in the years 1991 to around 1997), b) the lack of social 
reforms and poor management after 1991 resulted in massive foreign debt, inflation 
and economic stagnation. After 1992 this resulted in urban riots, anti government 
demonstrations and vocal criticism of the development polices. Also, while the trade 
deficit and foreign debt shot up, oil revenues remained lower than forecast. This all 
exposed Iran's seriously neglected internal structural problems and the lack of 
knowledge of the global economic situation, as well as the extent of Iran's 
international isolation. 86 - 
The whole situation which had divided Iranian society was far from providing 
national reconciliation, but led to the acceleration of the delegitimisation of the 
regime, whose major slogan was eliminating the gap between poor and rich. All these 
misreading, which as Ehsani notes were the result of "a development strategy that 
emphasised growth over employment and export-oriented, government-owned 
industry over a privately-owned, grass roots national industrial base", neutralised 
Iran's industrialisation efforts. Besides the US pressure on its allies not to reschedule 
Iran's debt or issue new credit, foreign investors were deterred by both the unstable 
economy and insecurity of an unreformed political system. 87 
Therefore, since 1993 Iran experienced even more economic chaos due to poor 
political and economic leadership, the lack of government interest to apply real 
political and structural reforms and also the lack of a long-term development strategy. 
The alternative Islamic model of development was not realised but in its place was 
created a model that, although generating popular and local initiative, lacked the basic 
foundations of political and legal reforms. 88 
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Socio-Political Issues 
As was mentioned earlier, the debate over reconstruction was closely bound to the 
discussion over national reconciliation. Therefore, two major events in the `Second 
Republic' provided the regime an appropriate situation to overcome its strategic 
problems. A major socio-political result of the end of the war and the new political 
atmosphere after the death of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, according to many 
observers, was a new era of the civil society discourse. Such evolution in the new era 
not only resulted in increasing awareness among the various social forces but also 
contributed to the competition among the political elites and the formation of new 
political groupings. It also caused the diffusion of social and political powers into 
multiple centres with the opportunity of sharing power through various efforts, 
bargains and pacts. 89 
However, despite the advantages of the new political environment, the regime could 
not achieve its domestic or foreign policy goals. Domestically, this was due to the 
inability of the government to address sensible and controversial internal debates, 
especially regarding demands from secular Iranians, for more cultural freedom, which 
were in contrast with the demands of the lower classes, or received criticism from 
religious sides asking for greater political tolerance. 
Also for internal issues some solutions like the "China model, " were discussed and 
implemented during Rafsanjani's presidency, 1989-1997. This model aimed to 
liberalise the economy and improve people's livelihood, while maintaining sole 
control of political power. This was to be achieved by preoccupying the people with 
either the threat of foreign enemies or the promise of economic welfare. However this 
model failed, just as on similar occasions in 1925-1941 under Reza Shah and in 1941- 
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1979 under Muhammad Reza Shah, and is unlikely to work in Iran at anytime. 
According to Abbas Milani, the reasons for these failures were because on the one 
hand, China has a strong industrial basis for its export sector and an impressive ability 
of attracting foreign investment, in comparison Iran has failed to export much more 
than oil and has a poor record of attracting foreign investments. On the other hand 
economic needs are not the only principle of people's lives, especially. in an era in 
which democracy has become an essential part of every nation's basic rights and 
demands. Milani goes on to support his argument by the historical evidence that 
economic riches lead not only to greater political demands but also provide the new 
affluent classes with the political, social and economic means to see their demands are 
met. This includes Iran's vibrant civil society, which is far from dead. 90 
Hence, at the latter end of the second decade of the revolution, despite Iran's tactical 
stability, it was confronting serious strategic challenges, including: Rafsanjani's 
failure to develop a civil society based on social justice, to include a great middle 
class with political knowledge and to form a free market economy system. Such 
failure prevented Iran from establishing a democratic society with the ability to attract 
the essential investments needed to solve Iran's economic difficulties and endemic 
unemployment problems. It also resulted in the absence of the rule of law in the 
government's policy, which led to a system of regular corruption, economic 
incompetence, ideological impoverishment, interference in the private lives of 
citizens, socio-political intolerance, oppressive policy against dissidents, 91 millions of 
unemployed youth, and the growth of the women's movement. All especially the last 
two issues resulted in the 2nd Khordad event when the populace rejected existing 
policy and emphasised the necessity of real social, economic and specifically political 
reforms. This event ended with extraordinary support for Khatami's reforms in 1997. 
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It was only after 1997, that discussions of civil society expanded from a small hesitant 
circle of intellectuals and assumed its current importance at the level of national 
politics in Iran. 
Regarding Iran's foreign policy in the second decade of the revolution, there was a 
general wish to face domestic issues and economic problems by improving relations 
with the outside world and to change Iran's international relations. However the 
multiplicity of power centres, the lack of a single centre for designing foreign policy, 
and the great dependency of external relations on politics within Iran dominated by 
rivalries and the significant disagreements between left and right wings (latter 
reformist and conservatives forces) over domestic and foreign policies, all meant that 
vigorous debate among the factions prevented a clear foreign policy being formulated. 
As a result Iran was not able to establish constructive and cooperative relations with 
the West, especially regarding its negative international image. 92 
In sum, all internal and external challenges during the first two decades of IRI 
decreased the regime's legitimacy, added imperativeness and motivated the 
democratic movement. But what helped strengthen the tactical stability of IRI was the 
continuance of Western, especially the US, antagonistic policy, including long-term. 
embargoes. This helped the regime to justify its failure of not implementing the 
revolutions' promises because the IRI's strength was that it opposed the US and could 
still count on the support of some part of the population. With greater foreign threats 
strong Iranian nationalism was added to the equation, which strangled Iran's reforms 
and democratic movement. The embargo placed on Iran imposed heavy costs on the 
population. Meanwhile, according to Abbas Milani, domestic right-wing allies, 
particularly the bonyads and the IRGC, gained much benefit. They attained their 
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power, privilege and illicit gains through "import licenses" for embargoed goods. 
However, without embargoes, Iran, which was looking to solve its economic 
problems, could integrate into the global economy. This would result in more legal 
and economic transparencies and the emergence of a more vibrant middle class which 
would strengthen the private sector and civil society. 93 
Domestic Military; the Role of Military Forces on Iran's Society 
Socio-Politically 
Historically the Iranian military has always played a significant role in Iran's society, 
however it is impossible to separate their security role from their role in domestic 
politics. As well as using the military to secure the national sovereignty they have also 
been used to control the masses and strengthen the government. However IRI has 
tried to limit the amount of influence the military has on society and has purposefully 
excluded them from everyday politics, like previous regimes. 94 
This study will first describe the military's role in IRI's politics and then go on to 
explore the question of whether the armed forces would be a threat to the regime or a 
threat to the people. It also will consider their role in Iran's policy with respect to its 
difficulties in the PG. Particular consideration will be given to the increase of political 
strife and the surrounding ideological issues. 
After the revolution one of the most important steps to institutionalise the regime was 
the establishment of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), who gained a 
permanent position in the security of the regime. The IRGC offset the distrusted 
regular military at the beginning of the revolution and became a popular force during 
the diplomatic hostage crisis, which threatened a possible US invasion 95 Also a huge 
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number of volunteers (of the Basij) were trained by the IRGC and were established to 
fight Iraq as an auxiliary to the front-line operations. In addition, they were used to 
confront the revolution's domestic threats and uphold Islamic norms in society. 
96 
The division of Iran's armed forces affected the unity of command, resulting in rivalry 
and decreased the military's effectiveness. There were distinct differences in the 
methodology of the two branches regarding their preparation for war. The regular 
military focused on hardware, technology, and the human component while the IRGC 
concentrated on the human element, particularly ideological commitment and morale 
beliefs. However the regime could develop a more balanced understanding of these 
various elements of the military. 97 
The second decade of the revolution saw some success in the structural reform of the 
security system. This included the integration between the visions and values of the 
regular army and those of the IRGC, allowing there to be more of a balance of power 
between the two forces. For example, establishing the Ministry of Defence and Armed 
Forces Logistics (MODAFL), under which both the IRGC and the regular army were 
to operate, 98 or choosing commanders from each side for the other organisation 99 
In the first decade of the revolution, the military forces were all engaged with Iraq's 
invasion. Since the end of the war, the military forces have been making preparations 
for the eventuality of a foreign attack and procuring and developing new armaments 
following the war damages to their arsenals. In particular, they have also been re- 
engaged with civilian plans. 
The Artesh has done the latter both in strategic and practical term. Strategically, it has 
operated by emphasising its ability to defend Iran against its external enemies, and by 
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giving the impression that it is staying above the factional politics of the regime only 
for the good of the nation, and not because it is unable to engage in national politics. 
Practically, by assisting civilian projects with the manpower and expert technical 
knowledge required, by playing a central role in the reconstruction of those areas of 
the country that were damaged by the war and by generally opening up access to its 
assets. 100 
The IRGC, as well as having a massive involvement in civil society plans, perceives 
itself as the vanguard of the revolutionary regime and feels that it has a right to 
intervene in internal politics. However, it has its own interpretation regarding what 
socio-political reforms are necessary. It has also reacted to political issues according 
to the makeup of the political leadership and the scale of the violence. For instance 
despite massive popular support many among the IRGC and the Basij interpreted 
President Khatami's reforms "as challenges to the interests of those who have been 
loyal supporters of the Islamic Republic and defenders of the Fagih". 101 Such 
interpretations and even taking a stance by criticising the president's reforms are often 
encouraged by Conservative political forces who encourage radical groups like Ansar- 
e Hezballah and the Basij to get politically involved. 102 Both of these factors have 
raised serious concerns to Iranian society as well as the defence system: 
A) President Khatami's reform process became contentious within the defence 
establishment and its constituent parts in the Entezamat (the law and security 
enforcement agencies). ' Inaction towards it on the part of the political establishment 
could threaten the complex defence structure that had been so carefully created. In 
this regard for example, the IRGC had different responses to the 1994 Qazvin riots 
and the July 1999 Tehran student riots. In the Qazvin riots of 1994, some IRGC 
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officers refused to carry out orders that they thought were unnecessarily against the 
people, believing that the IRGC should not dogmatically always defend the existing 
political regime when it is attacked by domestic pressure or criticism. The IRGC's 
response to the 1999 student riots was different. Its commanders publicly criticised 
President Khatami and his reforms, believing that his reforms were the cause of the 
riots and were endangering the regime. 103 
B) From the social perspective, the IRGC's self-interpretations about the socio- 
political issues have been criticised by the Artesh, the intelligentsia and the reformists 
who have maintained that the defence establishment should not have a view on 
political matters. They also voiced concern over the military's determining the fate of 
the country, fearing that a gap between Iranian society and its political leaders is 
likely to get wider as the IRGC becomes more involved in socio-political matters and 
Iran's youth grow in numbers and in culturally diversity. This factor may contribute to 
the country's tendency to secularise. As a result the regime's reliance on coercion as a 
mean of control may well increase. Iran's intelligentsia, however, prefers to avoid 
direct confrontation and will take any conciliatory means possible towards 
opposition. '°4 Nevertheless, since the advent of Ahmadinejad's presidency and a 
concomitant increase in the IRGC's involvement in all the affairs of state, the problem 
has become all the more salient. 
There are no signs that the armed forces are lacking in loyalty towards the regime, 
despite some differences of opinion and disputes between them. Traditionally, the 
armed forces have always had close ideological affinities to the conservative elements 
of the regime, and have far from presented a threat to them. '°5 Historically, Artesh 
has always been dependent on a political master, and the political establishment has 
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deliberately deprived it of having one. It would thus only interfere in internal politics 
in a situation of social chaos or where the government was facing near-collapse, (as 
Daniel Byman [et al] mention). 106 The IRGC leadership is closely allied to the regime, 
and is unlikely to become politically active against it. Furthermore, both Artesh and 
the IRGC consider the stability of the regime to be the red line, though if the IRGC 
perceives a danger to the Islamic or revolutionary values it may feel compelled to 
intervene. Although there is no serious dispute between them, the IRGC's leaders 
have different points of view regarding Iran's socio-political issues. According to 
Byman [et al], "some believe that this can be done only through reform and openness, 
while others believe that such reforms pose a mortal threat to the character and nature 
of the Islamic Republic. " 107 
As Byman [et al] also remark, there are concerns about the IRGC's inaction or slow 
response to social crises, which may be due to the large numbers in the IRGC's rank 
and file who are less ideological, more sympathetic to calls for reform, and are likely 
to prefer political discourse to the use of force. In addition, there has been a large 
presence of IRGC (and other pillars of the revolution) members' children at anti- 
establishment demonstrations, for instance at the July 1999 student demonstrations in 
Tehran. This is of special concern because it is unclear how the IRGC would respond 
to the elite's splitting, particularly if those who currently support the Supreme Leader 
were divided. According to Byman [et al] what is most unclear, however, is how the 
IRGC would react to an extensive reform movement that was popularly supported by 
Iranians claiming to be upholding an Islamic system. It is hard to predict how the 
IRGC would react in the event of further riots like those in Qazvin in 1994 and 
Tehran in 1999. Whether or not it would support the official response would largely 
depend on the makeup of the political leadership and the scale of the violence. '08 
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According to Byman [et al], in an effort to respond to the concern regarding the 
IRGC's inaction or slow response to civil strife, the political leadership have formed 
special units (the Ashura, Zahra, Sayid-ul Shohoda battalions) specifically designed to 
handle problems of popular unrest. 
Although there is consensus in Iran, the possibility of military intervention in Iranian 
politics has not been ruled out by analysts if certain red lines are crossed. These red 
lines include threats to the rule of the Vali-e Faqih, open disrespect of Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his legacy, overly dramatic social reforms, and relations with 
the US and Israel. 109 In the context of a process of socio-political and economic 
reform, these red lines are beginning to fade, however. In addition, as Byman [et all 
argue, despite the intervention that would ensue were these red lines to be crossed, 
Iran's military apparatus is likely to be a force for the stability of the country. 110 
In addition, it is much harder to arrive at consensus on economic and social policies 
than on security policy, since there are more interests and revolutionary sensitive 
issues involved in the former. " However, arriving at consensus on Iran's security 
policy is getting harder. This is due to the military and security organisations' 
(especially the IRGC, Basij and Police) greatly increased involvement in various 
political and economic projects in the country as well as the impact of their emphasis 
on cultural and religious issues. 
However, provided that Iranian politics remain stable and avoid widespread strife, 
"the IRGC leadership would prefer to devote its attention to improving its military 
standards and competing more effectively with the Artesh. "112 Yet, the recent 
experience of "unified governance" after 2005 under the control of the conservatives 
has shown that the IRGC is not content with developing its military capabilities in 
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times of their perceived political stability, but will also seek to secure for itself a 
wider and more influential role in Iranian society. 
The IRGC already has a very influential economic network as a result of the 
privatisation of the economy in the 1990s. Its strong military-economic role was given 
a political dimension by the majority of its members and the conservatives, secured at 
the seventh parliamentary election, and by Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2005 
presidential election. 
According to Byman [et al], the probability of military intervention on the part of the 
major military forces (i. e. the IRGC and Artesh) is likely to increase if Iran's elite 
become increasingly divisive and political factionalism turns into widespread 
violence. If this view is correct, then such a scenario would in turn culminate in the 
armed forces' (especially IRGS, Basij and police) increased interference in Iranian 
society. But such a reaction (including more interference in a direct way, less 
tolerance, and the closure of the political space) would pave the way for more 
opposition, an increased tendency towards secularisation and even more direct public 
confrontation with the regime as well as with the military forces. However, the IRGC 
should recognise that aggressively opposing any reform to conservative policies 
would result in further aggravating its existing internal ruptures, galvanise its external 
opposition and lead to further marginalisation of its position. 113 
Economically 
One of the major regional and domestic impacts of the Iran-Iraq war was the growth 
and empowerment of Iran's military forces' manpower. What was to be done with it 
during peace time proved to be a major dilemma. Iraq used its surplus troops to wage 
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another war against Kuwait. However, Iran used the privatisation of its economy in 
the 1990s as a way to occupy a great number its soldiers during peacetime, in order to 
prevent them from becoming embroiled in any anti-government activities such as 
coups. 114 
The soldiers were given several opportunities, including buying shares or working at 
local (as well as international) industrial, commercial and housing companies. "5 This 
was achieved on a large scale, for example, by 2007 Khatam-ol-Anbia Headquarters 
(known in English as Ghorb Khatam) had already completed over 1,200 projects and 
had been contracted to work on 250 others. ' 16 This process gave the IRGC a strong 
economic network, which, especially since Ahmadinejad's presidency, it continues to 
enjoy. The conservative forces have thus been able to take advantage of IRGC's 
economic influence in the struggle for absolute power. However, according to a 
former general manager of one of Iran's largest steel factories, this solution has 
created another problem: namely, involving troops in economic affairs risks 
abandoning in them the idea that the state is worth sacrificing oneself for. ' 17 Whilst 
this has indeed been a problem, it is also true that military men tend to prefer military 
solutions and to that extent a sense of selflessness has remained. 
Although the new situation benefited the IRGC's high ranks, many of its lower ranks, 
especially in the Basij, were left marginalised in the post-war reconstruction period. 
Ahmadinejad addressed this issue, which together with his militant view of politics, 
re-enfranchised those feeling marginalised and ensured the IRGC's support during the 
presidential election. Today, this translates into the IRGC and the Presidency's 
continued relationship of mutual reinforcement and support. 118 
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This relationship has meant that the IRGC has gained control of huge assets in the 
country and heightened its economic role, which began during Rafsanjani's 
administration. It has profited more than anyone by Ahmadinejad's election in 2005. 
For example, the government has awarded the IRGC (and its associate companies) in 
excess of $3.4 billion to pursue engineering projects in the oil and gas industry, and in 
one case alone was given $1.3 billion to pursue a civilian services project. ' 19 
The IRGC has been criticised by reformists for its lack of accountability and for its 
monopoly on contracts that no outside party can bid for and for which the IRGC does 
not necessarily have any expertise. 120 Although this enormous economic role can 
partly be accounted for by the official distrust of foreign and private sector 
companies, these factors have, in recent years, fed speculation that the government's 
vast generosity in handing out contracts to the IRGC is fuelled by its increasing 
dependence on the IRGC and the need to pay back its dues incurred by the IRGC's 
support during Ahmadinejad's election. 121 The international embargoes imposed upon 
Iran have also helped ensure the IRGC's economic domination, including in the 
energy sector. They have put obstacles in the way of international financing which 
have given state-run companies the upper hand in their battle with private 
companies. 122 According to Abbas Milani, they have also made it possible for IRGC's 
domestic allies, such as the right wing and the bonyads, to profit from the illegal trade 
of goods that because of the embargo have become hard-to-find commodities. Ending 
the embargo, as he suggests, would thus have a number of positive effects: it would 
reduce the power of radical right wing groups, it would challenge the IRGC's 
economic monopoly by encouraging international companies to do business in Iran, 
and taking away IRGC's concessions. As Milani concludes, this would thereby assist 
the development of an emerging middle class closely allied to the presently restrained 
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democratic movement. If the international community would like to give Iran's 
process of democratisation a chance, it should end its sanctions upon it. 123 
Military Development 
Policies: Having been engaged in a revolution, ä war, and having faced embargoes, 
Iran's military has been somewhat depleted. Its main focus since 1988 has not 
therefore been on expansion due to an increased willingness to use force but, rather, 
on the rebuilding and replacement of its forces in an effort to remedy its deficiencies, 
particularly with regard to technological advancement. Its arms programmes are 
designed to deter attacks from those parties whom it consider it is under potential 
military threat, such as the US, Israel and, until 2003, Iraq. 124 
The official line following the revolution was that Iran no longer serves American 
interests in the PG and would discontinue all military agreements with the US. 
However, despite this and its handling of the war with Iraq, it has continually 
displayed a pragmatic side to itself with regard to its defence strategy, visible in both 
military procurements and domestic defence production. Soon after the end of the 
war, the government made it clear that the country's rearmament strategy was one of 
its main priorities, and increased the governmental budget for military expenditure. 125 
As was explained earlier, Iran, since the Second Republic, has been attempting to 
replace, rationalise, and modernise its military structures as well as to accelerate the 
development of its defence industries, partly engendered by a review of its 
rearmament strategy. A pragmatist led move towards `moderation' in foreign policy 
properly began in the mid-1980s when President Rafsanjani himself made diplomatic 
visits to China and North Korea. The President's support enabled the pragmatists to 
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begin to take fuller control of the country's military affairs, and between 1988 and 
1992 they had managed to assure that about a quarter to one-third of overall 
government expenditure was due to defence and defence-related matters. 126 These 
factors raise the general consideration of how and when Iran intends to use its 
growing military strength: is it becoming the source of regional concern, or does its 
military strategy merely reflect local realities and the regional arms race? 
Rearmament: Under the Shah, most of Iran's weapons were imported from the West 
and Iran's military industry was limited to the assembly of such foreign weapons. 127 
After the Islamic revolution, Iran faced growing isolation and a weapons embargo 
imposed upon it by the West. This meant that Iran was subsequently dependent on a 
domestic arms industry lacking in technological expertise and thus had to also rely on 
military imports from various Eastern countries as well as its existing western 
weaponry. 128 
Iran has the lowest military budget in the PG and due to continuing sanctions and 
economic problems cannot compete in the region's arm race. Moreover, not only are 
its military imports overly disparate and of questionable quality, they are also not 
guaranteed the long-term after-sales service required for aircraft sales, since importers 
such as Russia, China and North Korea are susceptible to US pressure. Furthermore, it 
has had to abandon the idea that domestic arms production will provide a significant 
solution to these problems and has decreased its expenditure since the end of the Iran- 
Iraq war to less than one half of what it was spending. Although, according to certain 
sources, it continued to spend $4 billion a year on its military, ' 29 in 1989, according to 
Michael Eisenstadt, the majlis allocated $10 billion over a five year-period for arms 
imports in support of its conventional arms build-up, for instance. It has sought to 
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increase its role in the market of technology (for which domestic arms production can 
serve as a medium) and powerful arms transfer, also is using missiles and fast attack 
boats in order to become less dependent on problematic aircraft imports. 130 
Although Iran's rearmament since the end of the war in 1988 has been 
comprehensive, it has been limited due to the Western embargo and Iran's resultant 
inability to acquire exactly what they might have done had they not been in place. As 
Terrence Taylor of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) puts it, 
"There is certainly an attempt to increase the capabilities of the Iranian military, 
although the full extent of it is not clear. " 131 
The Iranian military is one of the largest in the region. It totals about 545,000 
personnel, 420,000 of whom serve for the regular armed forces and 125,000 for the 
IRGC. It also includes a paramilitary volunteer force called the Basij which is made 
up of 90,000 full time uniformed members, up to 300,000 reservists, and a further 11 
million men and women who could be mobilised. Despite its size, the Iranian military 
also spends less as a percentage of gross national product than any other PG nation, 
except the UAE. Nevertheless, it has been described as the most powerful force in the 
ME by the US commander in the region, for example. '32 
Aside from the different problems regarding Iran's military which were outlined 
above, there is a general concern regarding Iran's attempt to develop its 
unconventional weapons. Despite the fact that Iran has publicly and internationally 
condemned the use of chemical weapons, from whose use it greatly suffered during 
the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and in 1997 ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
many worry about its intentions regarding unconventional weapons. As Chubin 
remarks, 
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Iran's policies are a product of various factors including its recent experience, its 
world view, its capabilities, the global and regional opportunities and its other values. 
Its intensions are thus variable although its inclination is fairly steady. 
He then concludes that Iran's strategic inclinations towards developing 
unconventional weapons are predictable. 133 Like Chubin, most Western analysts 
assume Iran's strategic weapons programme to be its top priority. However, some 
such as Eisenstadt believe that in trying to develop its strategic weapons programme, 
Iran is displaying its wish to become the dominant power in the PG, as well as 
expressing how vulnerable it is feeling. 134 Others, Barry Rubin for instance, believe 
that Iran is pursuing the development of missiles and perhaps nuclear weapons as a 
cheaper substitute to fully addressing the needs of its run-down conventional 
military. '35 
Together with these assumptions, the lack of transparency in Iran's military statistics 
has further compounded suspicions, despite Tehran's denial of developing 
unconventional weapons. Iran' military capabilities are kept largely secret. Only in 
recent years have official announcements highlighted the development of weapons 
such as a large arsenal of missiles as well as its own tanks, armoured personnel 
carriers, submarines and a fighter plane (it is known that the IRGC is responsible for 
the development of Iran's military industry and for making procurements such as 
those listed above). 136 However, despite allegations made by US officials, in its 
February 2006 report on Iran's nuclear programme the IAEA found no evidence to 
support the claim that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. 
As Jerrold Green remarks, some Middle Eastern strategic analysts, such as Ahmed 
Hashim, have highlighted the fact that regional actors Israel and Pakistan have nuclear 
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weapons, that some of Iran's northern neighbour states may be littered with stray 
former Soviet weapons, that the Arab states in the PG are protected by the US, and 
that the US as a consequence is militarily active all along the PG's coastline. 
According to such analysts, not only do these factors make Iran's nuclear ambitions 
likely, they also make them understandable. However, although Iran may well have 
the intention to develop WMDs, it has limited possibilities available to achieve this, 
rendering "reports of secret nuclear sites being built unsubstantiated. " A major 
difficulty facing Iran's putative unconventional weapons program has been acquiring 
the requisite technological expertise. While Russia and China have not altogether 
towed the US line, most countries, partly down to US pressure, have been unwilling 
to provide Iran with the assistance it needs in order to properly develop its nuclear and 
chemical weapons capabilities, as Green mentions. Iran is also likely to be mindful of 
Iraq's ill-destined putative nuclear program which caused an Israeli air attack on its 
Osirak nuclear reactor and, having been subjected to years of UN inspections, 
culminated in its eventual invasion by the US and its allies. This has meant that while 
most Middle Eastern strategic analysts agree that Iran could potentially become a 
nuclear power, they are uncertain as to how and when such a capability could 
surface. ' 37 This is specifically true following the release of a report of the US National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), in December 2007, which acknowledged that Iran has no 
weapons program. 
Defence Role iri the Persian Gulf 
In general, particularly because Iran's economy is centred on the PG's natural 
resources, the continual presence of foreign forces in the region has made Tehran feel 
very threatened. This has led it to the conclusion that it should adopt a policy of 
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strengthening its military capabilities dovetailed with a foreign policy that will deal 
with external threats (especially from the US) to change the regime, prevent another 
experience such as the unexpected 8-year war from occurring again, and will, as 
Brigadier General Rahim Safavi puts it, "better defend Islamic ideals and safeguard 
territorial integrity". 138 
I 
As Chubin remarks, Iran's military weakness, which was in part due to US' sanctions, 
as well as poor relations between the US and Iran, paved the way for an Iraqi 
invasion. Iraq perceived these as ideal conditions for it to attempt to change the 
balance of power in the PG and dominate the region. Iran's military weakness thus 
proved to be a destabilising force in the PG threatening instability for all interested 
parties. It is no surprise then that Iran felt the need to strengthen its military power 
after the revolution. 139 
The US strategy also appears premised on a faulty analysis of Iranian politics. The US 
argument has been that putting pressure on the regime will expedite a change in 
Iranian policy as well as restoring the respect in the US necessary for a more balanced 
dialogue to take place. 140 US strategy has thus been to increase its military presence in 
the PG, place embargoes on Iran and hint at intensions towards regime change all in 
an effort to prove to Iran that it means business. However, such a strategy is more 
likely to retard than accelerate an Iranian policy change; all it has achieved is to make 
Iran feel under threat and that it must engage in escalating its own military agenda as 
well as adopting a more radical and sceptical policy towards the US. The same goes 
for the policy of exaggerating Iran's military threat to its neighbours in the PG, which 
has had the added disadvantage of increasing the destabilisation of the region by 
encouraging an arms race in the GCC. GCC countries have felt compelled to purchase 
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expensive, and sometimes unnecessary, weapons'4' and the recent emphasis on Iran's 
nuclear ambitions (albeit denied by Tehran) have led many states to consider 
undertaking their own nuclear projects (though they have announced plans for 
achieving nuclear energy, they have not announced any intention to develop nuclear 
weapons). Such a potential arms race in the ME is highly unlikely to lead to regional 
security and only benefits Western arms companies. 
As has been discussed, although Iran's military growth has been fairly extensive, it is 
built upon foreign and sometimes incompatible weapons system imports and still has 
a long way to go. It is also questionable whether Iran's unhealthy economy is capable 
of enabling it to compete with its wealthy neighbours in the region. For instance, in 
1996 Saudi Arabia's defence budget was $ 13.9 billion; Israel's was $7 billion, while 
Iran's was only $3.4 billion. This has led many analysts to believe that Iran's displays 
of military strength are merely cases of diplomatic posturing born out of a sense of its 
own weakness in the face of overwhelming US military strength. '42 
A confrontational US policy also has some internal impacts. Under heavy pressure 
from the US, Iranian nationalist and radical anti-foreigners sentiments as well as 
government support are likely to increase. As a result, the government would come 
under decreasing criticism and would be able present domestic failures as the effect of 
such external threats, thereby assuring that the domestic process of democracy 
continues to be in trammels. In the words of a prominent reformist: 
Those who threaten and pressure from the outside forget that we still think in 
traditional ways about national sovereignty. If we have to choose between individual 
freedom and national sovereignty, we will choose the latter. We hope we don't have 
to choose. '43 
304 
Iran's perception, as articulated by Ayatollah Khamenei that the US will not be 
satisfied until it goes back to the same patron-client relationship it enjoyed during the 
Shah's regime, is shaping some of its foreign policy. 144 In particular, it has allowed 
the armed forces and intelligence services to influence many of its decisions, 
especially in regard to its security challenges. '45 
Much of Iran's use of the armed forces in pursuing its foreign policy goal in the PG is 
really just `diplomatic posturing' on the part of Tehran. As Rathmell observes, the 
intensification of Iran's military exercises and procurement (constituting part of the 
aim of becoming the dominant power in the region, as mentioned in the 20-year 
development plan) are attempts to assert Iran's right to the PG. Or, as Chubin argues, 
they are there for the dual purpose of reminding the Arab states that Iran is a major 
power, and reminding the Americans that an attack on Iran would be against their 
interests. 146 
Iran, by developing relations, with its neighbours in the PG, has sought to encourage 
them to enter into collective security arrangements that exclude outside powers. It has 
also assured them that "as long as the territorial integrity of Iran is not threatened, the 
military and defence power of Iran will not be a threat to any country, " (Mohsen 
Rezaei) while at the same time warning them of its slogan `security for all or for 
none'. 
147 
As Eisenstadt observes, Iran's military build-up is motivated by a number of factors: 
firstly, by its perception that it faces threats from regional and non-regional potential 
enemies. Secondly, by its religious and nationalistic desire to become a regional 
power. IRI believes that it ought to play a major role in world affairs and as the 





should be treated as a beacon for revolutionary Islam throughout the world. Finally, 
by its leadership's belief that Iran is geographically optimally situated to become the 
dominant power in the PG. After all, it has the largest coastline of any PG state and 
has vital interests in the region. 148 
Iran has pursued a dual policy of economic and political engagement with its non- 
Arab neighbours and a sceptical, instable attitude towards the GCC. This, together 
with an inability to estimate Iran's true military capabilities due to a lack of 
transparency, has fuelled concerns and uncertainties on the part of the GCC and the 
West. '49 Added to these concerns are Iran's desire to dominate the PG, in order to 
have a more powerful position regarding outstanding border and territorial disputes 
with its Arab PG neighbours, and its willingness to have considerable influence over 
oil production levels and prices, having the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, 
through which about 20% of the world's oil flows. '50 However, all of these analysts 
believe that the Iranian army does not seem to be in a position where it could 
successfully carry out any meaningful invasion. It could pose a limited threat to GCC 
targets with the use of its missiles and the laying of mines by submarines. 
Also in the event 'of a US attack, Iran has announced its reservation to attack US 
interests around the world as a means to defend itself. Ayatollah Khamenei, for 
instance, on different occasions in 2007 stated that a US invasion on Iran would cause 
it to target US interests all over the world. Iran has portrayed the current situation as a 
win-win case for itself, as Ayatollah Khamenei has stated: "if the US doesn't attack us 
we will become stronger. And if it does attack us, we will become more united and 
find a lot of friends throughout the world" and that the US "is the main loser because 
it boycotts Iran. "151 From the US perspective increases in Iran's military activity as 
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well as the potential use of terrorism as a means of hitting its targets around the world 
constitute a great threat. Meanwhile, Iran sees its current foreign policy as vital to the 
prevention of any threat to its sovereignty, even if it is political posturing. The result 
is an escalating security chain which threatens to worsen regional stability and assures 
neither regional nor global security. 
In sum, disturbance in the military balance of power in the PG has been followed by 
an unstable situation which has consequently proved to be a threat to all internal and 
external players. Such instability has also attracted foreign forces to the region in 
order to protect their interests. This has been the cause of complaints from some 
regional states as well as a rise in anti-Western sentiments among people in the whole 
region. It has isolated the weaker player, and compelled it to implement a more 
radical policy, which has in turn encouraged all sides to build-up their military 
capabilities, and has engendered a new arms race. Although such a situation has set 
the scene perfectly for arms suppliers, it has created a more unstable climate by 
causing regional players to have increasingly antagonistic and sceptical attitudes 
towards one another. Under such circumstances, a violent reaction from the internal or 
external players is inevitable. These parties may use invasion or terrorist attacks as a 
way implementing their foreign policy objectives, both of which would affect the 
regional, as well as the international community. 
The prevailing view on US foreign policy is solely coloured by security and military 
concerns. Thus, only those who place more emphasis on their security and military 
capabilities can follow their foreign policy goals in such a situation. So the US could 
only enter into dialogue with those who have power in these two fields, as Akbar 
Ganji argues. 152 
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Facing such an attitude, the empowerment of military forces, especially the IRGC, in 
the decision-making system of Iran looks like an inevitable solution to its survival. 
Even though Iran has not announced an intention to seek nuclear weapons, the current 
situation, together with the US continued threats of regime change, makes it 
reasonable for it to do so in an effort to defend itself in a region where some of its 
neighbours have, or may subsequently develop, nuclear capabilities and the support of 
the US. 
The IRI is also partly responsible for the current tense political situation. It has failed 
to establish a stable relationship with its neighbours as well as with the West 
(especially the US), and acknowledge Western interests in this geopolitical region. It 
has also failed to reconcile its differences with the West and assure it of its vital 
interests in the PG. This has meant that Iran's goal of establishing collective regional 
security arrangements excluding foreign powers has not been achieved, and has 
therefore contributed to the wider presence of foreign forces. 
Nevertheless, the question is: what is the reason for the US strategy in this region 
especially its antagonistic policy towards Iran? Particularly considering the negative 
impact US embargoes have had towards the security and stability of the region as a 
sub-system of the ME, significant to the international community. This is a question 
that featured prominently in the old discussion between the EU and the US regarding 
Iran, with the EU taking the opinion that threatening, or indeed using, force against 
Iran would only make the situation deteriorate, since crises work like chains: one 
instance generates several more. 
Perhaps there are two lines of response to this question. The first is that the US 
decision makers are ignorant of regional sensitivities and issues. If this is true, which 
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is unlikely, the US should discontinue its insistence on pursuing the dream of global 
leadership. The second is that they are aware of the negative consequences an 
antagonistic policy would harbour, but that they are motivated by some hidden 
political or economic agenda. For instance, perhaps the secret US agenda is to turn 
Iran into the domestic ME enemy in an effort to solve the problem of Israel's regional 
recognition. This would not only deflect attention away from Israel, but in 
maintaining a regional enemy, would create a scenario suitable for the continuation of 
a `divide and rule' strategy to implement US foreign policy objectives, including its 
desired effects on oil prices and increasing arms sales. 
If something like this is the case, which looks more likely than the first response, then 
all the US allegations concerning ME states' military ambitions drastically begin to 
loose credibility, particularly since its antagonistic policy and also its foreign policy's 
prevailing view on security and military concerns has created a haven for 
undemocratic governments as well as strengthening the military forces' role in the 
whole socio-political life of ME nations. The US should thus stop pretending that it is 
trying to instigate democracy in the ME. 
Conclusion: Despite all the foreign threats and antagonistic policies against the IRI 
since the revolution, the major challenges of its survival have been internal issues. In 
particular, the IRI should be very worried about political and economic instability as 
well as the social pressures in people's lives. Tension in foreign relations (especially 
with its neighbours in the PG and also the West, particularly the US), as well as 
international isolation and sanctions which have resulted in Iran's failure to integrate 
in the global economy (e. g. not becoming a member of WTO) could constitute a 
threat to bring the regime down. If the uneven economic and political development in 
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Iranian society forced the Shah's regime to be overthrown, the threat to the new 
regime cannot be ignored or underestimated. 
Therefore, the regime's survival depends upon opening up the political system to 
more democratic participation and economic reforms in order to address its most 
strategic weakness. As Abbas Milani remarks, the IRI is relatively stable despite 
serious problems such as: having millions of unemployed youths; peoples' exclusive 
dependence on patronage and subsidies of the regime whose transparency and ability 
in economic policies have been criticised and are under question even by statesmen; 
its failure to curb growing poverty, despite the wide wealth sources in Iran; the 
existence of women's and democratic movements that are a response to unanswered 
demands. Despite existing tensions and disagreements between political groups, such 
as the regime's divine legitimacy in contrast to popular sovereignty, a popular 
uprising, or less violent government change, seems very unlikely at the moment, as 
Abbas Milani like other observers believe. 153 
However, the regime's failure to establish a government based on the rule of law, or 
to deliver on the revolution's reform promises, as well as temporary and unsuccessful 
policies like the "China model" will not help it displace the political demands made 
upon it. As Abbas Milani also observes, the new regime's supposed stability is 
comparable to that which the Shah enjoyed in the mid-1970s when none of the major 
Western powers (nor the Shah and his powerful secret service, SAVAK) had any 
suspicion at all that there was a revolution to follow. Therefore, because of the 
revolution in particular, democracy is a necessity not a luxury matter for Iran more 
than for any other state in the ME. Democracy, and its promise to attract the 
investments it needs to put an end to high numbers of unemployment, is the only 
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solution to its huge economic problems. External pressures and antagonistic policies, 
such as the threat of invasion and the imposition of sanctions, risk further postponing 
the advent of such democracy and the integration of Iran in the global economy. 
154 
Furthermore, the IRI's authorities should not, as Mohsen Milani also mentions, 
assume they have more time than the previous Iranian leaders actually had to 
lss implement their promises. 
Domestic issues are the pivotal problems facing Iranian society. Hence, as long as 
satisfying its people, the provision of wealth (as a major element to the success of a 
society'56, as well as a significant element of power and influence), and preparations 
towards democracy (giving the government soft and hard power as well as political 
legitimacy) are not the top priority of the IRI, Iran cannot become a stable regional 
power. This is especially the case if Iran fails to reduce tension in its relations with its 
neighbours in the PG and the West, particularly the US. Military strength together 
with the support of the masses alone (assuming that Iran's foreign policy is supported 
by the people of other countries) cannot help in this regard without the 
administrational lever of the governments with whom it is in tension with. 
Democracy is indispensable to Iranian society with its long history of independent 
thought. However, implementing democracy takes time and requires patience and 
sustained effort. It faces- three major challenges in Iran: firstly, in overcoming 
people's impatience, especially on the part of the youth, secondly, in overcoming the 
anti-Western sentiments the conservative and more religious factions of society wish 
to instil, and finally, in the reconciliation it must attain with Sharia law. Facing up to 
the last two challenges means facing up to the perennial social tension between the 
C 
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demands of the traditionalists and modernists, an issue that the reformist government 
of President Khatami also had to address. 
The US use of military force to attain its foreign policy objectives in the ME has 
helped to ensure the empowerment of deep-rooted security and intelligence 
organisations in the whole socio-political life of Iran, as well as other countries in the 
region. This has in turn slowed down and encumbered Iran's domestic process of 
democratisation whose potential impact should not be underestimated as has been 
evidenced since the presidency of Khatami. 
Thus, like any other country, a shift in Iran's political climate, in particular can only 
be achieved if it is initiated within the framework of domestic debate. Attempts to 
impose it from outside will only stifle the process of change; however the 
international community could support democratisation by encouraging an 
atmosphere that is germane to such a process (for instance, by ending the current 
embargoes and thereby help Iran solve its economic problems and actively participate 
in the global system). This means that the internal challenges facing Iran could 
translate into security concerns. These issues, together with the IRI's relative political 
immaturity show, by considering two completely different results from the elections 
of Khatami in 1997 and Ahmadinejad in 2005, that Iranian society needs time to 
educate itself about its rights, needs, and the methods (such as establishing powerful 
parties) it can use to achieve its goals. '57 
As Bernard Hourcade. mentions, "Today we are facing a new political landscape with 
the emergence of a new generation of leaders and political actors [who have] (... ) a 
new political history, originating from the Islamic Revolution and not from the 
imperial regime. " 158 This new generation of leaders should be given a chance to 
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develop the kinds of reform that are needed, especially since they will only work if 
they are sensitive to local cultural and religious norms, such as being consistent with 
Sharia law. 
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Chapter 10 
Iran: External Security Threats and Challenges 
Introduction 
Iran has legitimate security concerns and a history that helps explain much of its 
current ambitions, rhetoric, and hostility toward the West. 
A. Cordesman (1999)' 
Like those of other small states Iran's security and ability to manoeuvre largely 
depends on an international environment which it can little affect. 
S. Chubin (1974)2 
Iran's domestic history during most of the latter part of the nineteenth century 
consisted of efforts to defend itself against British and Russian attempts to dominate 
the country as part of the `Great Game'. Russia, Britain and later the US helped end 
Iran's democratic revolutions with a series of occupations, by supporting 
undemocratic, totalitarian regimes, intervening when such regimes were under 
internal threat and by overthrowing the nationalist and democratic governments in 
Iran. Based on their geopolitical world-picture, not only did they have a political 
vested interest in doing so,, they also gained economically from it. Although all of 
these factors contributed towards a growing antipathy towards the West, Iran 
continued to serve Western interests under pro-Western regimes like the Shah's. 3 
However, after the Islamic revolution in 1979, when Tehran discontinued such a pro- 
Western policy, the West re-engaged its old policy of interference in Iran's internal 
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affairs and has since made numerous attempts to depose the existing regime through 
war, isolation, sanctions and threats of direct invasion. 
Regionally, one of Iran's most prominent threats has been the state of Iraq, 4 a hostile 
state immediately to the west of Iran with insufficient borders outlet to the PG. Iraq's 
border arrangements which were deliberately designed by a Britain keen to control the 
ME to limit Iraq's regional influence have not only been the cause of much instability, 
but have also triggered Iraqi claims on Iran's oil-rich Southwest and culminated in a 
major Iranian-Iraqi arms race and border wars. 
Another major threat resulted from the new political situation with various security 
problems in the southern littoral of the PG that the departure of the British created. 
Once the British left authority was to be passed to the Sheikdoms, however the British 
left the PG before the territorial and border disputes between the Sheikdoms and with 
other PG neighbours had a chance to be resolved. 5 This created a, broader issue of 
security in the PG that continues to the present day, for example it resulted in the 
longest and most damaging war in the ME, the Iraq-Iran war. 
Imperial Iran during 1960s-1970s 
The improvement of relations between superpowers, Iran's We facto nonalignment' 
policy as well as its attempts to attain a more balanced and stable relationship with the 
superpowers led to a more harmonious relationship with them in 1962. In order to 
hold the USSR's potential threat at arms length, it sought to give its northern 
neighbour a vested interest in a flourishing Iran with a number of peaceful 
negotiations, and largely succeeded. This enabled Iran to improve its security and 
leverage with the US and enabled it to anticipate events relevant to the US-USSR 
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detente to prevent any risks to Iran's interests. Iran also pursued a progressively less 
pro-American posture in the international arena to both internal and external positive 
effects. This meant that Iran could begin to gradually reduce its dependence on direct 
US military and financial aid. 
The PG, since the early 1960s had increasingly become on the top of Iran's economic 
and strategic agenda. This had mainly been due to the PG's growing role in the 
world's oil economy that, together with the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 
aggravating oil dependence on the PG, as well as the conflicting interests and 
aspirations of non-littoral states in the region, had turned it into a vital sea-lane. Its 
growing interest here forced Iran to deal with differing PG states perspectives and 
priorities. Unlike more distant ME countries whose foreign policy focused on Israel or 
on an `Arab Cold War', for Iran, like Turkey, the Cold War took priority over and 
shaped regional politics. It also had to deal with the effects of the British departure 
from the PG in 1971 without the resolution of a number of outstanding territorial 
disputes. The issues regarding the transfer of authority to the Sheikdoms and status of 
foreign military stations in the PG created a new political situation connected with the 
broader concern of regional security. 
Iran's Challenges after Britain's Departure from the PG 
The complex new situation which emerged in the wake of Britain's departure from 
the PG forced Iran to take a particular course in order to achieve its long and short 
term objectives. Its priorities were, as Zabih remarks: 
1) To solve its territorial disputes with regard to new Sheikhdoms regardless of their 
own territorial disputes or the impacts of regional conflicts, e. g. the Arab-Israeli war. 
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Hence, besides attempts to establish relations with them in a way that would be 
compatible with its overall regional policy, Iran chose Bahrain's case to display a 
willingness to deal with these issues in a peaceful way. Iran also expected its 
acquisition of the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, in 1971 to be 
accepted. Its diplomatic and military leverages as well as an appropriate regional and 
international environment, which can be found in Appendix-8-C, helped Iran in this 
acquisition. The policy of using diplomatic means backed up with economic leverage 
to solve disputes helped Iran in resolving its other disputes such as those regarding the 
Iran-Iraq border (1975 Algiers Accord), the Dhoffar communist rebellion, and the 
1969 Saudi Arabian - Iranian dispute regarding the demarcation the Median line. 
8 
2) To prevent an extra-regional power from filling the vacuum of power that Britain's 
departure would create. Therefore, Iran sought a bipartite objective: both to make sure 
that the power vacuum was filled by neither the USSR nor the US and to make sure 
that filling it would seem politically and militarily otiose. 9 
3) To place the security responsibility mainly in the hands of littoral states; however 
this policy faced a number of problems. Iran faced certain regional security issues, 
particularly as regards oil and the territorial and political status quo of neighbouring 
PG states. As Zabih points out, however, these issues had broader political 
implications due to the increasing significance of the PG's becoming a vital maritime 
route. The security issues thereby included the defence of those sea-lanes that extend 
into and beyond the Indian Ocean. In theory, a solution to these issues could have 
been to arrange mutual defence arrangements with regional allies, or, if that proves 
impossible, building up Iran's army and navy so that it could assume the role of sole 
guardian. In practice, the notion of collective PG defense measures proved 
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unattainable due to the continuous hostilities among many of the littoral states and the 
lack of agreement about what security is necessary, not to mention the lack of 
enthusiasm they evoked towards the proposal. From the point of view of many of the 
smaller PG states, accepting this proposal was equivalent to accepting the political 
dominance of Iran and its military hegemony over the region. Furthermore, due to the 
absence of a direct and immediate danger to PG security, such states were likely to 
view the proposed arrangement from the narrow point of view of their own national 
interests. Thus, sensing these problems, Iran followed the option of building up its 
army and navy and in doing so had to become aware of the constraints imposed by the 
international environment, as was evidenced by its tolerance of the American naval 
presence in Bahrain and its seeking Chinese support for its PG policies. '0 
4) The entanglement of Sheikhdoms in non-PG political issues was viewed by Iran as 
a threat, and it was necessary to ensure that their involvement would not become 
destabilising to the southern littoral states. " A major problem was presented by the 
impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The lack of progress in resolving this conflict and 
the continuation of a `no-war, no-peace' attitude towards it both increased the 
prospect of radicalisation in the ME as a whole, and gave PG countries in particular 
an influential role in negotiating an outcome to the conflict. 12 However, Nasser's 
defeat in the 1967 war had further relieved Iran of a regional rival and removed 
another limitation to Iran's relationship with Arab states. 13 Iran's regional relations 
also benefited from other advantageous circumstances. The many rivalries and the 
lack of a homogenous mind-set on the part of the Arab states and particularly the wide 
distrust of Iraq among the sheikhdoms turned out to be beneficial in that relations with 
Iran were valued by the smaller PG states, partly due to its role as balancer, though 
also partly due to the states leaders' ambivalence to whom to commit themselves to. 14 
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As Chubin also points out, Iran's policy was to engender as much as it possibly could 
an environment that was conducive to stability and moderation. Recognising the 
relationship between regional rivalries and outside powers' intervention, it did so 
firstly by balancing between India and Pakistan in the East and by trying to play-up 
the benefits of dealing with a moderate PG to the West. Secondly, it did so by 
isolating the PG region from external rivalries also separating issues of regional 
security from issues regarding central strategic balance and then attempting to make 
itself militarily autonomous. The latter was carried out in an effort to be able to deal 
unilaterally with a regional threat, though it would not have been able to do so under a 
fully fledged attack from the USSR and so was still partly dependent on the West. 
15 
The divergence between Iran and the US notion of regional security that was evident 
between 1965 and 1969 (in particular regarding Washington's policy of seeking good 
relations with radical governments in Iraq and Yemen) was brought to an end by the 
advent of Nixon's twin-pillar doctrine. This signaled a change in US policy towards 
one that placed more importance to a geopolitical perspective, keeping the USSR's 
regional allies in check and denying it from having an increasing influence in the 
Third World in general, a strategy which was to help Iran achieve its major foreign 
policy objectives. 16 To this end, Iran expanded its relations with Europe in the 1960s 
and 1970s and was thereby able to further reduce its political and economic 
dependence on the US. 17 
Consequently, during the period between the 1960s and the end of the 1970s, a 
suitable international environment made it possible for Iran to achieve its foreign 
policy goals. It solved its major territorial and boundary disputes with its PG 
neighbours and prevented any extra-regional power from filling the power vacuum 
that was left in the wake of Britain's departure. ' Furthermore, the PG states' reluctance 
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to establish a collective security arrangement, as well as Nixon's Twin-Pillar doctrine, 
meant that Iran steadily built up its military and naval capabilities and was thus able 
to stabilise itself as a regional power. Iran's naval and military build-up as well as its 
detente and realistic policy was to a level that made it possible to convince both 
regional and extra-regional players of Iran's new role as the sole guardian of PG 
security. This resulted in security and stability in the PG being assured without the 
presence of foreign forces. 
Islamic Republic of Iran during 1980s-1990s 
The foreign policy of Iran's post revolutionary regime was mostly a response to the 
interacting contemporary regional and international security environments. Therefore, 
in order to understand Iran's foreign policy at the time, the overall security 
environment to which it was a response must be examined. 
The establishment of the IRI resulting from the overthrow of Iran's Pahlavi monarchy 
in 1979 was a cause of concern to the Arab states whose rulers worried that their own 
political instability and people's raised awareness of political Islam would threaten 
their regimes. Thus, despite the masses' support in the Arab World their rulers 
attacked the Islamic revolution by casting it as a Shiite-Sunni dichotomy. The 
potential rise of political Islam also concerned the US and the USSR, already wary of 
Iran's new `Neither East nor West' foreign policy, and as a result their interests in the 
region converged. Both now felt that their aims and objectives in the region were 
compromised by an Islamic Iran and so both attempted to destabilise it, especially the 
US who had now lost its most powerful ally in the PG. The USSR was particularly 
concerned with the IRI's support of the Afghan Mujahedin both because it did not 
want Iran to have control over its new colony and because it feared the effects this 
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would have on its own internal stability due to its Muslim population. The Soviets 
were also unhappy that on the 22nd of January 1980, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Council revoked Articles V and VI of the 1921 treaty with the USSR. They refused to 
accept the revocation, and thought that this would give them a permanent pretext to 
intervene in Iran. However, both superpowers failed to take into account the new 
Iranian leadership's steadfastness in the face of outside aggression and all their 
attempts to destabilise the regime, including supporting Iraq in its war against Iran, 
resulted in failure. However, the strategy of bleeding Iran's economy had some 
serious repercussions on the IRI's economic development plans. '8 
The 1979 revolution had not only been a vote of no confidence in the existing 
monarchy, it had also been an expression of anti-US sentiments, particularly as 
regards the superpower's involvement in Iran. Right from its inception, the IRI 
declared that it would no longer honour any military agreement with the US, and that 
it would no longer serve American interests in the PG. Nevertheless, Iran still feared 
that the US would attempt to re-instate the Shah, as it had done in 1953, particularly 
since Washington had allowed him into the US. None of the other Western countries 
had done the latter in the knowledge that such an action would greatly anger the new 
regime, and that supporting the deposed Shah would no longer be useful to securing 
their national and vested interests in the PG. 
Thus when the Shah was granted entrance to the US in October 1979, a group of 
Iranian students took over the US Embassy in Tehran and held 66 Americans hostage, 
of which 13 women and African-Americans were soon released. The US response 
was to freeze Iranian assets held by US banks and to impose a trade embargo on the 
IRI. It was announced, to the approval of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, that the 
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remaining hostages would not be released until the US had given up the exiled Shah 
along with the vast sums of money he was said to have secretly kept in banks abroad. 
The ensuing crisis culminated, a few days after the event, in the resignation of Prime 
Minister Mehdi Bazargan along with his cabinet and in the lasting total breakdown of 
a relationship between the US and Iran. The US' rescue operation, `Eagle Claw' in the 
Tabas Desert in the East of Iran, had failed suffering from 8 casualties, 5 USAF 
Airmen and 3 US Marines. The crisis was settled with the return of the hostages to 
America nearly 15 months later through the help of Algeria's mediation. 
Although Iran's policy of not engaging with the USSR seemed positive to the US at 
first, the hostage crisis made Washington confident that Iran would not get along with 
the US either. Washington, who had hitherto thought it had a free hand to do what it 
liked in the ME, was also now very concerned that similar actions might be carried 
out by other non-Western countries. Iran's actions were thus successful in somewhat 
emasculating the US without suffering retaliation from it. 19 
The US saw the creation of the IRI as a threat to its vital interests in the PG. It was 
also concerned about the USSR invasion of Afghanistan which had disturbed US 
strategies, also some American policy makers perceived that the new threat in the ME 
derived from Communism. However, as Asaf Hussain points out, the invasion was . 
mostly thought to be a Soviet response to the rising threat from Iran. Nevertheless, all 
US policy makers agreed on the establishment of a Rapid Development Force (RDF) 
to be deployed in the region. Such a force was meant to address the effective absence 
of a regional security apparatus which had resulted from the creation of the IRI and 
the ensuing abandonment of Nixon's twin-pillar security system. It was thought that 
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the RDF would be able to combat any force that threatened to destabilise security in 
the PG 2° 
Iran's major counterrevolutionary threat, however, came from Iraq whose leader was 
intent on securing power in the Arab world. In 1980 Saddam had perceived Iran's 
situation as ripe for attack. As he saw it, Iran was unprepared to engage in major 
military operations, had become internationally isolated because of the hostage crisis, 
and, following the revolution, full of internal political tensions which an Iraqi 
invasion could turn into a counterrevolutionary uprising. Saddam thus thought that his 
invasion of Iran would be a short campaign that would end with Iraqi hegemony in 
the PG, and restore allegedly usurped lands (such as the Arvand Roud, the Three 
Islands, and the province of Khuzistan) back to Arab control. 
Iraq's invasion of Iran was fortuitous to a US who was worried about losing the 
balance of power in the PG. The US gave full support to Saudi Arabia and Iraq to 
ensure that the war would continue and thereby weaken the key regional players and 
increase Saudi and other Arab countries' dependence on Washington. America's other 
strategy in restoring its balance of power in the PG was to extend the RDF to the 
newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in collaboration with the Arab 
countries. The ostensive purpose of creating the GCC was to provide regional 
security, especially against potential attacks from the USSR, Israel, and Iran. 
However, it greatly depended on US support and played into the hands of a US PG 
policy aimed at creating an association of client-states for whom it would be the major 
supplier. In any case, the result of forming the GCC was an increase in the presence of 
US troops in the ME (for example, 31 US Navy Warships were dispersed around the 
PG) and the formation of stronger military ties against Iran. 21 
330 
While the collapse of the USSR in 1991 relieved Iran of the threat of communism and 
Soviet military power, the end of the Cold war presented Iran with another threat. 
After the Islamic revolution the West's security umbrella which was given to Iran for 
free despite Iran's lack. of tendency to play any role in the superpowers' rivalry was 
removed. During the USSR's invasion and war in Afghanistan, Iran's stance which 
was on the same side as the US (a reflection of strategic realities) was very important 
for the US in its rivalry with the USSR. However, the Iraq-Iran war showed that a 
new atmosphere was developing regarding the Cold War and that a convergence of 
interests between the two superpowers was beginning to form. Furthermore, the end 
of the Cold War meant that the superpowers' focus could now be turned towards 
regional conflicts in the PG. Both of these factors were contrary to the interests and 
security of Iran, since the superpowers now made an unofficial agreement to help Iraq 
to defeat the IRI. 22 
During the 1980s and 1990s the US policy was to prevent Iranian hegemony by 
shifting the balance of power towards pro-Western countries, by supporting Iraq in its 
attempt to overthrow the Iranian regime and encouraging other allies to do the same. 
Although the US arms sales to Iran during the war were apparently meant to help Iran 
secure the release of US hostages in Lebanon, they were also carried out in order for 
the war to be continued, congruously with the US `fun wars'23 strategy. The US also 
pressured all its PG allies to buy its weapons, and treated them as clients. However, 
this strategy allowed countries such as Iraq to build up large military arsenals which 
only compounded the existing security dilemma. In supporting countries like Iraq and 
in doing so also turning a blind eye to Saddam's use of chemical weapons against Iran 
(among other human-rights transgressions), the Iranian people's hostility and distrust 
towards the US was aggravated and fueled growing sentiments towards Iranian 
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nationalism. The strategy also engendered an increase in fear and distrust between 
regional states which have in turn intensified the regional arms race. The US was 
ready to bring down the Iranian regime at all costs, and was even ready to intervene 
militarily itself , 
were Iraq to fail. 24 Its strategy of encouraging Iraq to target Iran's oil 
tankers and terminals (which will be explained in more details in chapter eleven), 
further paved the way for the US and its allies to have a direct presence in the PG. 
The Challenges of Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy 
Iran's foreign policy in the 1980s was in large part a response to a number of inter- 
related problems it faced during this period. The sanctions imposed on it together with 
the repercussions of a long war with Iraq caused it considerable economic debilitation 
as well as increasing regional and international isolation. Furthermore, the 
continuation of a strong US military presence in the area, not to mention American 
support of Saddam during the war, which had prolonged the war, fuelled Iranian 
feelings of insecurity and anger. 25 Several other episodes made Iran suspicious of the 
US, for instance the July 3rd 1988 USS Vincennes' shooting down of an Iranian 
civilian plane, claiming that it was mistaken it for an attacking jet and killing all of its 
290 passengers. All of these factors, as well as Tehran's recognition that foreign 
capital and expertise were required for a successful reconstruction program (despite 
success in securing political and economic needs by improving its relations with 
developing and under-developed countries), led to its realisation that it needed to 
pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy towards the West. The 1980s ended with 
Iran's acknowledgement that if it is under siege, it is because, as Chubin observes, 
"pursuing independent policies" 26 comes with a dilemma significantly related to the 
survival of the Islamic Republic. 
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In the 1990s, the US continued to threaten Iran in various ways. The friction between 
Iran and some of it neighbours, such as the GCC and Turkey, was largely due to US 
hostility towards Iran. The US, no longer willing to support Saddam, began a policy 
of `dual containment' aimed at preventing both Iraq and Iran from having an 
influential role in the region and continuing its strategic interest in maintaining access 
to oil. It allocated millions of dollars to secret service initiatives to destabilise the 
Iranian regime and intensified its economic sanctions against it putting pressure on 
China and Russia to follow suit. The end of the Cold War and the ensuing dissipation 
of a bi-polar global atmosphere, together with the growing eminence of the US as the 
world's most influential superpower were problematic to the IRI. This was 
particularly due to the fact that Iran had now lost the ability to capitalise on the 
superpowers' strategic rivalries. It was further due the fact that the US was carrying 
out massive arms sales with Iran's Arab neighbours as well as cultivating secular 
Turkey. These factors made a military operation against Iran possible. These factors, 
together with an increase of US direct military involvement in the PG ensured that 
Iran's leaders continued to be suspicious of American intentions throughout the 1990s 
and pushed it towards pursuing more independent solutions to their military and 
technological concerns. Similarly, the US was wary that Iran was harboring rouge 
regional ambitions, was developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting 
international terrorism. However, as well as forging strategic alliances with Russia 
and China, Iran was able to capitalise on the friction that existed between it and the 
US by expanding its relationships with Canada, Japan and European Union 
countries. 27 
Iran had several national security concerns in the 1990s. The new geopolitical 
situation of the region, consisting of an unstable northern frontier zone to the north of 
333 
Iran behind which lay a weak, though still assertive, Russia, and a weakened Iraq on 
the west, could cause problems, like the encouragement of secessionist movements 
and could give the West a pretext to intervene in the region. The new geopolitical 
atmosphere had increased Iran's isolation since it could not count on the support of 
nonalignment and third world countries who were mostly concerned with their 
national interests. In particular, the impact of Iraq's return to regional politics was 
worrisome due to the uncertainties about its political regime and its effect on regional 
oil prices, as was the increasingly open reliance the Arab states now had on the US. 
Furthermore, the impact of the pervious decade's crises had heightened 
sectarian/national tensions. 28 Although during the 80s and 90s sectarian, cultural and 
national rifts were merely a concern, the continuation of US aggressive and 
interventionist policy in the ME, for instance the invasion of Iraq in 2003, has 
worsened the problematic sectarian issue and has greatly contributed to the creation of 
a crisis for the whole region. 
Tehran was also concerned about the US policy to contain Iran from engaging with 
states on both its southern and northern borders. Its main security concerns were thus 
local; it primarily sought to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing 
states, for instance to protect the unstable borders that were in an arc from Iraq in the 
west to the Kurdish areas of Turkey, to Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan in the 
east. Its foreign policy priorities were to eliminate the US's presence in the PG and to 
develop its relations with other countries such as the PG states and Turkey in order to 
have a more harmonised oil policy and to prevent further US interventions into the 
region. Another Iranian foreign policy priority was to develop its ties with China, 
India and Pakistan as potential strategic partners and in particular with Russia to 
stabilise the northern border. 29 
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However, the effects of the end of the Cold War in the 1990s provided Iran with some 
opportunities to overcome and frustrate the major threats from the US. Iran was now 
feeling more secure, American and Russian nuclear arsenals had been significantly 
reduced and the fall of the USSR had removed nearly two centuries of direct and 
indirect threats to Iran's national security. The IRI was now able to broker a new 
strategic alliance with Russia and to sign different economic agreements with the 
newly formed Central Asian and Caucasian countries. Although the end of the bi- 
polar structure had threatened to turn into US unipolarity, a multi-polar structure in 
the international system was beginning to emerge, particularly in the form of three 
major global economic spheres: the NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement), the EU, and the AP (Asian Pacific region). This meant that Iran was in a 
position where it could exploit competition between these economic areas in an effort 
to secure its political and economic independence. 30 
Thus Iran continued to pursue its nonalignment foreign policy. Some scholars, such as 
Chubin, regard this as merely a continuation of Cold War policy and as a reflection of 
the IRI's inability to adapt to the emerging new world order. A nonalignment foreign 
policy does not make sense, according to them, in a world with only one superpower, 
and by continuing its hostility towards the US the IRI was unable to forge stable 
relations with its GCC neighbours and made Israel begin to regard Iran as a strategic 
threat, 1 However, other scholars, such as Sadri, think that such a strategy well served 
Iran's interests. Although the US was the world's only superpower, this did not 
prevent Tehran from being able to take advantage of the economic and political 
rivalry among the emerging global economic spheres. The IRI was thereby able to 
withstand US efforts to isolate it (via the imposition of embargoes among other 
means): it diversified its trade partners, sources of technology and investment and 
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increased its political maneuverability, acquiring supporters at the UN along the way. 
Iran's new geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era made Iran become more 
important than it had been in decades in the eyes of the EU who has geo-economic 
interests in the Central Asia and has refused to capitulate to US pressure to cut its ties 
with Iran. 32 Furthermore, as Green points out, in order to counterbalance the cold and 
unstable ties with the GCC, the IRI improved its relations with its non-Arab 
neighbours, such as Turkey, Pakistan and the Central Asian states north of the 
Caspian Sea. 33 It should also be noticed, as does Chubin, that despite its revisionist 
foreign policy (it sought to amend the existing world order) and its clear antipathy 
towards the US, the IRI always undertook its attempts to achieve its foreign policy 
aims through indirect means and was careful not to provoke confrontation, since 
attempting to shift the hierarchy of nations would be likely to be in opposition to the 
US and its regional client's interests. 34 
Conclusion 
Iran's foreign policy, and its ability to achieve its objectives as well as its political 
orientations, has mainly depended on its security environment which is influenced by 
the international system. In a cooperative international environment and with the use 
of a detente policy, the Imperial Iran was able to build CBM with the PG states and 
assured the extra-regional powers that their interests in the PG were being maintained. 
This meant that the presence of foreign forces in the region was prevented. However, 
the emergence of the IRI was not welcomed by the superpowers who found that the 
IRI was disturbing their influence and the balance of power in the ME. The new 
republic, with its commitment to political Islam and revolutionary rhetoric, was 
perceived to be a threat to the Arab PG states (the CBM with whom were thereby in 
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decline) and was unable to assure the maintenance of the extra-regional powers' 
interests in the region. These factors as well as policies that ranged from a 
revolutionary stance to pragmatism evidenced in the three decades of the IRI's 
existence provided a good pretext for extra-regional direct interference in PG states' 
affairs and regional military presence. 
As Mohsen Milani observes, this was especially the case for the US, for whom the 
demise of the USSR had threatened the conceptualisation of the world as consisting of 
the two rival camps of good and evil. The demise of the USSR had also created a 
geopolitical crisis for the US and some of its allies in the ME, since some of the latter 
had lost their strategic value that could only be regained if they became influential in 
dealing with a new threat. 5 Thus, during the bipolar system, the threat posed by Iran 
was greatly exaggerated in order to replace that posed in the eyes of Arabs by Israel. 
After the end of the Cold War the Iranian and Islamic ideological threat was played- 
up to replace that posed by Soviet Communism, much to the benefit of US-PG states' 
arms sales which were now given a reason to continue. 36 
There is a sense in which both Iran and the US were in a dilemma; both sides needed 
each other but realised that positively engaging with one another came at a price. As 
Abbas Milani remarks, the IRI needed US approval in order to secure the flow of 
capital necessary for Iran's economic problems to subside, as well as a guarantee that 
the US will not seek to overthrow the regime; however, much of the regime's 
legitimacy rested on its opposition to the US. Similarly, the US needed to engage with 
Iran, qua influential PG power, in order to secure regional stability and thereby US 
interests; however, Washington feared that engaging with Iran would strengthen a 
regime it opposed. The US has been unable to develop an effective and permanent 
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strategy towards Iran; its policies have been reactionary and have thus only lasted 
until the next crisis. 37 The IRI did make some attempts to improve US-Iranian 
relations, for instance it supported the liberation of Kuwait after Iraq invasion, and it 
had a positive role in Afghanistan. Also, in order to face its greatest challenges 
(reconstruction and economic problems), and although the rise of the IRI was 
considered to have `subdued those voices in favour of pursuing an accommodation 
with the US', 38 a pragmatic Iran was prepared to forge such relations. However, in 
doing " so, it faced two problems: firstly, it was not willing to give up its policy 
regarding independence and secondly, the conservative forces who, in a climate of 
relative internal instability, wanted to be seen as the ones who rebuilt relations with 
the US; they did not want a rival camp, especially the leftists/reformists, to have this 
accolade. 
The US, however, did not display an intention to reciprocate such conciliatory 
gestures and mend its frustrated relationship with Iran. This meant that the bilateral 
relationship between them remained stagnant. 39 It also meant that the Arab PG states 
were being persuaded to take up a similarly isolationist stance towards Iran. The 
corollary of all this has been that the. IRI has had to operate in a difficult international 
environment which has pushed it towards more independent policies and has delayed 
its better and closer integration with the West. 
Three decades of such a policy has caused many crises in the ME and a growing fear 
on the part of Arab PG rulers regarding their political stability. It has also caused an 
increase in anti-Western (especially US) sentiments which have highlighted that, 
firstly, the ME/Arab PG states are tired of the economic and socio-political impacts of 
regional crises and that even though the instability of the situation has been 
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exaggerated by the US, they prefer a peaceful atmosphere. Secondly, the importance 
of Iran's role in the security and stability of the region has been stressed and that by 
ignoring and diminishing its role the security of both regional and extra-regional 
states is threatened, as well as affects oil the supply and market. Due to Iran's 
geopolitical situation all its political regimes, despite their differing political 
orientations, including those both before and after the revolution, have converged on 
what Iran's general security policy should be. This is that Iran should develop its 
natural role in the PG's security. 
The regional importance of Iran makes it vital for there to be relations between it and 
those extra-regional powers with interests in the region. The attempts to circumvent 
this necessity, such as the US strategy to place the GCC instead of Iran as the region's 
most influential player, have not been successful. The IRI perceives Iran's value in 
this respect, as well as the US need to cooperate with it in order to solve its crisis in 
Iraq, for instance. The IRI has, in this recognition, shown a diminishing tendency to 
accept US pressure, for instance regarding its nuclear program. The lesson to be 
learned from the experience of the most geopolitical region in the world, the PG, is 
that in order to attain regional security it is imperative that the major regional and 
external players have suitable relations. No other alternative strategy would be able to 
fulfill regional and ultra regional interests and meet security concerns. 
However, what Iran needs is coalition-building with the West to feature in its foreign 
policy. As Sariolghalam observes, "Iran's unique political ideology and foreign policy 
objectives prevents it from entering into meaningful coalition with other countries in 
its neighbourhood as well as in the entire Muslim World. " Thus, the main way it can 
acquire technology, wealth, science and power in the contemporary world is via the 
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West 40 This is why, as Sariolghalam continues, the IRI needs to reach a consensus on 
the issue of relation with the West. Only by doing so can Iran grow and develop 
economically, improve its global image, secure its national interests41; a matter that 
can pave the way for a stable CBM with the PG states too.. 
The antagonistic relationship of Iran and the West has provided the GCC with the 
opportunity to take advantage of Tehran's political isolation to sort the issue out in a 
way that benefited its members. For example, even Iran's territorial disputes became a 
leverage for the GCC in different political occasions. Before the revolution, the PG 
Arab states placed little emphasis on the islands dispute because of their similar 
Western orientation and the fear of the Shah who was supported by the US 42 After 
the revolution, however, the advent of the IRI's revolutionary rhetoric made them 
more frightened of Iran and so they increased their claims regarding the islands on 
different occasions as a leverage against Iran. 
Hence, the lack of US-Iranian relations as the major regional and ultra regional 
powers in the PG has been a major obstacle to the establishment of a stable regional 
security system. This has resulted in more international pressure being put on Iran. 
This international pressure has helped the IRI to justify its domestic failure and to 
keep the country unified. Due to its geostrategic position, its Islamic political 
ideology, its energy resources and its nuclear program, Iran is currently at the 
forefront of international concerns. However, as Hourcade observes, being the focus 
of such attentions has made Iran work towards independence; its perception of the 
balance of power has made Iran become more confident that it will not be attacked by 
external players. This has also united the country against the West, making it harder 
for it to integrate with the rest of the world, the opposite of what the international 
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community would have liked. Iran is now protected from the imposition of heavy 
sanctions due to its building strong and efficient ties with several different countries, 
organisations and economic and oil lobbies. 43 In the interest and security of all, the 
need to have CBM between Iran and the West (especially the US) should therefore 
now be understood. 
By applying the outcome of the previous chapters dealing with the different security 
concerns and different perceptions of regional and ultra-regional players of what 
constitutes a threat to regional security, in the next and the final chapter of the second 
part of this thesis, I will study the future shape of security arrangements in the PG that 
will address the need for a stable and peaceful structure of relationships that provide 
security. 
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Chapter 11 
Shape of Security Arrangements in the PG 
Introduction 
The intention in this chapter is to provide a conceptual and analytical foundation for a 
discussion about the future shape of security arrangements in the PG in order to 
address the need for a stable and peaceful structure of relationships that provides 
security for all individual littoral states, as well as assuring the interests of the external 
powers. To this end, three fundamental schools of thought in international security 
will be briefly examined in order to explain the major strategic choices available to 
both the PG and the external powers' decision makers in a different international 
atmosphere. The schools of thought that will be explored are: the realist school, the 
neo-liberalism or the cooperative-security school, and the hegemonic or 
counterproliferation school. 
By a historical and theoretical study of the security systems in the PG during the 
1960s-1990s, the aim in this chapter is to identify the different models' elements of 
success and failure and suggest a more, durable and pervasive system. Some key, 
intimate factors, such as inclusiveness (for all regional players), legitimacy and 
authority, will be investigated in order to cast light on the issues involved in creating a 
regional security regime. 
The goal of the suggested system is that of any security system, namely to "be able to 
reduce, prevent, or meet potential threats"', or as Kraig expresses "to create a stable 
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and peaceful structure of relationships that allows every state to meet its minimum 
security needs and develop its economy and political institutions without at the same 
time increasing the level of threat toward its neighbors. s92 
This chapter will also include a study of the failure of the existing security situation as 
well as a look at scholars' diverging solutions to it. The objective is that doing so will 
make it possible to assess what a more ideal endpoint could be. Once the latter is 
achieved, it will be possible to suggest better future security arrangements, for 
instance one whose agenda is to manage relations between states, or whose grand 
strategy is the management and regulation of power. 
The perception of what constitutes a threat to regional security varies among the 
Arabs, Iranians and the ultra regional powers, and all accordingly have different 
solutions to what they perceive is the problem. The West sees the potential use of 
force by regional players armed with WMDs, domestic instability, social and 
economic decline and terrorism as cause for grave concern. The regional PG states, on 
the other hand, are worried that their national sovereignty is under threat, via domestic 
problems and the danger of political instability which contributes to socio-political 
turmoil, or via external pressure. All the PG states are in different ways victims of 
non-regional states' interventionist policies. Some have experienced invasions, others 
sanctions and some states have endured the presence of foreign forces, all of which 
have resulted in regional crises. Nevertheless, regardless of the relevant parties' 
difference of opinion, all these issues along with three decades of crises in the PG 
illustrate how urgent it is for the problem regarding regional security to be resolved. 
Thus to be able to analyse the determinant factors of a security system this study has 
drawn upon the level of analysis framework in international relations. As Steven 
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Spiegel also notes, a state's foreign policy, within a system of international politics, 
can be analysed on three levels. Doing so makes it possible to identify the forces that 
affect policy at each level. The implications of such identification can then be used to 
suggest ways in which- innovative methods for attaining more stable regional relations 
can be developed. The first level, or the `systemic' level, concerns the interaction 
between different states. At this level the nation-state in the central unit of analysis, 
which is driven by national interests, defined in terms of power. This means that the 
sovereign nation-state is the main factor to consider when an outline for security and 
stability is being drafted. This also means that national security is 'essentially "a 
relationship between the state and its external environment", according to Maoz, 3 and 
thus that states' behaviour will partly depend on the international security system's 
structure. 4 In the second and third levels, the `domestic' and `individual (leaders)' 
levels respectively, the domestic dimensions of stability are recognised. Indeed, based 
on the outcomes of previous chapters also according to many analysts the greatest 
dangers in the PG are the potential internal socioeconomic and political changes more 
5 than any other regional or non-regional aggressions 
All three levels of the PG states' foreign policies and the forces that affected them 
especially the debate that occurs at the domestic and individual levels, was studied in 
the previous chapters. However, using the level of analysis framework, it will be 
argued, as does Spiegel, that the best solution to the regional security problems in the 
ME, including its sub-region the PG, is through dialogue. That is, to promote 
unofficial, informal contacts and negotiations in creating a functional regional 
security arrangement, 6 a matter that puts emphasis on soft, as opposed to sole, hard, 
power. Some analysts such as Kraig believe that such a strategy presents a good 
model for defence and economic policy. According to him, the proposal recommends 
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"a situation in which the financial and human capital of nations is used primarily for 
social, political, economic and spiritual development, rather than for military and 
security/police forces. " The proposed framework also addresses the question of 
legitimacy and authority, and sees them as inextricably linked to those of 
sustainability. It acknowledges that it needs regional states not to believe that the 
security framework is purposely disadvantageous to them and that if it is to last it 
must be supported by most, if not all, of those players involved. This is only possible 
if all parties concerned consider the security framework's aims to be the attainment of 
mutually beneficial results. 7 
Security Theories 
When faced with perceived threats from other states, the reactionary choices nation- 
states make (as units of international politics) determine the structure and the various 
institutions of the security system which will, in turn, define the options available to 
such states. To understand nation-states' choices concerning the use of their power, 
whether political or military, to attain national security in response to threats from 
other states in various international systems (see table 11-1), three fundamental, 
competing schools of thought regarding the practice of international security will be 
examined here. The following study will attempt to define these schools of thought as 
well as evaluate some of their strengths and weaknesses. 
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Table 1 1-1 
Security º 
Unit Level: National Securi ty Strategies 
Unilateral Action Multilateral Action 















Containment Trade Arbitration 
Systems Level: Structure an d Institutions 
Anarchy International Society World Order 
Military 
means 
Balance-of Power Alliances Confidence- 
building Arms control 
Collective 
security 
Parit Mutual Defensive Superiority Security regimes Peacekeeping 
Military 
means Common security Cooperative Security 
Institutionalization 




Source: Bjorn Moller 
Realpolitik/Realist school 
The main assumption of (neo) realists is that states naturally prefer conflict rather than 
cooperation in their relationship. In such an atmosphere of anarchy, their behaviour is 
motivated by a desire for power and security, influenced by the key political players 
in the system with regard to their relative strength. As Moller notes, a system of 
international relations entirely based on either `national self-help' unilateral action] 
or `collective self-help', where states create alliances against one another will 
unavoidably result in anarchy. Realists believe the main principle of order in such an 
anarchical environment is the balance of power, limited by how polarised the system 
is. This is especially dependent upon the number of factions within it and how closely 
integrated these camps or blocs are. Although realists will regard unipolarity to he at 
best a transitory stage, they will regard the distinction between bipolarity and 
multipolarity as central in a debate as to how best to achieve a balance of power. 
Whether the system becomes bipolar or multipolar will depend mainly on whether the 
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states attempt to achieve balance against absolute strength or against strength 
combined with hostile goals. Also, the level of conflict produced by the system will 
largely depend on which security approach is chose. 8 
Realpolitik as a guideline for foreign policy is related to realism and can be 
considered as one of the foundations of realism. Realpolitik is the pragmatic notion 
that politics or diplomacy is based principally on practical considerations rather than 
ideological thoughts. It was, for example, a policy that Henry Kissinger introduced to 
the Nixon White House and was used to develop a new relationship with communist 
China. 
Due to the emphasis in realpolitik on securing national interests via the most practical 
means, pursing its directives can sometimes mean violating ideological principles. For 
instance, the US under the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations supported 
authoritarian regimes in the ME/PG that violated human rights, such as the Shah in 
Iran and Saddam in Iraq; so that the US' national interest in the stability of this region 
was secured. 
While supporters of realpolitik would consider actions such as these defensible under 
the restrictions of practical reality rather than a fixed set of rules, political ideologues 
describe such attitude as amoral. According to the later group, realpolitik is a selfish 
search of national interest in a well calculated play of power to which ethical norms 
are inappropriate. The political ideologues which prefer principled action over all 
other considerations usually reject any compromises and accept failing to achieve 
their short-term political gains in favour of adhering to principles. 9 
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As mentioned earlier, realpolitik can be regarded as one foundations of realism 
because they both implicate power politics and concentrate on the balance of power 
among nations-states. They act in one direction with two different tasks. Realism acts 
like a theoretical paradigm which provides a description and prediction of 
international relations, while realpolitik is a normative outline for policy-making. As 
Kraig notes, realpolitik prescribes diplomacy on the basis of military threats but it 
never ignores other sovereign states' core national interests or security concerns. It 
also recognises commonalities as well as areas of competition for all nation-states and 
rejects any definition of allies and enemies on a permanent basis. Such kinds of 
realpolitik diplomacy were developed during 1648-1789, the years of nation-state 
development in Europe, prior to the French Revolution. During this period, most 
competition was centred round expansion and the reinforcement of the state with little 
connection with people. National expansion was not ideologically motivated but 
mainly pragmatic. However, traditional realpolitik started to dissipate as radically 
diverse ideologies and value systems between nation-states began to emerge in 
Western Europe, with a wide range of mutual misperceptions about security. This 
worsened when those states that wanted to secure some relative advantage over their 
rivals were able to guarantee security via traditional methods of weakening or 
eliminating the rivals, while as Kraig notes, "the conflicting value systems made 
cooperative efforts look too costly and even immoral. " In addition, in the nineteenth 
century, the activities of the growing number of sub-national or trans-national actors 
(many of whom were part of ethnic nationalist movements and terrorist groups), 
subverted the strong sovereign control that is essential for a security system based on 
principles of balance of power to be rational. When this occurred during WWI it 
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resulted in greater interstate competition between the Great Powers and eventually 
undermined the use of power balancing as a conflict-management mechanism. 
10 
While in general a balance of power signifies parity or stability between competing 
forces, as a term in international law it also expresses intention to prevent any one 
nation from becoming strong enough to compel the others to obey its political 
agenda. " According to the traditional balance of power logic, Conflict management 
operates best under some particular circumstances. According to Kraig, nation-states 
should define national security and stability in kind (according to their common 
values and interests) and should rely on their rivals to respect the system and the 
independence of all other states more than their interest in spreading their doctrine or 
ideologies. The central role of the sovereign states is not undermined because of the 
existence of the trans-national or intra-national movements. Eventually, by applying 
stable domestic and foreign policies states will be able to prevent radical changes in 
ideology from effecting foreign policy. This is a major element that allows mutual 
trust to build up and to pave the way for stable confidence building measures. 'Z 
With these considerations in mind, as well as the different political ideologies and 
foreign policy objectives of the PG states, the major factor of balance of power cannot 
be ignored in any PG security system. 
Hegemonic or Counterproliferation School 
Another strategy for regional security is provided by the hegemonic or 
counterproliferation school. This school justifies the operational use of military and 
economic instruments to achieve the interests of one state or one set of states over the 
others, through compliance and deterrence. This is a strategy the US is pursuing, 
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based on a network of friends and allies who greatly share the US' foreign policy 
goals. In this regard, confronting new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the US 
seeks to further strengthen and adapt its Cold War security relationship with its allies 
to establish new security relationships. 
Different tools for implementing this kind of strategy have been introduced, such as 
export control (especially the denial of technology to the developing world), methods 
of deterrence including high technology and powerful military equipment (e. g. 
nuclear arsenal), and proactive techniques of defence based on pre-emptive strikes 
and reactive measures. The main aim of Washington national security planning has 
been to improve the implementation of this strategy by applying such methods. 13 
As Kraig remarks, there is some similarity between the hegemonic strategy and the 
mercantilism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, based on the belief that 
traditional alliances would guarantee the collective security for them and their friends 
and allies. According to this vision of international politics, a selective globalisation 
of the free market was necessary while developing countries were being denied dual- 
use commercial advances with military applications with the intention of gaining 
political or military power. Therefore, security was only seen in terms of cooperation 
of allies in their join military and economic relations against their enemies, who were 
perceived stubborn and impossible to integrate within the hegemonic security 
framework. To summarise, in the hegemonic or counterproliferation theory, 
diplomatic relations is defined largely in terms of bilateral and selectively multilateral 
relationships between friends and allies. For the US, for instance, such relationships in 
the ME have been formed with Israel and the GCC. Similarly with the balance of 
power principle, this theory depends on both the explicit and implicit use of threats. 
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However, unlike traditional realpolitik, as Kraig notes, "the goal of these threats is not 
to establish a roughly equal balance among all sovereign actors but rather to 
consolidate economic and military supremacy among friends and allies. " Under this 
framework also there is no attempt to build conceptual bridges between their 
ideologies and those of their enemies but rather an explicit attempt to make their 
interests and those of their allies predominant. '4 
Cooperative School 
The last and most relevant school of thought to be considered regarding the output of 
this study is neo-liberalism or cooperative theory. According to this school of thought 
cooperation is possible and will occur when states calculate that it is in their best 
interest. There is no argument between neo-realists and neo-liberalists that the state is 
a rational, unitary actor driven by its interests; however their disagreement is centred 
round the nature of states and their interests. '5 The neo-liberal's reason for feasibility 
of cooperation among states is that they believe states are motivated by their interest 
in wealth and are concerned with absolute and not relative gains. 16 
Moreover, while the liberals emphasise the significant role institutions can play in 
negotiations, the realists see them as an extension of a state's interest. Hence, 
according to Spiegel, neo-realism seems to have the best conceptual resources to 
explain modem ME history. However, while in neo-realism much of the focus for 
achieving security is on predicting conflict rather than cooperation, neo-liberalism 
suggests the theoretical possibility of the prospect of cooperation through institutions 
as a way that the creation and acceptance of cooperative norms will influence states' 
interests. The various approaches discussed here emphasise the importance of 
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providing solutions for security concerns, and at the same time, an attempt is needed 
to create an environment encouraging cooperation. '7 
The main hypothesis of the cooperative-security school of thought is that it is not only 
a nation-state's friends and allies who should participate in security arrangements. 
This school's fundamental tenet is that, "all nation-states will find greater relative 
security through mutual obligations to limit their military capabilities rather than 
through unilateral or allied attempts to gain dominance. " The thesis works via some 
assumptions such as, all nation-states (friends and foes alike), despite the existence of 
considerable mutual mistrust, will accept the terms of these proposed mutual 
obligations, and also, that such obligations will be mutually advantageous and 
verifiable. Therefore, according to this school of thought, security can be obtained 
only through the outlawing of policies that aim to achieve inter-state dominance. 
18 
The most important strategic problem facing the theory, according to the Brookings 
study group, is reassurance and not deterrence as in the Cold War. In order to achieve 
the reassurance between sovereign states to address their national security, 
cooperation must first be instigated and then maintained. Therefore, the key to 
reassurance is a reliable normative and institutional structure. Achieving such kind of 
cooperation depends variously on economic incentives and inducements, political 
legitimacy, threats against bad behaviour such as the imposition of sanctions, and a 
sort of inclusiveness that rewards nation-states for their involvement and continued 
compliance. 19 To summarise, according to the cooperative-security framework, due to 
the globalisation of social and economic trends, security is increasingly clarified as a 
collective good. Therefore, nation-states can not be divided into the categories of 
`friends' and `enemies' but, rather should all be treated as mutual partners struggling 
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to achieve mutual security, even when different states are ideologically radically 
different. 20 
The differences and similarities of these theories has been summarised by Kraig as 
follows: proponents of traditional realpolitik consider international security to be a 
balance of interests based on a rough balance of power, whereas the more recent US 
strategic model is based on an imbalance of power and interests (hegemony) and on 
the use of both offensive and defensive threats. According to neo-liberals however the 
cooperative model can be considered as a balance of interests based upon mutual 
reassurance. Nonetheless, despite the similarity of realpolitik and cooperative in that 
both strategies advocate the importance of brokering a balance of interests, they differ 
in their preferred model of guaranteeing this balance. The realpolitik relies to a great 
extent on implicit military and economic threats (and temporary alliances to build up 
power), while the cooperative theory relies on promises and reassurances as firm and 
impenetrable factors. Nevertheless, both of these schools are quite different to the 
evolving US hegemony strategy which is increasingly focused on establishing a 
unitary and dominant value system based on a network of friends and allies in keeping 
with US foreign policy objectives. The hegemonic approach assumes no possibility 
for competitors with different goals and values, while the realpolitik and cooperative 
security models believe that each nation-states' national interests should be 
guaranteed at some minimal level. In addition, the cooperative school of thought 
shares some of its theoretical assumptions with realism, e. g. requiring a set of 
geopolitical circumstances. For instance, they both assume that the primary actor is 
the sovereign state and that such states will be domestically stable, immune from the 
sort of domestic turmoil evident in Iran's 1979 revolution, and therefore the mutual 
agreements ordering relations would remain stable. 21 
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Thus in order to achieve durable security it is necessary to design a security model 
that will be able to give such basic assurances to all its members. The security model 
should construe the gains it aims to achieve as mutual gains for all participants, not as 
gains for one particular player, or set of players, and thereby be able to assure that 
remaining in the system will be in all the relevant parties' interests. The model should 
also be immune to any internal turmoil or changes (in this particular case) to the 
littoral states. With these constraints in mind, as well as the results of the previous 
study of security theories and those of a forthcoming study in these models' history in 
the PG, an attempt will be made to suggest and develop-an appropriate model for 
security in the region. 
Persian Gulf's Security Systems 
The present aim of this study is to attempt to create a comprehensive strategy for 
peace and stability in the PG. In order to do this the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the three theories as well as the various historical challenges in applying the 
frameworks to the PG security environment need to be assessed. 
In the period between the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Britain's departure 
from the ME, the security system in the PG was founded on realpolitik's balance-of- 
power principle. The security -system at this time worked 
due to a number of factors. 
First, the complex policies pursued by Britain included the application of the policy 
which stated that `to dominate a region it is necessary to weaken regional powers'. As 
explained earlier (chapter six, also Appendix-2), for this reason Iran's efforts to 
establish power in the PG were totally unacceptable to and annulled by Britain. 
Britain severely vetoed every action, measure, or proposal by Iran to establish a navy 
for security in the PG. Second, Britain combined consolidating its military superiority 
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in the region by placing troops in well chosen bases, supported by offshore naval 
forces and the secondment of officers in key areas, with the installation of proxy 
regimes, which thus created and supported friendly governments in this region. Third, 
the Sheikhs were at this time ready to welcome the help and support of Britain in 
making the political changes that led towards the establishment of their new countries, 
despite London's action in keeping competition among them within limits. 22 
Following Britain's departure, the PG region, particularly because of its huge oil 
reserves, became a platform on which the feuding Cold War powers could compete. 
Competing for control over this geopolitical region, the US assumed the role of 
regional security guarantor from the British, and could thereby take over the role of 
security manager of the region. Nevertheless, numerous attempts to find an effective 
regional security arrangement after the British departure were ended ineffectually. At 
I 
first the US followed its containment policy against the USSR by supporting the 
Baghdad Pact (1955-58); however the 1958 military coup in Iraq converted such 
formal alignment to bilateral ties and agreements between the US and every state in 
the region. From the late 1960s through the late 1970s, seeking to maintain regional 
stability, the US persisted in a realpolitik strategy of attempting to support a rough 
balance of military power between the most dominant powers in the region, Iran and 
Iraq. Iran as the military pillar of Nixon's doctrine was supported by the US against 
the socialist, anti-Western Iraq. Nixon's `Twin-Pillar' or the strategy of local 
hegemony with US dependence on local powers did not work; however, this was 
mainly due to the US' underestimation of the domestic side of security. The lack of 
the US' regional allies' political legitimacy due to their careless about domestic 
developments and political reforms was in large part responsible for security failure in 
this region. Hence, as Kraig notes, the strategy of local hegemony which eventually 
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led to Iran's revolution in 1979 and later to the terrorist attacks of Saudi citizens on 
the US in September 11th, 2001 also failed. Consequently, the factor of legitimacy is 
essential for establishing any new PG security order, as is the awareness that a 
strategy based on structures of power, particularly when one relies on local military 
powers that are prone to fail or change, is bound to be unsuccessful. 
23 
Following the Iranian revolution of 1979 which effectively removed one of the 
`pillars' of Nixon's twin-pillar doctrine, and also the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, 
US policy for PG security became based on what was to become known as the `Carter 
doctrine'. According to this strategy, Washington would resist any outside forces' 
attempts to gain control over the PG and its oil flow. 
During the 1980s, the US aim was to achieve, as Kraig remarks, `a pure balance of 
power' in order to keep the peace, by limiting both Iran and Iraq from growing too 
powerful. This included the support of Baghdad in its war with Tehran in order to 
prevent the emergence of revolutionary Iran as the local hegemony, also providing 
immediate security to the newly established GCC. Simultaneously, -because of the 
military weakness of the GCC states and its ideological opposition with socialist, anti- 
Western Iraq (and hence the lack of a strong pro-West pillar fill the place of the 
Shah), the US was convinced to be drawn more directly into the region. Therefore, the 
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was established and Washington invested in regional 
military bases. Regarding the RDF, in 1983, a new US Central Command (US 
CENTCOM) was established by the Reagan administration to project power and 
command, particularly regarding the US who were ill-prepared to project power in the 
PG. RDF, as its central base, was extended from East Mediterranean to Pakistan and 
from the shared Turkish and Iraq borders (NATO frontiers) in the North to the 
I 
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African Horn region in the South with Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. 
Besides the US most major nuclear facilities in Western Europe under NATO 
command, these weapons were also deployed to the ME and the PG region (South 
West Asia) under US central command. As Nassar adds to this issue, "these weapons 
had been deployed with the full consent and approval of European countries, whereas 
these weapons can be deployed at any time in South West Asia (... ) without any 
agreement concluded with the countries concerned. 9924 Regarding the regional military 
bases, though the GCC states that while US military help in the event of absolute 
emergencies was highly esteemed, they were not interested in institutionalising a US 
military role, preferring whenever possible to take advantage of diplomatic 
manoeuvring, including providing financial aid to thwart any potential threats. Being 
aware of their military weakness and comparatively small population, the GCC (with 
the exception of Oman) was pleased that the RDF was located `over the horizon', 
believing that a direct US military presence in the region could provoke the anger of 
Iran, Iraq and several other Arab states as well as arguably the USSR. Therefore, none 
of the GCC members took part in any official agreement with the US over defence 
until two events which resulted in volatility of the region in the period between the 
early 1980s and 1990s, viz. the war on tankers and the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait. The 
US, which had little physical or institutional involvement in regional defence 
schemes, responded to the former with a reflagging operation and embarked on direct 
military activity by escorting GCC tankers carrying a US flag. Nevertheless, the 
operation, which was an escalation in terms of intervention and was sanctioned by the 
UN Security Council and the participation of other Western states, convinced both the 
US and Kuwait (which had initiated the idea) to take steps to characterise the 
operation as merely an international policing activity rather than US defence of GCC 
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stases. Therefore, the reflagging operation with a wide international dimensions and a 
very limited GCC states' assistance was not a new kind of US-GCC alliance but 
rather a limited US military operation. 25 
Disadvantages of US Strategy in 1980s: There were several disadvantages to the US' 
use of the balance-of-power strategy in the PG. First, ignoring Iran's security 
concerns and national interests as the major regional player resulted in not only the 
failure of the US PG security system but also compelled Iran to take a more radical 
approach to a foreign policy that placed more emphasis on military empowerment. 
Second, as Kraig also notes, the strategy authorised Iraq to proliferate offensive 
military power and entailed ignoring Iraqi human-rights transgressions, including the 
replacement of WMDs. 
Until 1990 the US had stuck to a strategy of maintaining a low cost security system in 
the PG. Until then it had relied merely on a naval presence and on its regional allies, 
mainly the GCC and, to some extent, Iraq. However, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990 indicated the failure of this policy. In contrast to previous situations, in a 
direct reaction to Iraq's invasion and the growing threat to Saudi Arabia, the US 
assumed its new role as main military defender in the region. This security approach 
was not welcomed by the GCC and included extensive forward basing and regular 
military engagements of US forces that sometimes turned into significant 
deployments. However, it was the GCC's best choice since none of its allies in the 
Arab World could offer help. 
As mentioned earlier the additional factor resulting in Washington changing its 
strategy and causing the US' reflagging operation was the war on tankers that was 
initiated by Iraq 26 and resulted in Iran's escalating its attacks on shipping serving 
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Arab ports in the PG. Furthermore, according to some sources, 
27the invasion of 
Kuwait was the consequence of the US green light to Iraq to do so. Arguably then, 
both of the `reasons' for an increased US military role had been part of a US 
premeditated and engineered scheme. In any case, regardless of whether these 
speculations seem logical and consistent, by the end of the `Desert Storm' operation, 
the US was practically the major military force in the region. 28 
Shortly after `Desert Storm', the 1991 `Damascus Declaration' (an US encouraged 
treaty which entrusted GCC land defences to Syrian and Egyptian infantry and 
armoured divisions) was signed to show that the US did not seek to be the dominant 
force in all the PG defences. However, the GCC states were not eager to accept the 
declaration, since they did not trust Egypt and Syria, politically and militarily. This 
meant that Washington was able to sign several different military agreements with 
GCC states and looked enthusiastic to accept its new role of offering security and 
selling arms. These military treaties were different, there was not any US-GCC pact, 
and Washington had to deal with each state separately and with varying success. 
However, for instance, while Saudi Arabia decided not to make an official agreement 
with the US (because of some technical problems with Washington as well as fear of 
the consequences of angering Iran and Syria), Kuwait did (following it up with pacts 
with Britain and France), as did Bahrain. 29 
Despite stationing several thousand infantry and armoured forces in the PG, US forces 
mainly relied on air power. However, although this strategy had been successful in 
operation `Desert Storm', the use of such air power demonstrated major deficiencies 
that US military power in the region was faced with. The importance of physical 
occupation was realised, whether for a conclusive victory in battles or to bring about 
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the political change Washington saw as necessary to prevent future threats in the 
region. This shortcoming, however, was overcome later by the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003. However, shortly after operation `Desert Storm', the new strategy of `Dual 
Containment' marked US distance from reliance on regional allies via the balance-of- 
power doctrine, and moving towards its more muscular regional attendance. 
Washington's strategy of `Dual Containment', to some extent a response to the 
deficiencies that were made evident during the Kuwait crisis, sought during the 
Clinton administration to replace Saddam Hussein, establish a new government in 
Iraq. and to force Iran to change its foreign policy through military and economic 
sanctions. It also included the new military agreements with the GCC states (despite 
their inability to operate their previous less sophisticated arms which were bought) 
with whom the US now entered into increased arm sales to equip some pro-US local 
military, to use them as supplemental weaponries to US forces. Since 1991 in 
particular, due to the removal of Soviet threats to Europe and East Asia the PG region 
has become the centre stage in terms of US strategic thinking and force planning. 
Therefore, the new strategy of both Iran and Iraq containment also indicated that a 
large portion of total US military operating, force-structure, and investment costs 
were devoted to military issues in the PG. Consequently, these developments signified 
a growing interdependent US-GCC relationship which before 1990 had largely been a 
potential alliance, but since then has been implemented as a very real and strategically 
crucial one for both sides. 30 
After `Desert Storm', besides military protection, the GCC's other expectation 
concerning its military pacts with Washington was that the US would make some 
efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order that the PLO and Syria would not 
be angered by this newly implemented alliance or seek retribution against the GCC 
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states. In response to this, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton had initiated 
a multilateral security approach known as the `Madrid process', which included 
producing a practical Israeli-Palestinian peace process among its goals. 
However, in the second half of the 1990s, by the fading of the Arab-Israeli peace 
process and the US bombing raids in response to Saddam's not completely 
cooperative attitude towards the UN inspection regime, the new US security approach 
failed to achieve its major objectives. In particular, the cooperative mode of GCC 
with the US evolved to a more critical position. This was especially due to Egyptian 
and Syrian anger with Washington which inspired the GCC states to seek additional 
security (in the events of a new crisis with Iraq) cooperation with these two countries 
and Iran. The other reason was that the US bombing raids, which were very unpopular 
in the whole Arab world, caused great sympathy in both Iraqis' and other Arab states' 
public opinion, who felt for the Iraqi people's suffering because of UN sanctions. 
Moreover, there was a growing criticism and voiced concerns from many regional 
intellectuals, journalists and others who felt that in addition to the costly US presence 
for the GCC states, the crisis in Iraq was only helping to establish US dominance in 
the PG. These factors convinced the GCC states to seek Washington military 
intervention only in times of need, believing that by seeking supplemental security 
cooperation with the assistance of Egypt, Syria and Iran, and led by President 
Khatami tensions in the region would dissipate. 31 
Disadvantages of US Security Strategy in the 1990s: During the 1990s, the occurrence 
of some intra-regional developments undermined the US security system in the PG. In 
the case of the GCC, Qatar emerged as an independent player. This shook up the 
kaleidoscope of relationships within the GCC six-member grouping. More 
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importantly, Iran gradually moved towards receiving a more moderate security 
approach, although still with the stipulation of Tehran's expectation that Iran was to 
be recognised as the natural regional hegemony. Iran's regional policy of detente was 
accompanied by some of its domestic democratic developments, including its 
democratic elections. Consequently, the dual containment policy begin to look futile 
as on the one hand, Iran's moderation brought hopes that at least cooperative 
measures such as CBM could be established between the GCC and Iran, and on the 
other Washington failed to contain Iraq, the immediate threat to the region. 
32 
In the post-Cold War world, the security arrangement under the desired US unipolar 
system did not work for a number of reasons. While Europe was mostly hospitable to 
American forces after WWII and during the Cold War, the PG was not. 33 Neither was 
the PG as hospitable to American forces as it was to Britain before its departure in 
1971. It was also a mistake to exclude key players, viz. Iran and Iraq, from security 
arrangements in the most geopolitical significant region in the world. In order to attain 
peace in such circumstances one needs good relations between the strongest global 
and regional players, in particular Iran. Moreover, the US military presence was 
costly, 34 dysfunctional and shifted from being reliant on regional allies to a more 
immediate presence. The dual containment policy which was designed to strangle Iran 
via economic sanctions was largely unfeasible, as some GCC members as well as 
European and Asian countries continued and even extended their economic ties with 
Iran in the absence of the American companies. In addition, many security problems 
of the GCC were internal and mostly connected to potential foreign threats or to a 
local reaction to their governments' cooperation with the US. Thereby, since `Desert 
Storm' these states have been harassed by local opposition and terrorism, in particular 
from religious extremists. Furthermore, GCC states which suffered from inter-state 
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disputes and differences (especially regarding non-demarcated borderlines and 
security cooperation with Iran) also had serious concerns about the backlash of 
dissatisfaction from Arab states such as Egypt and Syria regarding their alliance with 
the US, or that they would be left unsupported in times of need. Washington was 
unable and also was not asked by GCC governments to deal with their domestic 
issues, while Egypt, Syria and Iran's contribution to make domestic and inter-group 
problems easier and to cooperate for the sake of regional security, in particular as a 
way to counter Iraq, was welcomed. Hence, there was a great divergence in the threat 
perceptions of the GCC and the US, as among GCC states themselves. These were 
some important diversities and variations which were not considered in the simplistic 
dual containment strategy. 35 
Furthermore, as Kraig explains, the Madrid process had various structural problems 
and so was unable to tackle any of these concerns. It too was founded on a selectively 
multilateral approach of collective security relying on friends and allies to provide 
security for the whole region; thus it suffered from the systematic exclusion of key 
regional players, viz. Iran and Syria. Furthermore, it was part of a US foreign policy 
that was overly focused on military strategy and tactics rather than on a consistent 
political scheme for the PG as a ME's sub-region. The Madrid process' only political 
objective was to broker peace between the Israelis and Palestinians as the answer to 
all problems in the ME, including the PG. However, such assumption left the political 
and security questions in the PG unanswered and no political structure for a contained 
Iraq and Iran was drawn, except the continuance of relying on military tools as well as 
economic strangulation as the strong option to bring down regimes in Tehran and 
Baghdad. It was a quite different manner to regional security in Europe during and 
after the Cold War, in which security was brokered by a combination of military 
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means in the form of NATO, and extremely strong and inclusive political and 
economic frameworks to create a system based upon common norms, institutions and 
the rule of law. 
Similarly, despite the successful experience of applying the Marshall Plan for Europe 
after WWII, the defeat of Iraq in 1991 only resulted in bilateral defence pacts. This 
process weakened any potential regional security interdependency and in contrast 
increased the security dependence of the GCC on the US. Moreover, domestic issues 
of the GCC, as the rulers' major security problem, were neglected with no 
consideration. From the military point of view too, the US security strategy in the ME 
had structural problems. From the three major goals of the US Pentagon for security 
in this region, namely: improving the capabilities of the RDF through bilateral 
defence-cooperation agreements, strengthening the local defence capabilities of GCC 
states, and promoting intra-GCC cooperation, only 'the first easy goal was 
accomplished. These failures in US strategy have had several repercussions. Besides 
the inherent regional geopolitical dynamics, they too have been responsible for the 
maintenance of traditional notions of realpolitik to form the political agenda among 
the littoral states. Consecutively, these states have stuck to the security calculus of a 
rough balance of power and thus continue to rely on external powers (e. g. the US, 
China and Russia), sometimes by proxy like via the importation of weapons 
technology and in some other cases via actual US military deployments, to defend 
their sovereignty, regimes' permanence and domestic identity. 36 In addition, it is very 
likely, if not definite, that the surge in active US military deployments since the early 
1990s has radicalised many against the US and thus indirectly contributed to the 
attacks of 9/11. 
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Present Security Problems of the Key Players in the Persian Gulf 
The United States: The US approach of hegemony to security is increasingly focused 
on ensuring a stable and pro-Western system via the establishment of a commanding 
value system which includes promoting regional political change. So the start of the 
twenty first century has seen the US attempting to broker security in the PG by 
putting in place an extensive, growing military presence. On the one hand, this 
presence was motivated by the US understanding that over-the horizon intervention 
had failed to be a strong enough deterrent. On the other hand, it was motivated by its 
national interests and its foreign policy goals. Economically speaking, the US arms 
market profits from this stance. Furthermore, the US needs a well integrated world 
economy and the latter depends on stable oil supplies, and suppliers, including via 
impeding the development of WMDs by those regimes that may threaten PG oil flow. 
Politically speaking, the stance helps bring about its hegemony in the international 
system and assures its own domestic security. 37 
Despite the failure of its security policy, the US is still trying to convince the GCC to 
continue to be reliant on the US security umbrella and to purchase US arms. However, 
as in the inter-World-War period in Europe, the absence of an inclusive security 
arrangement has only made the possibility of insecurity and warfare look more likely. 
This means that the Arabs have been made dependent on a security arrangement they 
consider increasingly unreliable. 38 
However, Washington faces a strategic dilemma: it wants to secure its national 
interests and its need for a well integrated world economy; however, in doing so it has 
not chosen the best options; a combination of a costly and dangerous military strategy 
and supporting the weakest and politically least stable of the three regional powers in 
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the PG. Further political discontent and radicalism within the GCC also pose a direct 
threat to US national security. Both are fuelled by US support for Israel and regional 
dictatorial regimes as well as by the socioeconomic woes that grip the region. The 
current US military presence in the PG only fans the flames of such discontent and 
since September 2001 it has become obvious that, as well as being very expensive, the 
US strategy in the PG has caused dangers to its homeland security to have become 
very real and immediate. 39 
It also puts into danger whatever remaining regional allies the US has left, especially 
Saudi Arabia. Hence, although as Rathmell [et all argue, "the United States does not 
have the option of withdrawing from the Gulf as the British did 30 years ago, " 
Washington does have some alternative options available, and which it should take. 
For instance, it could pursue a comprehensive political strategy to broker CBM with 
Iran (with whom it is the only nation in the PG not to have relations). Iran is a key 
regional player with direct interests and security concerns in both its very long 
western and eastern borders with Iraq and Afghanistan, and so having CBM with it 
could help engender a situation where the US could more easily withdraw, from the 
region. Such a political process between two adversary countries is likely to take time; 
however, not pursuing this option would have far greater long-term negative 
consequences for the US. This is especially true for a number of reasons: 
Firstly, Iran's influence is rising due to the US removal of its local enemies, namely 
Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, an influence which was always large due to its 
advantageous geopolitical position. It is thus unlikely that Iran will easily surrender 
when it feels under threat. Secondly, although the Arab PG states feel under threat by 
Iran, the latter is unlikely to present a real threat, particularly if it is included in a 
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comprehensive regional security apparatus. Thirdly, the Arab PG states are 
unenthusiastic about putting their security solely in the hands of the US and their 
leaders have recently supported the idea of a collective security arrangement for the 
region that includes Iran (as voiced, for instance, by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al- 
Faisal at the 2004 Gulf Dialogue in Bahrain) and are growing more and more 
frustrated with US reluctance to have any dealing whatsoever with the Iranians. 
Furthermore, the recent US invasion of Iraq has led to much regional anti-US 
sentiment that has put Arab leaders under a great deal of domestic pressure to 
discontinue their US security alliance. In addition, there is a great fear of a US-Iran 
battle which would overflow into the Arab countries. 
Finally, Iraq's internal crisis has had a considerable impact on the GCC who now face 
the serious possibility of a shift in the political balance of power between the Sunnis 
and Shiites by loosing the Eastern flank of the Arab world through Iraq's conversion 
to a Shiite state and becoming Iran's ally. Due to its geopolitical features, Iraq will 
always be both politically ambitious and a major player in the Arab world as well as 
the PG, regardless of who rules it. This fact, together with the deep insecurities felt by 
Iraq about its geopolitical restriction in the PG and the fact that actual and potential 
enemies sit astride its oil export routes, all encourage the GCC to deal with Iran in a 
more peaceful manner in the interests of maintaining a balance of power. 
Therefore, Washington does not really have a choice as to whether to postpone or 
deny its need to enter into positive dialogue with Tehran. The US also needs to invest 
in a less expensive and more sustainable PG security system that promotes, rather 
than resists, political change. It is uncertain how political change is best achieved; 
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however, it is clear that the worst way to decrease tension and radicalism is the US 
strategy of putting pressure on the region's rulers to develop domestically. 
Iran: Iran desires to be recognised as a regional power (a position it feels has been 
ignored) and to play its role accordingly. It has the capability of posing a sea-denial 
threat in the PG and could develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, despite the US 
confrontational policy, the West's concern regarding Tehran's threat to regional 
stability by, for instance, spreading its revolution, and the GCC's fear of Iranian 
ambitions is unfounded; some analysts, such as Rathmell [et all feel it is unlikely to 
present a threat at all, depending on its role in the security system. This is because the 
PG is the major lifeline of Iran's economy and so requires its stability. Also, the 
future of US security policy in the PG looks uncertain, both to Iran and the Arabs in 
the southern peninsula who along with the Arab World in general question the US 
role and intentions in the region. 
The GCC: The GCC's concerns are: its weakness to defend itself, what the impacts of 
a direct US presence will be, and what Iran's ambitions are (i. e. will it pursue a policy 
of expansionism, or develop nuclear weapons? ) and what the impact of Iraq's internal 
crisis will be on its political as well as socio-economic situation, especially as regards 
terrorism. The GCC also fears the introduction of a rival democratic system and the 
shift in the political balance of power between Sunnis and Shiites. Finally, it questions 
the competence of foreign powers in their dealing in the region, including the US, 
with whom it originally wanted to keep an "over the horizon" relationship and who is 
still the de facto partner in the PG security arrangements 40 
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Strategic Conditions of the Persian Gulf 
The PG has some strategic properties which affect how successful a security system 
will be, and which have not been effectively dealt with in the attempt to construct a 
new and viable multilateral PG framework for security. These properties are as 
follows: 
First of all, the PG is made up of three poles, namely Saudi Arabia with the GCC, 
Iran, and Iraq, which all need to be taken into account when designing a lasting 
security system. None of these countries, including Saudi Arabia, is happy with the 
existing balance of power which is kept in check by the threat of American 
intervention. The relationship between the three poles is asymmetric, with Iran's 
geography and population giving it a naturally dominant position and strategic depth. 
Though Iraq was able to compete with Iran in the 1970s and 1980s, this was only via 
an unsustainable and oppressive militarisation of its people and economy as well as 
through help from the GCC and the great powers during its eight-year war with Iran. 
The GCC is powerful from a financial point of view (largely acquired from oil 
revenues), but it has been unable to turn this strength into the strategic leverage 
necessary to balance Iran or Iraq. The asymmetrical dynamic that exists in the PG has 
meant that it has been along the lines of realpolitik. However this has been done in a 
situation where it is impossible to find balance and a general acceptance of the status 
quo, and this has meant that the region has remained insecure and dangerous to its 
people and the rest of the world 41 
Secondly, the new global security thinking of cooperation which indicates the decline 
of traditional realist perceptions of international relations and an end to zero-sum 
notion of national security is difficult to implement in the PG. This security thinking 
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was initiated by the USSR President Gorbachev for arms control in the late 1980s and 
coincided with some Western definitions of security, evidenced in cooperative 
security theories with an emphasis on economic and political legitimacy. Cooperative 
security system succeeded in Europe, East Asia and Latin America during the 1990s 
mainly because these systems were supported with political transformation, 
meaningful reform and, thus, stability, a necessary political element which is missing 
in the PG. This has meant that despite some debates regarding a regional cooperative 
security system in the mid-1990s, it was not taken seriously. Therefore, the balance of 
power in the PG has remained unstable. None of the three major PG players, 
including the GCC (as a cooperative organisation), have displayed a functional 
interest in cooperating with the other two. So, while the US was able to depend more 
on an organic regional progress in lieu of mere military force in its security manners 
in Europe, East Asia and Latin America, the contextual aspects of the PG have made 
this impossible. 2 
Despite these issues, as well as those regarding potential American unwillingness to 
do so, there are some good reasons in favour of establishing a regional multilateral 
security arrangement. These reasons include, as Kraig observes, the comprehensive 
failure of different unilateral or selective bilateral or multilateral security frameworks 
in the PG via the foreign power intervention, as well as the systematic exclusion, 
economic and military, of major state and non-state actors from the prevailing 
security mandate. Furthermore, it is conceptually impossible to have a system that is 
considered to legitimately be in all the involved parties' interests when its strategy is 
to create a coalition whose existence is defined in terms of being opposed to one or 
more of those involved parties. 
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However, Kraig also has similar views to those of Sariolghalam, who has serious 
misgivings about the possibility of Iran entering into coalition (cooperative)-building 
with the GCC, because of different cultural, ideological and political differences. As 
Kraig also mentions, it seems that the preferred form of achieving stability and 
security is not via a multilateral coalition in the PG, but via a two-party coalition 
across regions' bilateral agreements with an outside power (based on the hegemonic 
principles or on traditional realpolitik) 43 Hence, regional multilateralism only plays a 
secondary role in PG security. For instance, the GCC, qua multilateral organisation, 
does not have the necessary expansion potential via its membership or the 
organisation's authorisation to be able to be the basis for a new PG security 
arrangement. Firstly, its too exclusionist character does not allow for easy expansion 
(to include Iraq, Iran and Turkey, for instance), unlike analogous European 
organisations. The GCC is limited to Arab monarchies with mostly similar domestic 
structures and foreign policies who share similar interactions with the US. Other 
similarities among the GCC members is that they all see Islamic fundamentalism a 
threat, widely agree about the intra-GCC trade expansion, and share similar political 
alignments both with other PG and non-PG countries. However, -despite their 
similarities, GCC states have often been engaged in arms buying as a means to deter 
and balance one another or as a way to obtain leverage within the organisation. Unlike 
NATO in Europe during the Cold War, which was able to harmonise and conduct its 
different countries' military capabilities towards a collective and overarching political 
objective, such integration in the case of the GCC states looks to have limited 
potential. While GCC states may have established viable deterrents against each other 
and Iran, they have not done so with regard to other potential foes and remain a net 
consumer, as opposed to net producer, of security 44 Under such conditions, it is hard 
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to accept that the GCC can have a serious role in a regional collective cooperation 
model for the PG. 
Secondly, reconciling the GCC's relatively new nation-states for a greater 
authorisation of this organisation is debatable. Consensus on such strong multilateral 
security organisation requires conceding some of their sovereignty over diplomatic, 
economic and military affairs. It also requires much liberalisation and transparency 
and GCC states are less than enthusiastic to join a wide cooperative effort that would 
give every member the power to oversee and influence the domestic issues of other 
members, and thereby loose control over information, finance and defence choices. 
Generally speaking, it is GCC states' fragile political base along with an emerging 
sense of each state's national identity that have thus far alleviated attempts to 
cooperate more productively in different fields of foreign policy. Thereby, economic 
and military levers have thus remained largely under these states' sovereign control 
rather than applying them through a joint plan for action. Moreover, the reliance of 
each member of the GCC (instead of the whole organisation) on outside powers has 
been to the benefit of cooperating partners, especially the smaller ones, at the regional 
level when dealing with large nation-states. Accordingly, due to the relative 
deficiency of technology and industry and in some cases population among many ME 
countries, it would be impossible to deal with crises without considerable 
contributions from external powers 45 
Other studies, such as the Bertelsmann group, also highlight the importance of foreign 
actors' contribution to ensure security in the PG, due to the enormous amount of 
mutual suspicion in the region. However, the Bertelsmann group, while emphasising a 
positive contribution of foreign actors, stresses the necessity of reducing the foreign 
374 
military presence in the region where the main responsibility for establishing a new 
approach to PG security should be on regional states. However the problem as this 
study explains is that: 
Regional actors do not share a common threat perception, let alone a joint approach to 
regional security. They have tended to view interaction as a zero-sum game, and their 
relations have almost exclusively been conducted on a bilateral basis. A shared 
approach to regional security has never emerged and multilateral designs have never 
been seriously considered a6 
US hegemonic power in the region, Kraig notes, significantly contributes to such a 
network of merely bilateral relationships. It signifies that in any future PG security 
plan, US actions should be taken into account, a matter that could easily become a 
prohibitive factor and de-motivate the spending of large amounts of political or 
financial capital in constructing a security model when Washington gets what it wants 
through bilateral regardless. In addition, there is not any certainty about the US trend 
for multilateral local cooperation in the economic fields; evidently it is in its interests 
to sustain oil prices as low as possible. Cooperation in the PG would result in its 
attaining more economic power, particularly if an independent regional energy 
organisation was established. Such regional cooperation has been successfully 
experienced in Europe, where the US goals have been to promote a strong side by side 
EU and NATO for concurrent growth of economic and military power. Yet, there is 
not any resemblance between US goals in Europe and its goals in the PG. However, 
without greater economic cooperations between littoral states, a basis for stronger 
security interactions in the PG does not seem to be approaching. In order for there to 
be regional security, the US has to prepare for higher oil prices; a question which 
examines Washington's security strategy in the PG. 47 
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Furthermore, from a political point of view, the US doesn't support any kind of 
coalition or regional cooperation of the GCC with Iran. This can be perceived from 
debates of analysts such as Bill, who notes, 
The US seeks to prevent the rise of independent-minded regional hegemons [such as 
Iran] (... ) [and] seeks to control the behaviour of regional hegemons in regions rich in 
geostrategic significance and natural resources. (... ) [Hence], as part of its policy of 
containment and control, the US enlists the support of regional allies. In the Middle 
East, this role is played by the GCC countries and Israel. 48 
Nevertheless, Kraig provides some reasons why the multilateral policy options should 
be at least tested alongside traditional bilateral ties: stating for example that the 
reliance on bilateral coalition with external powers has had so many negative 
consequences which contribute to domestic instability by showing the lack of 
government's ability to defend the country and thus give the impression of the state's 
dependence on `neo-imperial powers'. The role of external powers arguably prevents 
any consideration of the regional states in creating their own defence frameworks. It 
contributes to the current policy inertia that favours bilateral, and not multilateral, 
agreements for defence. Such outside contributions may also remove the need for 
greater regional cooperation in general, and may bring with them the particular 
ideological value systems and associated foreign policy goals of the outside players. 
The latter includes the effects of systemic competition between external powers, such. 
as the US, China and Russia. Aid to ME/PG countries with antipathy towards the US, 
especially Iran, is seen, for instance, as a way of uncooperative practice of China and 
Russia against the US. It may also embrace the domestic, political and economic 
objectives of the non-regional powers, i. e. the fact that the US, Europe, Russia, and 
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China need to keep their arms industries at high levels to satisfy domestic lobbies and 
facilitate unemployment. 
Most importantly, external powers' interference, particularly the US preferred 
strategy of bilateralism, may in the end overwhelm the stabilising aspects of the 
balance of power in the region; in such a context, actions such as the purchase of 
weaponry and the forging of alliances would have completely different meanings for 
competitors; what one side might see as a deterrent action the other side might 
perceive as an offensive action.. The latter can evidently be perceived as regards the 
differing perceptions of Arabs and Iran with regard to whether the Israeli nuclear 
weapons are there only as a deterrent. After all, there is a fundamental security 
dilemma in the region which is the lack of systematic interregional relationships, 
specifically in respect to political and military affairs. Consequently, there is no 
specific interaction between the large and small regional states, neither between the 
three PG poles (Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) or a systematic way for Iraq and Iran to 
interact with the GCC states. Moreover, no serious process or forum exists for this 
interaction to take place., 
To sum up the results: different policies of selective multilateralism, bilateralism and 
unilateralism have been ineffective and even disastrous in bringing about security in 
the PG. The reason for such a failure is simply because the most prominent states 
support inextricably exclusionary types of coalition. The outcome of all of the 
mentioned policies, besides a general political isolation, is the systematic exclusion, 
economically or militarily, of a major state and of non-state actors in the security 
order. If the major idea of a coalition is being opposed to someone else, then it is in 
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principle impossible for that coalition to be seen as legitimate to all, and therefore it 
would be unable to assimilate all the regional actors' major interests. 
9 
Alternatives 
Various changes in the global political landscape, most especially those that have 
occurred since the end of the Cold War, have provided a fresh opportunity to develop 
a new approach to international security. This new approach is one which places 
particular emphasis on patterns of cooperation. One viable path towards a more 
sustainable security situation in any region would be to stress the growing importance 
of economic developments and the role of regional and international organisations in 
increasing security. Examples of this would be the EU (European Union) and APEC 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), which increase security by fostering 
interdependency with other regions through increased cooperation; or the UN, which 
affects regional security affairs by means of its different peacekeeping missions. Not 
only have the changes in the global political landscape enabled the development of a 
new general approach to international security, they also offer an opportunity to 
develop a sustainable form of security in the PG, which is the most geopolitical region 
of the world. This can be achieved by a close analysis and evaluation of various 
successful cooperation models that are to be found in other regions of the globe. 
Given the new global landscape, the best proposal for a new security framework for 
the PG would be one that relied on fostering cooperative relationships among national 
military establishments, rather than confrontational relationships. The justification for 
this is that according to many theorists, such as Nolan, traditional security methods 
that are based on massive military confrontation are no longer particularly effective or 
even acceptable to global public opinion 50 
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Furthermore, as Ehteshami, Russell and Kraig observe, in any appropriate alternative 
strategy for security in the PG that aims to ensure sustainability it is crucial to 
maintain a clear distinction between short-term requirements and long-term goals or 
expectations 51 Apropos of this distinction, see the argument of the previous chapter 
on Iran. There it was argued that in addition to the need to construct comprehensive 
multilateral coalitions, it is important to recognise the significance of the relationship 
between major regional and non-regional powers to achieve a durable and long term 
security situation in any region. 
In addition to these conditions, the situation since 2003 and the downfall of Saddam's 
regime (which was the greatest obstacle to developing lasting security in the PG), has 
also created a greater and unprecedented opportunity for regional cooperation. 
Moreover, in doing so, they have inadvertently provided the conditions for the 
creation of new security arrangements in this region. 
One possible approach to the issue of security in the PG is to study security models 
applied in other regions of the world and consider whether they may be profitably 
applied to the PG. Among the various alternatives, the Asian model in the form of 
trade, financial, and political arrangements among countries of East Asia has been 
proposed as that most suitable for developing a better partnership between Iran, the 
GCC and the EU. The types of arrangements of the new Asian regional architecture 
include bilateral free trade agreements (FFAs), regional trade pacts, currency and 
monetary arrangements, and political and security arrangements. The East Asian 
regional architecture is supported by two distinct pillars. The economic pillar is strong 
and growing more intense through developing a web of bilateral and regional bilateral 
free trade agreements - like an East Asian Economic Community (with 13 nations), 
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an East Asian FTA (with 16 nations), and an Asia Pacific FTA (with 21 nations) - 
where the political and security pillar has remained relatively underdeveloped. 
Regarding security, the most progress has been made with the Association of South 
East Asian Nations acting as convener and has taken the form of the ASEAN Security 
Community (10 Southeast Asian nations) and ASEAN Regional Forum (25 nations, 
including the United States). 52 As Bertelsmann's group and others, such as Jones, 
remark, as a starting point this model is likely to be the most appropriate one for the 
PG, because it offers a set of arrangements that in the repletion of time could be 
extended to the rest of the ME too. This model is supported by a set of overlapping 
bilateral and multilateral dialogue structures which have, in turn, been built around 
several general principles of regional conduct. 
However, in this study the EU will be looked at as an interesting framework for PG 
security, as it is itself a successful model using the supporting method of dialogue 
structures. In any case, an alternative approach would be to encourage the 
involvement of Asian-Pacific countries, such as China, India and Japan, whose 
growing dependence on energy supplies from the PG has increased their desire to 
have a greater geopolitical role in maintaining security in the PG independent from 
the US. This may be a key to promoting regional stability. 53 
In general, what the discussion thus far has shown is that the important, interlocking 
elements needed to establish a workable, legitimate and authoritative security model 
in the PG can be categorised as follows: an inclusive and multilateral approach; a 
balance of power, preferably through arms control negotiations among all three 
regional key players; domestic developments and reforms in the littoral states, such as 
those suggested by different authors including Rathmell [et al]. 4 However, this thesis 
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would propose that these would be adding to an appropriate international political 
environment with a proper international security system's structure. The details of the 
major elements of such a security approach are as follows: 
To address the issues of legitimacy and authority there should be a comprehensive 
understanding of security by all parties, one that includes a consensus on security 
goals and economic and socio-political reforms. It should also include all PG states' 
security concerns, especially the aim of shaping a multilateral framework and a real 
sense of mutual gain. Despite contradictory national interests and the existence of 
disagreements over sovereignty, the role of dialogue and diplomatic engagement 
within the region for developing a cooperative, comprehensive and multilateral 
security framework that is based on reassurance as well as deterrence and coercion is 
significant. In this regard, as Kraig notes, to achieve a concerted multilateral approach 
"a new cooperative framework need not compete with existing bilateral relationships, 
and that the framework could be built incrementally over many years, even 
"ss decades. 
The deterrent system is an important consideration for any PG security model. As 
Holsti argues, it is one of the requirements for constructing a comprehensive 
multilateral coalition. According to Holsti, a deterrent system is necessary to prevent 
aggression or antagonistic actions that would undermine the new system. Referring to 
Kraig, Holsti's systemic conception differs in particular from the US' global and 
regional strategies; according to his conception, "deterrence should ideally be seen as 
an integral part of the multilateral order, not as the policy of one state against another 
on a bilateral basis. "56 
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There is a consensus among observers regarding the impact and destabilising effects 
of the presence of foreign forces in the region on the domestic issues of the GCC 
states. Foreign military presence, especially since 1990, has also had an impact on the 
GCC states' relations with their two large neighbours and consequently any security 
system in the PG. As Ehteshami and the Bertelsmann group note, in the long term the 
presence of all the foreign forces, including those from the US, should be significantly 
reduced and there should also be a reduction in the reliance of the collective security 
system on ultra regional powers. One alternative that has been suggested is a low- 
profile presence, along the lines of what Russell has described as "lily-pad" or "warm 
bases" in various PG host states, which can be used to prevent a massive military 
presence in the ME. This would limit the vulnerability of American forces in the 
region. However, such ready-to-activate bases would be counter-productive, 
especially regarding Iran, which does not welcome any foreign forces presence 
especially the US. 57 However, others such as Kraig have stressed the need for an 
external contribution to improve the security situation within the region, owing to the 
fragility of domestic politics and interstate relations. 58 
Therefore, the US needs to address two major issues: the first involves improving its 
relations with Iran as the major regional power; the second involves supporting a 
collective regional security system which is able to guarantee regional and ultra 
regional countries' interests. Addressing these two issues would create an opportunity 
to achieve the long term goal of complete military withdrawal from the region, such 
as that achieved by Britain more than thirty years ago with a lower financial and 
military cost but nonetheless greater stability. However, in order to achieve such a 
level of CBM given the existing long history of mistrust and mutual suspicion 
between all littoral states, the passage of time, good will and cooperation and an 
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appropriate and workable security mode are all vitally important. In the next section, a 
model for workable security will be suggested. 
The key issue for achieving a durable collective security approach will remain Iran- 
US relations. However, it is possible to create a counterbalance to the US hegemony 
through dialogue within the region, as well as dialogue with the non-regional powers 
with interests in this region. By building partnerships with major international powers, 
such as China and the EU, so that they take a greater role in the PG security matters, 
the US hegemony could be reduced. 
Lessons fron the Establishment of the European Union 
The issue in this section is whether the lessons learned during the transformation of 
Europe from an area of conflict into a security community could be validly applied in 
the PG region. If the lessons are applicable to the PG region, then studying the EU's 
security framework will be instructive and useful. Bjorn Moller's study of security 
models and their applicability to the PG is one of the best and most comprehensive 
studies of the European transformation. Consequently, the discussion here will mainly 
follow his. 
Bjorn Moller 
During the Cold War, realists argued that the West's political strategy of containment, 
with its purpose of maintaining the status quo and preventing the USSR from 
expanding towards the Western Europe, would result in stability. This was 
subsequently shown to be mistaken. As a defence strategy, containment soon became 
militarised and even nuclearised. It was perceived as a matter of impeding or deterring 
a military attack by military tools. The result was the necessity of a military alliance 
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similar to NATO, which resulted in a rough and disproportionate balance of power 
between the Eastern and Western pacts of NATO and Warsaw. Another consequence 
was a permanent arms race. However, there was little support in the West for 
alternative security models, such as `defensive, ' non-provocative' or `confidence- 
building defense' models, which place more burden on the balance of `mutual 
defensive superiority' rather than military strength to deter an attack from the other 
parties. Anyhow, Europe's military security problem was only solved when in the late 
1980s the USSR President Gorbachev's initiative for arms control was suggested. 59 
In discussing the concept of `mutual defensive superiority' as an integrated issue with 
the political strategy of common security, Moller argues that it was perceived as a 
way of obtaining the most advantage from the military stand-off. This is because of 
the implication that there would be no absolute winner from conflicts but mutual 
losses, particularly in respect of the use of nuclear weaponry. Hence, despite 
constraints on security concerns that arose from national interest and also in spite of 
divergent conceptions of common security, collaboration - even between opponents 
- was the more reasonable course. Trade was the major factor of the European 
security approach that engendered peaceful interaction, a real interdependency, and 
led to integration. The evidence for this lies in the fact that the EU, which evolved 
from the "European Coal and Steel Community", is the most successful of all 
European security models. 60 
This model of developing security through interdependency, which offers a 
completely non-military path to security and peace, may nonetheless, as Moller 
remarks, be combined with such military safeguards through collective security 
arrangements. Hence, even after the Cold War and in spite of the dissolution of the 
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Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991 respectively, NATO is still 
active and even seeks out new activities in other parts of the world. Among the new 
activities its role was limited to being a peacekeeping force within its traditional 
geographical bounds and to providing so-called `training' for former Eastern bloc 
member states on the civil-military relations befitting a democracy. However, it has 
recently extended its ventures beyond such geographical limits with the new role of 
military interventionism. As Moller notes, however, despite some humanitarian 
interventions, "suggestions to the effect that for NATO this was the logical behavior 
of an alliance that had simply abandoned its geopolitical self-definition in favour of 
seeing itself as a "community of values" ring rather hollow. v961 
However, the task of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe), one of the most important European organisations after the EU, which 
during the Cold War had a major role in maintaining regional peace, has since been 
kept in low-profile. This is an organisation with a long-history during the Cold War of 
supporting and encouraging the signing of agreements on CBMs, as well as 
confidence and security-building measures. Even some attempts, such as those 
pursued by Moscow, to raise the OSCE's role by developing this organisation into a 
major institution in Europe tasked with maintaining collective security have 
effectively been made redundant by NATO. Moller however, observes that despite 
this barrier the OSCE can still play an important role in fostering peace and security 
in the region via democratisation 62 
Hence, Moller, in a review of the old theory of "democratic peace" (which has its 
origins in Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" of 1795) by authors like Bruce Russett, 
Nils Petter Gleditsch, Havard Hagre, concludes that this theory has experienced a 
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significant renaissance since 1990. Moller finds the `monadic' version of this theory 
implausible on account of its claim that democratic countries are inherently peaceful: 
the pre-emptive military actions of the US and Israel are cases in point. The `dyadic' 
version, despite involving the less radical claim that democracies do not go to war 
against each other, also comes under criticism. It is unable to give a clear definition of 
war or an adequate answer to the question of how high to determine the standards for 
democracy (e. g. NATO's war against Serbia). 
Moller also rejects the third version of "democratic peace", the `strong systemic' 
version, as unrealistic insofar as "it envisages a democratic structure for the world. " 
Moller himself suggests a `weak systemic' version according to which, as he explains, 
"the system would be more democratic the more its constituent parts are so. The 
number of state dyads, between which war would be possible, would simply decline 
with the spread of democracy. " He concludes that if the "democratic peace" theory is 
correct then, it would be rational for states, including democracies, to democratise 
their neighbours, not just peacefully but using force if needed. The EU, being an 
organisation which offers various economic and security advantages, is a unique 
community of which every European state would like to be a part of. Therefore, the 
EU has the power and influence to require them to meet demanding standards of 
63 reforms before they are permitted to join the organisation. 
To explore whether European security models are applicable to the PG region, Moller 
examines the fact that the PG states interact on security issues more than they do with 
other countries (except the US). For this, Moller employs Barry Buzan's concept of a 
regional security complex (RSC), which places emphasis on the undividable 
relationship between the common primary security concerns of a group of states and 
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their individual national security concerns. As a means of understanding regional 
dynamics from both inside states and beyond states to international organisations, 
Moller places his emphasis on the interaction among states. The assumption of stable 
regional dynamics is that states have "socio-political cohesion based on a well- 
defined `idea' of the state, as well as the appropriate physical basis and institutional 
expression. " This is a stable base for preventing states from being driven by domestic 
political agendas to cause regional instability. 64 
However, the PG states are categorised as `weak states' because of their domestic and 
regional problems, such as religious or ethnic minority issues, lack of democracy, 
unresolved border disputes with each other, and what Moller calls `procedural 
legitimacy'. They also suffer from a low amount of "maturity, " where mutual 
recognition of sovereignty is still an unsolved issue among neighbours and there is the 
risk of conflicts and war forming between neighbours as well as with ultra-regional 
states. In sum, such domestic political instability with its impact on inter-state 
relations would result in regional instability as a whole. Despite the lack of common 
threat perception among the PG states, such fragile interstate relations and the absence 
of experience in coordinating a collective security approach, Moller notes that "the 
region does exhibit certain patterns of restraint, based on a shared commitment to 
important values and a certain commitment among states to the survival of all as well 
as an embryonic institutional framework. "65 
However, especially in reference to the present situation, Moller concludes that there 
definitely is not a unipolar system; neither is there any possibility of fostering a new 
form of bipolarity or a stable security approach of balance of power in the PG. In this 
regard he notes that the new definitions, like Huntington's, which divide the globe 
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between the West and the rest of the world, might even work as a unifying agent for 
the region. Regarding the region's lack of a major divisive issue over which there 
could develop bipolarity among neighbouring states, and further encourage clashes 
between them, Moller notes that despite the great divergence between Shiite and 
Sunni groups the division is not strong enough to serve as the basis for entrenched 
polarisation and conflict between and within the PG states. Given the existence of the 
three major poles of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (GCC), Moller believes that a tripolar 
structure is likely. However, the problem is that the balance of power between these 
three is delicate and very asymmetrical; (see Table 11-2) also temporary alignments of the 
classical kind of two against the third pillar have proved fragile. The other problem is 
that, in comparison with Europe, institutionalisation in this region is far more 
promising; there are no inclusive regional arrangements or institutions dealing with 
the various issues facing the PG. Most regional problems get discussed bilaterally. 
The GCC is the only form of institutionalised security cooperation, but, as Moller 
points out, "rather than seeking to involve Iran and Iraq, the GCC has (so far) merely 
sought to deter them, mainly by serving as a vehicle for ensuring US support. " 
Another problem is that despite the significance of indirect means to achieve security, 
such as establishing a network of economic and other ties for promoting peace and 
stability via interdependency as did the EU, the PG states have not been able to take 
advantage of such methods 66 
Table 11-2 
The Balance of Power between the Three Regional Powers 
Legend: Normal: prior to 2003, italics: after 2003 
Source: Bjorn Moller 
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Consequently, as Moller also recognises, the security situation up to 2003 was the 
best opportunity to provide a stable security approach in the PG. Iraq was weak, Iran's 
military threat was much weaker than it is today, with Tehran's more pragmatic 
foreign policy looking for normalisation with the GCC, especially under the 
presidency of Khatami and his dynamic detente foreign policy. The weak GCC, which 
was taking advantage of the US security umbrella, instead of making war against Iraq 
had the opportunity to stabilise the situation via diplomatic means as well as arms 
control negotiations. (See Table 11-3) However, by electing to pursue a dual containment 
strategy against Iran and Iraq b 
Washington missed this great opportunity. aý' 
Table 11-3 





























Support (Security guarantees) 
Phase 4 
Support (Security guarantees) 
(Security community, collective security, general security guarantees) 
SOurce: Bjorn Moller 
Other Studies o/'Serurity Models 
Other analysts like Richard Russell also believe that for stable security architecture in 
the volatile region of the PG (even in the post-Saddam era) there is no alternative to 
balance of power politics, nor can Iran he excluded from any regional security 
arrangements. As Joseph McMillan, Richard Sokolsky and Andrew Winner argue, 
"the region needs regularized multilateral connections on security and related issues 
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that encompass all the key players in the region namely, Iraq, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. s68 
Such multilateral connections will promote transparency and build trust that will 
enable the development of a new security network with more formal security 
institutions, similar to those used in Europe during the Cold War. As Pollack, Takeyh, 
Cook and Ehteshami for instance, have detailed in various ways, the PG needs a 
gradual approach, which would begin with the establishment of a regional-security 
forum for debates, the exchange of information and even for the formulation of 
agreements. This could be a move towards confidence building measures, such as 
exchanges of views, information and even observers, or also building links for 
multilateralism with the final intention of developing arms-control pacts. Eventually, 
69 these would lead to a full security system similar to institutions such as OSCE. 
Hence, Russell praises the flexibility of a balance-of-power strategy for the PG and 
argues that this would be a very good thing for the US. He emphasises that if this 
strategy is employed alongside over-the-horizon military capabilities, it would be 
beneficial to the mutual interests of both the US and the regional-security partners. 0 
Moreover, analysts and scholars, as well as policy-makers, have drawn similar 
conclusions concerning the two dominant contending frameworks for PG security: US 
hegemony and principled multilateralism. These conclusions are viewed as even more 
valid in the post-Saddam era. 
Rathmell [et al], for instance, argue that in the post-Saddam era none of the US 
alternative models of security, either to unilaterally attempt to enforce a democratic 
system or to act merely as external balancer in the traditional balance-of-power 
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approach, will work. They emphasise the disadvantages of the US hegemony strategy 
and the heavy dependence on a forward US military presence to provide the region's 
security. Instead, Rathmell [et al] suggest that because of a wide range of national, 
regional and international issues related to developments in the PG, the US and 
Europe need to work together to construct a more sustainable PG security system 
based on a combination of balance of military power between Iran, Iraq and the GCC, 
and broad political and economic reforms to tackle the political and socio-economic 
problems causing reasons for discontent and extremism in the region. Besides 
Europe's strategic interest in the PG such as its greater dependency than the US on 
PG energy supplies, close ties with the region by a network of economic and political 
linkages and deep concerns regarding US permanent hegemony in the ME/PG, as 
Rathmell [et al] remark, EU's perception that it needs military power to back up its 
soft power and prove its ability to be a more effective partner to the US in this region 
is understandable. 1 
However, what makes the European Union's role in the PG security especially 
valuable is its less confrontational policy towards the region than that of the US. Also, 
it has the power and influence to foster practical reforms. Its policy of `critical 
dialogue' with Tehran in 1990s, despite US discontent, and its demanding standards 
of reform before expanding its economic ties with the GCC are some examples of 
when it has used its considerable economic and institutional ties to make a real 
contribution to moderation and stability in the region. Moreover, as was mentioned in 
previous chapters, since 2004 the EU decision to create a rapid reaction force (RRF) 
independently of NATO, in spite of its small and limited forces, could be a starting 
point for the EU to take a more significant geopolitical role in the strategic region of 
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the PG. Hence, there is a long list of reasons for not only the US, but also the littoral 
states, to involve the Europe/EU more in any future PG security system. 
Kraig is another writer who has also questioned the continuing strategy of US 
hegemony. 72 He suggests, an alternative, quite different security approach would be a 
`principled multilateral' approach, which is distinguished by its inclusiveness and 
basic recognition of the inherent rights of all PG states, especially those regarding 
legitimate measures for self-defence and regime survival. It also includes a rule-based 
system in which international law is applicable to all actors in the PG, including the 
US. The major hypothesis of principled multilateralism is that "security is sought 
with other states, rather than against them, and that domestic developments in the 
Gulf will follow a more beneficial course if all states are gradually intertwined in a 
"73 web of military and economic agreements that create strong interdependence. 
An Alternative; PG Security Model of Pyramid 
In designing a model that addresses the need for collective security architecture for 
the PG region, this thesis has come up with a model of developing security through 
the feelings of attachment and interdependency which should occur when the littoral 
states have a single geopolitical vision. The following factors with some new 
mechanisms are its major principles: 
Geopolitics, which, being the most fixed and firm feature of the region, will 
provide the basis for discussion. Geopolitics is the major convergent element 
among the PG states: it shows that every state, as a part of this geopolitical 
region, has a unique and non-ignorable place in the security system. 
Irrespective of their size, all states have a similar, though unequal, weight. It 
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also shows that how important is for regional states to take advantage of 
geopolitical significance of the PG as a power/knowledge which would enable 
them to play a major role in the balance of power politics in the international 
system and be able to take advantage of various opportunities resulting from 
geopolitical developments, to their best interests as well as the region's 
security and stability. Urging littoral states to have global and not merely 
regional geopolitical perspectives would result in a single geopolitical vision 
as a power/knowledge for all the regional states in the PG. Only by addressing 
this fragile region as a whole, not as divided states and groups of individuals 
ranged against the other states or groups, would it be possible to prevent 
further geopolitical problems in this region and change the traditional 
disruptive role of geopolitical significance of the PG in the region's security to 
enable it to become a convergent element. Under such circumstances, 
geopolitics would work as an element for encouraging cooperation among all 
beneficiary parties instead of being an expansion lever of the external powers. 
- The need to include all littoral states. The attitude of all PG states should be 
that of mutual partners attempting to achieve global and regional security, 
irrespective of a diversity of dissimilar state ideologies. 
The balance of military power between the region's three major players: Iran, 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia (GCC). This balance should not be of the classical kind 
of two against the third, but should preferably be maintained through arms 
control negotiations. 
- The need to assure the interests of all regional and non-regional players. 
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Acknowledging the necessity of a proper and positive relationship between the 
strongest regional actor and the non-regional player (with great influence and 
interest in that region), as a general and certain principle to attain regional 
security in any region, including in the PG. Based on the single successful 
occurrence of the twin-pillar security model in the PG, as well as the need to 
construct comprehensive multilateral coalitions, the key factor in achieving a 
durable collective security approach in the PG will remain Iran-US relations. 
The need for there to be no foreign military presence (in the long-term) or 
dominance (in the short-term) in the region, as this affects the regional balance 
of power and is a source of instability. It is also a cause of radicalism and a 
major obstacle to reform. 
Introducing a fourth element to previous categories of the important, 
interlocking elements needed to establish a workable, legitimate and 
authoritative security model in the PG. An appropriate international political 
environment with a proper international security system's structure is added to 
other three elements of: an inclusive and multilateral approach; a balance of 
power, preferably through arms control negotiations among all three regional 
key players; and domestic developments and reforms in the littoral states. 
The last and most important element of integration is people's 
communication/interconnections. Developing and capitalising on these will 
increase a nation-state's soft power and also strengthen the regional security 
situation. 
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The importance of this model stems not just from the role that states have in its 
architecture and their effect on its functionality, but also that some consideration is 
given to the role of people (even sub-national groups), their interactions, as well as 
their satisfaction. The reasons for this emphasis are as follows: 
a) As the fundamental part of any nation-state, people have a significant role in the 
success of any cooperation model. Therefore, in the process of reform in the PG 
states' national governments will be obliged to consider their role more seriously, 
which in the current century should be a compulsory requirement. 
b) Interpersonal communication is important to prevent an escalation of 
confrontational feelings between Arabs and Persians, or the further development of 
political theories that specify the clashes between civilisations as a reason for the 
differences in cultural and religious identities (according to the Huntington's theory). 
At present (the 21S` century) this is a major challenge that all littoral states are 
confronted with. 
c) President Khatami's theory of dialogue among civilisations in international 
relations should be acknowledged within the PG to be significant. The theory has 
been recognised internationally to correctly emphasise the importance of dialogue, 
despite cultural diversities. However, its particular applicability to the PG is owing to 
the experience of peaceful coexistence of the " people in this region long before 
foreigners' dominance over the PG, which began in the 15`h century, and the policy by 
foreigners to `divide and rule' to increase ethnic confrontational feeling among people 
in this region. Hence emphasising this theory at the present is specifically important 
because of current regional ethnic disputes, which have greatly increased since the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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In other words, the emphasis of this model on the role of people is supported by the 
modem world's wider and more complex set of interactions, in addition to the 
growing capacity and importance of and emphasis on reforms which encourages 
nations and groups to have more influence on world affairs. Even expansionist 
geöpoliticians such as Huntington acknowledge the growing influence of people 
(individuals and groups) where he downplays the continuing major power of the 
nation-states, and assumes `cultures' of people as the dominant source of conflicts in 
the future global politics. It is in such a world that Huntington's post-Cold War 
strategic debate, with its aim of maintaining the US as the premier global power, is 
based on, stressing the importance of "renewing its Western civilization from within 
and actively containing, dividing and playing off other civilizations against each 
other"74 PG states should be aware of such a divide and rule policy and overcome 
their domestic and regional problems. This argument is supported by the efforts made 
to spread the concept of the new war against terrorism, and ideas like Huntington's 
perception of the potentially rough conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations 
as a defining feature of an evolving world order. 
Moreover, the new political climate after Saddam, which has caused a growing 
sectarian issue in the region, would urge the PG states (especially the GCC who have 
discriminated and oppressed Shiites who form a large segment of several of their 
populations, and the growing anti-government religious militancy, specifically Sunni 
radical Muslims) to overcome their domestic and regional problems. It is important to 
include Yemen in the pyramid security model, since it is a major state in the vicinity, 
and a source of radicalism. 
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As was studied in previous chapters on internal threats, the GCC states are aware of 
the need for domestic reform to make their regimes more stable and their economies 
more vibrant, however their domestic socioeconomic and political problems confront 
them with rigorous restrictions in their attempts to carry out real reforms. Despite this 
fact, the GCC states are advised to implement real reforms sooner rather than later. 
For instance, as Malik and Niblock note, the reforms undertaken by the Saudi regime 
so far suffer from two problems: 
First, they have mostly been implemented slowly and partially. There is the danger, 
already apparent in the country, that economic reform may become more difficult the 
longer it is left. Rising unemployment and deteriorating social conditions, fed by one 
of the highest rates of population growth in the world (... ), will intensify political 
unrest and social disruption. Second, the reforms are still inadequate. The wider 
reforms that are needed are in many ways the most difficult, and will require a greater 
social and political transformation than has so far been envisaged. Greater 
transparency and accountability will be needed, and the educational and social 
facilities offered to Saudis must enable Saudi labour to be as productive as 
migrant/expatriate labour. 75 
Moreover, as Turki Al-Hamad states, due to issues, especially the consequence of 
very high corruption and . uncountable government spending levels, 
"The 
unconditional social agreement of loyalty in return for free social services between the 
rulers and the ruled in the GCC states has been shaken. 06 Also, due to potential 
reductions in oil revenues (which have worked as legitimate factor for all regional 
states) unrest may increase as government resources diminish in the future; this will 
probably contribute towards further socio-political instability. Any decline in socio- 
economic opportunities, e. g. imposing a tax system, may motivate requests for 
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political reforms and deliver greater political participation to citizens. However, the 
reform process needs time and a specific education of the people (especially in this 
region with a combination of traditional values and modern culture and other current 
socio-political issues which has increased radicalism) to prevent social unrest or any 
possible confrontation with citizens, especially the large and restless younger 
generation who are unemployed and have high expectations. 
Domestic issues are pivotal problems facing Iranian society too. As the uneven 
economic and political development in Iranian society forced the Shah's regime to be 
overthrown, the threat to the new regime cannot be ignored or underestimated. 
Because of the revolution in particular, democracy is a necessity not a luxury for Iran 
more than for any other state in the ME. Democracy, and its promise to attract the 
investments it needs to put an end to high numbers of unemployment, is the only 
solution to its huge economic problems. Hence, as long as satisfying its people, the 
provision of wealth (as a major element to the success of a society, as well as a 
significant element of power and influence), and preparations towards democracy 
(giving the government soft and hard power as well as political legitimacy) are not the 
top priority of the IRI, Iran cannot become a stable regional power. This is 
particularly the case if Iran fails to reduce the tension in its relations with its 
neighbours in the PG and the West, particularly the US. Therefore, the regime's 
survival depends upon opening up the political system to more democratic 
participation and economic reforms in order to address its most strategic weakness. 
In sum, wider economic reforms and creating a regional economic interdependency 
would be a solution to the difficulties that all the PG states are facing. In the pyramid 
model, NGOs, private sectors and people's communications/interrelations are 
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employed to help shape dialogue as the basic step towards any CBM and 
interdependency. 
Nevertheless the orientation of the future global politics is important to whether they 
serve the interest of a premier global power or serve the benefit of a world which 
appreciates diversity and contains different nations and civilizations. This is where the 
thesis has come up with a fourth element to the previous categories of the interlocking 
elements needed to establish a functional security model in the PG, `an appropriate 
international political environment with a proper international security system's 
structure'. Therefore, it has stressed the necessity of considering more seriously 
President Khatami's theory of dialogue among civilizations in international relations. 
This theory, which was mainly provided in response to Huntington's, emphasises the 
importance of dialogue, despite cultural diversities, in a time where all nations and the 
globe itself need the most cooperation and harmony; some major examples of present 
day threats being the global warming, environmental degradation and resource 
depletion. 
Geometrical Functionality of a Pyramid Model 
I have designed this model as a pyramid, (see, figure i1-1) with three sides consisting of: 
A) The policies of the littoral Arab states. 
B) The policies of ultra-regional powers. 
C) Iran's Policies - As the most powerful regional player, with its geopolitical 
features, it has strategic depth and a naturally dominant position in the PG. One side 
of the pyramid is dedicated to Iran because as was mentioned earlier, to establish any 
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long term multilateral security approach a coalition of the strongest regional and 
global powers is needed to guarantee peace and stability. 
In addition to the three sides, the base of the pyramid, which interacts with all three 
sides, is the geopolitics of the PG. The reasons for taking geopolitics as the base are: 
A) The geopolitics of the PG should be treated as the determining factor of all 
regional and ultra regional interactions and relations: as geopolitics has an impact on 
every single nation-state's interests and national security and hence must always be 
the base of pyramid. It is the major axis of the security model. 
B) In any instance of an attempt by any of the three regional and non regional 
elements to ' change the base of the pyramid in its favour, the model will be 
destabilised and regional instability will be the result. In other words, in a balance of 
power based on geopolitics (including military power, arms races, or 
cultural/nationalist issues) if any party tries to ruin the balance (i. e., if there is too 
much movement of the vertex which means the picture of vertex will not be seen on 
the base `geopolitics' any more) history will repeat itself. If one of the countries 
involved gains too much weight, the other two would feel threatened and try to 
compensate. 
C) Every one of the three sides of the pyramid interacts with geopolitics as the 
regional axis, but also each member any pair of sides has some interaction with each 
other. In other words, there is bilateral as well as multilateral interaction between the 
sides. Also, at the vertex of this pyramid, triple interactions come together as the basis 
of the models' balancer. So long as the vertex of the pyramid is projected onto the 
geopolitics base, the stability of the region is guaranteed. 
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Figure 1 1-1 
The Pyramid Model 
Some Factors Influencing the /Functionality (#'the Model 
I believe this model can work on the basis of the mixed approaches of a cooperative- 
security (liberalism) framework and Realpolitik (realism). What is needed is a balance 
of interests between the three sides of' the pyramid. Without interaction and 
cooperation between these three sides, such that there is interdependency between 
them, this balance will not be achieved. Also, according to the cooperative model, the 
factor of equality and prosperity for all will mitigate any humiliations and weakness, 
and consequently reduce radical behavior. This will also give all states and nations 
opportunities to improve their own opportunities for peace, security and prosperity, to 
lower hostility and increase cooperation and it healthy interdependency. This can he 
achieved by decreasing investment in military capabilities and investing more in 
social wealth and prosperity. 
In this model the primary actor is the sovereign state, which will enter into verifiable 
agreements with other states, however a wide role is allocated to the people. Since the 
interactions of the nation-states, people and the governments, are important to 
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strengthen the cooperation model there should be a greater emphasis on promoting the 
convergence elements and eliminating the divergence elements. The stability of the 
pyramid arises from the interaction of nation-states through the axis of convergence 
elements existing between them. So, to prevent instability and preserve the authority 
of this model in the PG we should bear the following points in mind: 
A) We must pay attention to all major strategic elements of the PG (in the long-term), 
including the concerns of all states, which affect any regional security system. In 
insisting on this as a requirement of any new and viable multilateral PG framework, it 
would increase the possibility of all the littoral nation-states defining their national 
security in terms of their common values and interests, such as Islam, rather than their 
differences, such as the Shiite and Sunni division, or energy as the major economic 
source of all PG states. 
B) This model, with its emphasis on a balance of power by means of negotiations for 
arms control, along with its CBM, also aims to establish and encourage a broad 
understanding of security that includes its economic and social dimensions. This 
would also include making issues such as political reform, economic diversification 
and educational reform the key pillars of any sustainable framework. This argument is 
supported by the prevailing global atmosphere which since the end of the Cold War 
has places particular emphasis on patterns of cooperation, as well as on real domestic 
reforms, a pre-eminent global security issue in the post-9/11 world. Added to this is 
the the fact that, due to growing political discontent and radicalism within the GCC 
and also the spread and growing process of terrorism from the radical religious 
militants in the whole region which has intensified since 2003, the issue of applying 
domestic reforms is not simply construed as political prestige but as a necessity. 
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Moreover, recent regional developments support this argument that littoral states, both 
Iran and Arabs, have shown more serious interest in supporting the idea of an 
inclusive collective security arrangement for the region. 77 Each state, by increasing its 
stability via improving its social-economic standards and values, can upgrade its 
weight in this security framework, so social-economic dimensions will gradually 
become the most important geopolitical features of each state, irrespective of the size 
of the country. In such circumstances (i. e. a broader understanding of security), 
communication will become increasingly important for a more stable region. 
C) Construing geopolitics as the basis of this model could work as a deterrent system, 
due to its mentioned role as a convergent element among the PG states and as a shape 
of power/knowledge resulting from a single geopolitical vision. As was mentioned 
earlier, only by addressing this fragile region as a whole, would it be possible to 
prevent further geopolitical problems in this region. However, the littoral states would 
be able to take advantage of a single geopolitical vision in the international system if 
they make efforts to solve their domestic problems as well as their long-standing 
regional disputes, e. g. territorial and boundary disputes. This could be done through 
the improvement of the political conditions via extending confidence-building 
measurements and regional cooperation, especially by having greater economic 
interaction, and in particular by establishing various organisations to promote 
cooperation and the rule of law. Such a process, one that puts emphasis on soft, as 
opposed to exclusively hard, power would pave the way for the creation of a 
functional regional security arrangement. It also may effectively deter aggression or 
hostile actions that would otherwise undermine the pyramid. One of the organisations 
for promoting the rule of law should be an organisation tasked with preventing 
aggression or antagonistic actions that would undermine the new system. 
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By emphasising the geopolitical elements, especially socio-political and economic 
power, rather than military power it is possible to maximize domestic stability and 
political legitimacy while at the same time minimising the strength of the fear of 
bigger states by smaller states. The pyramid model connects the issues of legitimacy 
and authority closely with the issue of sustainability. This is primarily because the 
model construes the gains it aims to achieve as mutual gains for all participants, not as 
gains for one particular actor, or set of actors. It can thereby more plausibly make the 
assurance that remaining in the system will be in the interests of all the relevant 
parties. This would in turn lessen the possibility of any states withdrawing from the 
model because of any sudden ideological or political changes. 
Some Details and Suggestions 
A) The role of people and the private sector: among the various possible socio- 
economic interactions, trade is a particularly significant element for creating 
interdependency, which would in turn be peace-promoting. 
B) Europe and the key Asian Pacific region's states would also need to play a greater 
security role. However, the best security role can be obtained through increasing the 
interdependency of these regions with the PG states. Continuing efforts to strengthen 
the cooperation axis and interdependence between EU-AP and the PG may result in 
the following corollaries for the region: encouraging domestic developments in the 
PG; encouraging greater CBM among PG states as well as regulating regional and 
non-regional powers' relations and in some cases, such as US-Iran, to establish a new 
relations; cooperating with all relevant parties to control insurgencies and terrorist 
attacks in the region. This could assist the PG states to stabilise this model of 
cooperation until their CBMs have been sufficiently developed and they have been 
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assured of the functionality of this model. After this the over-the-horizon presence can 
even be reduced to nil. 
C) Given the considerable effect Iran can have on the security of the PG; its domestic 
stability as well as its permanent and stable foreign policy is very significant for the 
security and steadiness of this region. Detente foreign policy with an emphasis on the 
convergent elements with its neighbors is needed to assure regional and non regional 
parties of Tehran's peaceful goals. These can pave the way for guaranteeing the long 
term security which could result in foreign forces withdrawing from the region. 
D) Arab states will need to understand that the idea of multilateral security structures 
and the improvement of relations between Iran and the US are in their interests. 
Furthermore, they need not be concerned about a devaluation of their political weight 
and of being excluded from future decision-making in this region. To assuage the 
Arab states, especially the smaller or weaker countries, of their fear of Iran they 
would need to be assured that the establishment of regionally based security structures 
will not result in a reduced US military umbrella with a reciprocal Iranian move. 
Moreover, they would need to know that even if Iran had such ambitions Iran should, 
within the Pyramid model's regulation, first develop bases like CBM to assure its 
neighbours of its peaceful goals. 
E) Since integration in the PG has not been welcomed by the West and any 
multilateralism in this region might face some resistance, it is especially important to 
emphasise that stability in this geopolitical and geostrategic region has been proven to 
be essential to global peace and prosperity. So despite any possible resistances, 
forming such integration would be in the interests of everyone, rather than just 
flattering to the concerns of the great powers with huge interests in this region. 
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F) A further reason in favour of regional integration is that any regional cooperation 
and integrity within Islamic countries would be to the advantage of the Islamic world. 
Given that no unity can happen at once, it must occur region by region. This is an idea 
that is no doubt not particularly welcomed by the great powers, especially as they are 
spreading ideas like Huntington's or the concept of the new war against terrorism, 
which places great emphasis on reactions rather than its true causes. This can be 
addressed by considering and confronting real causes and problems, which is an 
approach that has been effective in other places, such as the recent IRA peace process 
in Northern Ireland. If there is any true willingness for peace in the ME there are 
many examples to follow: a plan like the Marshal Plan could easily work in this 
region. 
Some Practical Solutions 
The pyramid model can avoid the typical problems that arise for models based on a 
competition for power between states with conflicting national interests and agendas, 
like Russell's, 78 as it does not base a balance of power on such confrontational bases. 
The other tools for achieving the balance, like political-military contacts, confidence- 
building measures and arms control, can be provided via: 
Forums, used as initiatives for CBM in different fields. These forums could be 
the beginning of the establishment of different regional institutions in various 
fields (i. e., arms control, counter-terrorism, economic/trade, security, 
cultural/educational, etc. ) 
- Continuing current bilateral agreements and starting new multilateral 
agreements until there is real reassurance. New ties and agreements between 
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Iran-US and with the GCC should be explored, especially over geopolitical 
issues, like oil and gas, transportation networks, goods transition, etc. 
- To increase the geopolitical position of the PG and decrease the security threat 
to the status quo, Yemen should be included as a member of this region. 
Conclusion 
Various developments in the modem world have generated greater interconnectedness 
and interdependency between nation-states. Traditional security approaches based on 
military confrontation rather than cooperative relations have become increasingly 
untenable and are unlikely to succeed at all, especially in a significant geopolitical 
region like the PG, where issues of security have wide local, regional and global 
effects. 
The existence of such diverging opinions about the threats to regional security held by 
relevant parties in the PG, together with three decades of crises in this region, 
illustrate how urgent it is for the problem of regional security to be solved. 
Throughout this chapter, by studying possible conceptual and analytical foundations 
for the future shape of security . arrangements 
in the PG, several major needs for 
security were identified. The important, interlocking elements needed to establish a 
workable, legitimate and authoritative security model were categorised as follows: an 
inclusive and multilateral approach; a balance of power, preferably through arms 
control negotiations among all three regional key players; domestic developments and 
reforms in the littoral states, and an appropriate international political environment 
with a proper international security system's structure. 
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It was observed that this security model would be able to manage relations between 
states and create a regulation of power, which would mean the rule of `law' and not 
`the powers'. It would be a system with legitimacy and authority, as none of the actors 
would perceive itself to be outside the prevailing order. It would also create 
interdependence among the regional states themselves which would promote security, 
instead of reliance on the security umbrella of non-regional powers. Such a security 
model can also assure the gains it aims to achieve are mutual gains for all participants, 
and is thereby able to assure that it would be in the interests of all relevant parties' to 
remain in the system. 
It was noted that there is a general consensus among different authors and analysts 
that dialogue between states and organisations is the best tool for building confidence, 
settling disputes and deterring conflict in the PG. It was emphasised that engaging in 
dialogue is the only way to promote transparency, build trust and create a new 
security network with more formal security institutions. A starting point for 
formalising the security system would be the establishment of various organisations 
for promoting cooperation and promoting the rule of law. In addition to developing 
internal political dialogue to decrease the risk of extremist views, developing a 
network of military and economic agreements that create considerable 
interdependence among the PG states should also leave less room for discontent and 
extremism. This would further assist the process of domestic reform in the region. 
Rathmell [et al] and Kraig argue that this would be especially true of the newly 
formed cooperative arrangements, in which the financial and human capital of nation- 
states will be expended on civil, rather than military, development. 9 
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The result of such processes would be similar to the consistent political strategy 
(Marshal Plan) employed alongside a military strategy (NATO) in Europe during and 
after the Cold War. The PG states are wealthy enough that if they develop regional 
collective cooperation they will not need international financial aid to implement this 
strategy; they would mainly need the political and technological support of ultra- 
regional powers for a multilateral security approach. 
However, despite all the disadvantages of a selective security approach in the PG, 
Washington still prefers and employs bilateral defence arrangements and military 
tools rather than a political framework by offering to sell more arms to its regional 
allies against Iran. 
This is evidenced by the recent trip (August 2007) of the US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and the Defence Secretary Robert Gates to the region with the aim 
of launching Washington's new ME strategy of containment against Iran, arming its 
allies, obtaining support for an Iraq Shiite-led government and arranging a new 
conference for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. 80 The arming of US Arab 
allies was announced as a response to the growth of the threat of Iran, with the aim of 
reassuring them of continuing US support in the long term, especially after 
Washington and Tehran appeared to be entrenched their stances on Iran's nuclear 
programme. In this regard Gates remarked during this trip that, having been in the PG 
for some 60 years, the US has "every intention of being here for a lot longer". 
Moreover, Iran's unstable and unwise foreign policy, especially towards its PG 
neighbours, has paved the way for the US to continue its hegemonic regional security 
strategy. Its policy, especially regarding its nuclear programme, has served as an 
opportunity for the US to make a wider front in the ME against Iran. It has also paved 
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the way for closer ties between old enemies, Arab-Israeli, as they both see Iran as a 
common threat. 
However, US direct military involvement in the PG has not just been an expensive 
exercise for Washington, but has resulted in competing reactions from other parties 
with interests in this region, viz., China, the EU and Russia. It has also stimulated 
popular discontent in the host countries, particularly against Arab regimes. This 
situation has resulted in increasing militarism, whether in the form of extending the 
military presence and power of different regional and non-regional parties, directly or 
indirectly, or in the form of terrorist attacks. Therefore, a big question remains to be 
answered: what are the US real foreign policy goals in the MEIPG? Is there any 
willingness to build peace and security in this region or does Washington need at least 
one permanent enemy in the region to achieve its hidden hegemonic intentions, 
including arms sales? However, when giving any answer to these questions, the GCC 
as well as the US should be aware that although ME issues are highly interconnected 
the PG's problems, and the dilemmas facing the ME in particular, cannot be solved 
without the positive and cooperative role of Iran. 
However, the major role the littoral states themselves have in the establishment of 
durable security in the PG cannot be ignored; it remains a particularly glaring 
omission from the GCC's considerations. According to one high ranking diplomat of 
Bahrain, for instance, the major reason of their reliance on a US security umbrella is 
the GCC's fear of Iran. However, in response to the author's question about the 
existence of plans for a short or long term agenda to develop CBMs with Iran to 
overcome such fear, his response was completely negative. The point is that if the 
GCC has been able to continue to exist and overcome its members' differences and 
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disputes to work as a group, an inclusive, multilateral cooperation model that is to the 
advantage of all involved should be able to work. 
Besides the regional perception of the importance of cooperation models, the key 
issue will remain the US-Iran relationship, being the two major regional and non- 
regional powers. In addition, the role of other ultra regional players, especially those 
emerging powers like the EU and some key states in the AP (viz. China, India, Japan), 
in building a durable security framework is significant. Their strategic interest in the 
PG, such as their growing dependency on PG energy supplies which exceeds the 
US's, their close ties with the region by a network of economic and political linkages 
and their deep concerns over US permanent hegemony in the ME/PG have resulted in 
their recognition of a need for military power to back up their soft power. This 
military power is needed if they are to adopt a greater geopolitical role independently 
of Washington and if they are to counterbalance the balance of power controlled by 
the US in the PG. 
All the distrust, confrontational policies and preferred strategies for assuring each 
parties' interests in the PG have brought about continued threat to regional, as well as 
global, stability. Consequently, to prevent wider militarism in this narrow and volatile 
geostrategic waterway, and promote a real and substantial process of development in 
the PG states, it is necessary to encourage all parties to work together to construct a 
more durable security system which would be in the interests of all, via increasing 
global economic integration. By this process, the fourth interlocking element of the 
PG security system, which was described as an appropriate international political 
environment, would also be achieved. 
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This thesis holds that the Pyramid security model could be a solution to the very 
volatile situation in the PG, because in addressing major security issues this model is 
based on the geopolitical realities, as well as the political and economic concerns, of 
all regional and ultra-regional parties. In the modern world, with its wider and more 
complex sets of interactions and interdependencies, this model also appreciate the role 
of peoples' communication. Its emphasis on reforms will encourage positive 
competition among all littoral states to upgrade their weight in this security 
framework via greater civil development, rather than military power or territorial size. 
This is true for ultra-regional players too; in particular, by contributing towards the 
region's development they can upgrade their role in this region. 
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Final Conclusion 
The PG is one of the most significant geopolitical regions in the world as well as the 
main dominant energy source and gateway for global energy. These two elements, 
strategic and economic, which strengthened the region's vital significance to all 
littoral states, as well as the entire world economy and political life, have caused the 
PG to be a worthy rival to outside powers, particularly the West, as well being the 
most unstable and chaotic of any world region. 
The perceptions of what constitutes a threat to regional security varies among the 
Arabs, Iranians and the ultra regional powers, and all accordingly have different 
solutions to what they perceive as the problem. Nevertheless, regardless of the 
relevant parties' difference of opinion, all the consequent issues along with three 
decades of crises in the PG illustrate how urgent it is for the problem regarding 
regional security to be resolved. 
Therefore the objective of this thesis has been to provide a conceptual and analytical 
foundation for a discussion about the future shape of security arrangements in the PG 
that addresses the need for a stable and peaceful structure of relationships which will 
provide security for all individual littoral states, as well as assuring the interests of the 
external powers. 
Using the level of analysis framework as well as three fundamental, competing 
schools of thought regarding the practice of international security, it has been argued 
that cooperation is the best solution to the regional security problems in the ME, 
including its sub-region the PG. These arguments have been supported by the new 
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global political landscape, most especially those that have occurred since the end of 
the Cold War, in addition to various successful cooperation models that are to be 
found in other regions of the globe, e. g. the EU. 
To this end, this study has analysed various security models in this significant 
geopolitical region in the world since 1962, with special reference to Iran's foreign 
policy. Particular reference was made to Iran because of its geostrategic and 
geopolitical situation and as the hegemonic power in the PG, which regardless of its 
political regimes, has great national and security concerns and plays a determinant 
role in peace and security of the region. The main reason for choosing 1962 as the 
starting year of this study was the significant effect the successes and failures in Iran's 
foreign policy towards the PG have had on the stability and security of the region. 
Therefore, Iran's failures and successes in its policy towards the PG have been studied 
in the pre and post-revolutionary periods during 1962-1979. 
As it was shown, in order to attain regional security, besides the importance of 
considering the security concerns and national interests of both regional and non- 
regional players, it is imperative that the major regional and external players have 
suitable relations. No other alternative strategy would be able to fulfill regional and 
ultra regional interests and meet security concerns. In this regard, one of my major 
topics of analysis has been the behaviour of Iran and the US. Therefore, I have 
developed a cooperative model for a security system, the pyramid model, whereby 
which one of its major mechanism is such relationship. 
The issue of security has been studied from a combination of different perspectives, 
political, social, economic, geopolitical and international, all of which affect security 
in this region. Thereby this research has tried to study relations between these factors 
418 
as different variables relevant to modelling security in this region. Hence, in order to 
achieve a durable security of the PG this thesis has been designed in two parts to 
study the important geopolitical elements and security concerns and systems in this 
region. 
Geopolitical Discourses 
Focus on debates surrounding geopolitics has been applied to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical significance of the PG as a sub- 
system of the ME and its impact on the politics of the region, as well as on power 
struggles in international politics, besides concerns over access to its massive energy 
resources. It was shown, because of the geopolitical situation of the PG, particularly 
regarding its energy resources, how the rivalries and foreign policy goals of great 
powers were formed to have a greater geopolitical role in this region to further their 
strategic interests at the expense of the regional states, e. g. applying policy of `divide 
and rule', where regional states, especially major players, have not been able to act 
according to their best interests and assure their security concerns. Hence one of the 
thesis' emphases has been the necessity of having global and not merely regional 
geopolitical perspectives. This would result in a single geopolitical vision as a 
power/knowledge for all the regional states in the PG, which would enable them to 
understand their significant situation in the balance of power politics and be able to 
take advantage of various opportunities resulting from geopolitical developments, to 
their best interests as well as the region's security and stability. Moreover, other 
reasons for the littoral states for having a regional geopolitical perspective have been 
highlighted by studying their domestic, regional and external threats they are faced 
with. 
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It was concluded that only by addressing this fragile region as a whole, not as divided 
states and groups of individuals ranged against the other states or groups, would it be 
possible to prevent further geopolitical problems in this region and change the 
traditional disruptive role of geopolitical significance of the PG in the region's 
security to enable it to become a convergent element. Under such circumstances, 
geopolitics would work as an element for encouraging cooperation among all 
beneficiary parties instead of being an expansion lever of the external powers. 
However, by studying Iran-US relations since 1979 as an element of failure in the 
region's security arrangements, it was shown that having a geopolitical perspective 
would require understanding and recognise the geopolitical significance of this region 
from the non-regional players' views too. 
My other intention of focusing on debates surrounding geopolitics has been applied to 
build a security model based on the geopolitical realities of the region. Geopolitics is 
the most fixed and firm feature of the region and the major convergent element among 
the PG states, especially regarding their various long-standing divisions and 
traditional contentions, with an impact on every single nation-state's interests and 
national security. Emphasising on the region's geopolitics shows that every state, as a 
part of this geopolitical region, has a unique place in the security system. Irrespective 
of their size, all states have a similar, though unequal, weight. By increasing the 
geopolitical position of the region every member state will benefit. By emphasising 
the geopolitical elements, especially socio-political and economic power, rather than 
military power it is possible to minimise the significance of the fear of bigger states 
by smaller states. This would in turn lessen the possibility of any states withdrawing 
from the model because of any sudden ideological or political changes. This is one of 
the reasons for choosing the region's geopolitics as the base of my security model of 
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the pyramid as an important element for preventing littoral states' dependency on 
external powers for their security and instead on their own regional potentials. 
The other intention of the geopolitical discourses of this thesis has been the 
importance of the role of humans in any security equations. This is a significant 
geopolitical reality of the region which has been sorely neglected in all previous 
security arrangements. This thesis' security model appreciates the role of peoples' 
communication and interconnection. 
In addition, the geopolitical elements, especially oil and gas, and their impact on all 
littoral states as well as the entire world economy and political life has been studied to 
get a clearer understanding of different security models in this region in respect of all 
regional and more specifically ultra-regional powers' politics and security concerns. 
Here arguments are developed regarding the strategic position of oil and gas on the 
geopolitical importance of the region. This has caused a development of the new 
concept of `energy security' since 1970s, due to the severe and rapidly increasing 
competition among great powers to secure the principal production areas and 
transportation routes of oil and gas via various military or diplomacy means. 
The growing presence of American troops in the region has increased the militarism 
process, e. g. the attempts of the European Union and the countries in the Asian and 
Pacific region to create their own military forces to protect energy security from the 
ME/PG, together with the belief that for political survival and to ensure strategic 
interest, e. g. Iran's, a back up military power is a necessity. The US military presence 
has also stimulated popular discontent in the host countries, particularly against Arab 
regimes. This situation has resulted in increasing militarism, whether in the form of 
extending the military presence and power of different regional and non-regional 
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parties, directly or indirectly, or in the form of terrorist attacks. However, the role of 
other ultra regional players, especially those emerging powers with their growing 
dependency on PG energy supplies, is significant as a counterbalance to the US 
hegemonic position in particular, and for building a durable regional security 
framework. However as it was observed in Part I, energy security in the PG will be 
very heavily influenced by how the regional and ultra-regional powers understand 
each others' perceptions of threat as well as their national security issues. Energy 
security can be assured more effectively by establishing good relations, particularly 
through economic interdependency. The PG energy security is composed of 
multivariable components, requiring the responsibility and cooperation of the regional 
and international community. However, throughout the whole study it was observed 
that it is the policies of Iran and the US towards each other which will remain the 
most important factors in the security approaches of the PG. 
However, this has been the weakest factor of PG security arrangements since 1979. 
On the one hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has failed to establish a stable 
relationship with its neighbours as well as with the West, especially the US, and 
acknowledge Western interests in this geopolitical region. It has also failed to 
reconcile its differences with the West and assure it of its vital interests in the PG. 
This has meant that Iran's goal of establishing collective regional security 
arrangements that exclude foreign powers has not been achieved, and has therefore 
contributed to the wider presence of foreign forces; a major success of the Imperial 
rule of the Pahlavi regime which IRI has not been able to achieve. 
On the other hand, the complex foreign policy goals of the US in the region, 
especially regarding its antagonistic policy towards IRI, have prevented such an 
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opportunity for peace and security. The US approach of hegemony to security is 
increasingly focused on ensuring a stable and pro-Western system via the 
establishment of a commanding value system which includes promoting regional 
political change. So the region, especially since the start of the twenty first century, 
has seen the US attempting to broker security in the PG by putting in place an 
extensive, forward military presence. On one side, this presence was motivated by the 
US understanding that over-the horizon intervention had failed to be a strong enough 
deterrent. On the other side, it was motivated by its national interests and its foreign 
policy goals. Economically speaking, the US arms market profits from this stance. 
This is evidenced by the recent trip (August 2007) of the US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and the Defense Secretary Robert Gates to the region with the aim 
of launching Washington's new ME strategy of specifically containment against Iran 
and arming its allies. ' Furthermore, the US needs a well integrated world economy 
and the latter depends on stable oil supplies and suppliers, which involves impeding 
the development of WMD by those regimes that may threaten the PG oil flow. 
Politically speaking, this stance helps bring about its hegemony in the international 
system and assures its own domestic security. 2 
However, since the US' interests have been guaranteed in both peace and crisis 
situations in this region, some major questions are raised, and answered, especially 
with respect to the two most important traditional objectives of Washington's policy 
in the ME: a) preservation of the oil flow at an affordable price b) the security of 
Israel. This causes some questions to arise: is there any real US willingness to build 
peace and security in this region or does Washington need at least one permanent 
enemy in the region to achieve its hidden hegemonic intentions? Or, does the US 
support any kind of collective regional arrangements in the PG, whether security or 
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economic cooperation arrangements which would create assurance of commitment to 
a common interest? This kind of idea seems very much unwelcome to Washington - 
as well as other non-regional powers - because its long-term interests would be in 
contrast with the existence of a single voice of a powerful regional energy 
organisation in the PG. Also, greater economic interaction and cooperation would 
result in a basis for stronger security interactions among littoral states of the PG. 
Therefore, there would be no reason for US military presence or a flourishing US 
arms market in the region; a very dangerous and concerning fact to US foreign policy 
concerns. 
Under such circumstances the continuity of the West's expansionist geopolitical 
debates and the US' drive for control over the states and strategic resources and 
wealth of the world, with a determining influence on foreign policy and global 
strategy, becomes dependent on a description of the world map similar to that of the 
Cold War period, one of ideological identity and difference; such as foes or allies, 
`with us or against us', etc. Therefore, the recent model of emerging world order by 
Samuel Huntington, namely the `clash of civilizations', as a dominant factor in the 
future global politics for the continuance of dividing the world into good and evil has 
been highly welcomed. In his opinion the most fundamental of such clashes is the 
conflict between the West and the Rest of the world, 3 where in his new post-Cold War 
geopolitical world-picture, the major principal American strategic interest is to 
perpetuate the primacy of the US as the global power. 4 The continuity of this 
geopolitical debate and how US statesmen have conceptualised the role of their state 
in world affairs, which intensified since September 11`h , 2001, can be seen via the US 
terminology whereas instead of "the evil empire, " used by Ronald Reagan to describe 
the USSR, George W. Bush's terminology for the official enemies of the US in 2002 
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is the "axis of evil, " including, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, 5 or his use of terms like 
"Islamic fascists" is to link the actions of violent Muslims to their religion to 
strengthen arguments about the clash of civilisations between Islam and the West. 
Such definitions of a divided world is being propagandised where cooperation, most 
especially since the end of the Cold War, is the prevailing global atmosphere and is 
increasingly practiced within and by the West, but there is not any meaningful process 
or global support for collective cooperation and unity within the rest of world, viz. 
non-Western, developing and underdeveloped countries and more specifically the 
ME/PG. 
Nation-states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran have a special place in these 
geopolitical debates addressing the new confrontation of Islam and the West. The 
major reasons regarding Iran, besides its significant geopolitical situation, are its 
Islamic political ideology, its antipathy against the US, and its growing influence in 
the ME with its intention of collective regional security arrangements which would 
increase its regional role and simultaneously would exclude foreign powers' presence. 
Under such circumstances states such as Iran, whose foreign policies have great 
impact against US hegemonic unilateralism, specifically in the ME/PG, are meant to 
be disrupted and isolated, politically, militarily and economically. However, as was 
argued earlier, without a proper relationship between Iran and the US as the two 
major regional and non-regional powers, establishing peace and security would be 
impossible. This study is necessary owing to the failure of all security models in the 
PG during the time period of this study. Also due to the vast and extended regional 
and global consequences of regional crises, combined with the increasing complexity 
of methods of competition, specifically the more frequent resort to military solutions 
with more sophisticated weapons rather than to diplomacy or socio-economic 
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cooperation. Hence; under such circumstances achieving even remotely stable 
security is increasingly difficult. Therefore, I argue that as long as the foreign policy 
goals of the US as the hegemonic power in the present international system is based 
on preventing a natural development of regional powers' roles, especially Iran's, none 
of the security arrangements can work. The consequences of the US political strategy 
of containment in the PG could be similar to the defence strategy during the Cold War 
which soon became militarised and even nuclearised. 
Such external threats and interferences is one of the reasons why the PG states have 
regional geopolitical perspectives rather than global views. Other reasons which 
involve their domestic and regional threats and problems have been studied (chapters 
seven through ten) to explain why the PG states, especially the three major players, 
viz. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have not been able to take advantage of their 
geopolitical priorities with a great global impact. Adding the geopolitical significance 
of the PG to these factors, the littoral states of the PG have not been able to approach 
a single geopolitical perspective but have been compelled to rely on the security 
umbrella of non-regional powers. This is the reason why the intention of this study 
regarding security approach has been to direct PG states' attention towards the 
important element of geopolitics in their strategies. 
In order to analyse the determinant factors of a security system this study has drawn 
upon the level of analysis framework in international relations. This contribution has 
examined the issues involved in creating a regional security model so as to turn 
threats into opportunities for regional cooperation and sustainability, especially 
through the ability to identify casual factors of international politics. Hence, to 
investigate the future shape of collective security arrangements in the region this 
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study has investigated major insecurity components in the PG, viz. territorial, 
boundary and maritime disputes and specifically the heterogeneity of the political 
systems within the eight littoral states, specifically Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia as the 
major regional powers and their domestic instabilities as well as their different 
security perspectives within Part II. 
Boundary disputes, as a great divergent element in the littoral states' interaction, as 
well as for the regional stability and security, have contributed the other divergent 
factors to prevent the littoral states from creating a collective regional security 
arrangement. Hence, as was learned from chapter six, diplomatic means and regional 
solutions are the most lasting and practical answer to the different territorial and 
boundary disputes in this region. The necessity of such solutions is the improvement 
of the political conditions, with all regional actors including the US, in the case of 
Iran, esteeming previous agreements and avoiding any expansionist notions, 
respecting the sovereign existence and independence of all actors, states 
comprehending the significance of collaborative relationships in favour of all littoral 
members, efforts made to extend confidence-building measurements, and thereby 
finally achieving a collective security arrangement. 
Also as the different political position of the PG states (e. g. political structure, 
political history, interaction with the world's powers, national interests, etc. ) has 
significantly affected the regional security, focus has been on domestic, foreign and 
security policies which are not divided issues for the PG states. Security, as the most 
important issue of the PG region, has been influenced by the eight littoral states' 
interaction condition, as well as by the increasingly intense great non-regional 
powers' rivalry with its effect on PG states' domestic and foreign policies, and the 
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impact of their internal and external security threat on PG regional security as a 
whole. Hence, this study has discussed all three levels of the PG state's foreign 
policies and the forces that affected them, including the systemic level (the interaction 
between states) and the debate that occurs on the domestic and individual levels. 
Besides issues of particular importance to other countries, this thesis makes a special 
effort to evoke the perspective from which the PG states themselves view their 
problems and choose their domestic and foreign policy priorities in respect to certain 
legitimate strategic concerns which arise from their geographic, social, and historical 
context. This is a fundamental factor which motivates states' political behaviour to 
ensure the state's security, territorial integrity, national cohesion and approach to the 
sources of wealth essential to develop their economy and political institutions 
effectively and independently. A significant point that is usually absent from many 
analyses in the West, specifically in Washington, is that security in the PG will be 
very heavily influenced by how they understand the regional states' perceptions of 
threat, as well as their national security issues. Therefore, the major outlines of 
chapters seven through to ten were dedicated to the study of the littoral states, 
addressing their political history and political system as well as internal and external 
threats to their stability. 
However, using the level of analysis framework, it has been argued that the best 
solution to the regional security problems in the ME, including its sub-region the PG, 
is through dialogue. Regionally, it is only through confidence building measures 
(CBM) and by intensified and sustained diplomacy in a peaceful and non- 
confrontational atmosphere promoting unofficial, informal contacts and negotiations 
that a functional regional security arrangement can be created, a process that puts 
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emphasis on soft, as opposed to exclusively hard, power. Despite the fact that the 
region is a long way from establishing a solid foundation that could build confidence, 
settle disputes and deter conflict, this would be a starting point for formalising a 
security system which would establish various organisations for promoting 
cooperation and promoting the rule of law. Given examples of recent developments 
support this argument; e. g. the Arab PG states are unenthusiastic about putting their 
security solely in the hands of the US and their leaders have recently supported the 
idea of a collective security arrangement for the region that includes Iran (as voiced, 
for instance, by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal at the 2004 Gulf Dialogue in 
Bahrain) and are growing more and more frustrated with US reluctance to have any 
dealing with the Iranians. 7 In addition, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has welcomed the 
idea of a joint organisation between Iran and member states of the GCC in his recent 
trip to Qatar. In his address to the GCC summit which was held in the Doha in 
December 2007, Ahmadinejad made a string of proposals for collective economic and 
security cooperation. 8 Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki after this summit 
announced that in meetings with Saudi and other GCC's officials, Tehran's proposal 
for cooperation with the GCC in the different political, economic and security 
grounds and within a collective defence, treaty, has received the positive attention of 
regional states. Mottaki put the emphasis on the importance of the establishment of 
security in the PG through the collective and joint cooperation of regional states as the 
most crucial factor contributing to the growth, development and progress of the 
region, which will also influence the trend of world developments. 9 
Domestically, as was learned from chapters seven through to ten the major threat to 
regional states' society comes from within; therefore, the regimes' survival depends 
upon opening up the political systems to more democratic participation and economic 
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reforms in order to address their most strategic weakness. An inclusive national/inter- 
sectarian dialogue, encouraging tolerance and diversity, alongside political reforms, 
and in some cases like Saudi Arabia in particular, religious reforms, are necessary for 
preparations towards democracy. However, since the internal challenges facing 
littoral states could translate into security concerns for the whole region, domestic 
reform is a necessity from the regional perspective too. In addition to developing 
internal political dialogue to decrease the risk of extremist views, developing a 
network of military and economic agreements that create considerable 
interdependence among the PG states should also leave less room for discontent and 
extremism. This would further assist the process of domestic reform 'in the region. 
Rathmell [et all and Kraig argue that this would be especially true of the newly 
formed cooperative arrangements, in which the financial and human capital of nation- 
states will be expended on civil, rather than military, development. 10 
Domestic reform is a discourse whose necessity for the sake of stability in the region 
has been acknowledged even by the Bush administration. George W. Bush in a speech 
delivered in London on the 19th of November 2007, by criticising the inter-state 
bargain between the West and its authoritarian elites said that, "we must shake off 
decades of failed policy in the Middle East (... ) in the past [we] have been willing to 
make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties 
often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring 
stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and 
ideologies of violence took hold". " 
However, implementing democracy takes time and requires patience and sustained 
effort, and can only be achieved if it is initiated within the framework of domestic 
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debate. Attempts to impose it from outside will only stifle the process of change; 
however the international community could support democratisation by encouraging 
an atmosphere that is germane to such a process. 
Various changes in the global political landscape, most especially those that have 
occurred since the end of the Cold War, have provided a fresh opportunity to develop 
a new approach to international security. This new approach is one which places 
particular emphasis on patterns of cooperation. Traditional security methods that are 
based on massive military confrontation are no longer particularly effective or even 
acceptable to global public opinion. In addition to various successful cooperation 
models that are to be found in other regions of the globe, e. g. the EU, the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 with all its consequences is the latest example which highlights the need 
for cooperation. 
Security Debates 
To lay the groundwork for developing a better and more comprehensive future 
security arrangement, this thesis appeals to empirical data and observation, as well as 
theoretical framework and critical analysis, to articulate the reasons for the failure of 
security models in the PG. The arguments are supported by detailed evidence for each 
model, during the time period 1962-1997. Regional security is examined in order to 
explain the major strategic choices available to both the PG and the external powers' 
decision makers in a different international atmosphere in this regard. Looking for a 
comprehensive strategy for . peace and stability in the PG this study has been 
conducted through the prism of three fundamental, competing schools of thought 
regarding the practice of international security realism, neo-liberalism or the 
cooperative-security school, and the hegemonic or counterproliferation. Studying the 
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strengths and weaknesses of the three theories it was shown how the policies of 
selective multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism have been unsuccessful in 
bringing about security in the PG. It was shown that this is because the most 
prominent states favour inextricably exclusionary types of coalition. All of the above 
policies result in the systematic exclusion, economically or militarily, of a major state 
and of non-state actors in the security order. Regarding strategic properties of the PG 
which affect how successful a security system in it will be and the fragility of 
temporary alignments of the classical kind of two against the third pillar, there is an 
emphasis on a combination of two synergistic components of balance of power 
between the three key regional players, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and meaningful 
reform in the littoral states for the future PG security system, where the region lacks 
both. Therefore, analysts and scholars, as well as policy-makers, have drawn similar 
conclusions concerning the two dominant contending frameworks for PG security: US 
hegemony and its dominant military presence and principled multilateral ism. These 
conclusions are viewed as even more valid in the post-Saddam era. Accordingly by 
studying the analysis of Michael Kraig, Steven Spiegel, Richard Russell, Andrew 
Rathmell and Bjorn Moller, who with regard to strategic properties of the PG all 
emphasise the need for a new approach and policy options for security in the PG 
regional and external powers security policies towards the region, however from 
various angles and different solutions, this study has tried to come up with a more 
practicable approach to the security of this region. 
Besides the regional perception of the importance of cooperation models, this study 
has tried to show the significance of the US-Iran relationship as well as the role of 
other ultra regional players; especially those emerging powers like the EU and some 
key states in the AP (viz. China, India, and Japan) in constructing a more sustainable 
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PG security system. By using their strategic interest in the PG, especially their' 
growing dependency on PG energy supplies which exceeds the US', their close ties 
with the region by a network of economic and political linkages and their deep 
concerns over US permanent hegemony in the ME/PG, which have resulted in their 
recognition of a need to adopt a greater geopolitical role independently of 
Washington, it is possible to create a counterbalance to the US hegemony in the PG to 
benefit the development of a multilateral security regime. 
Consequently a number of key research gaps have been highlighted regarding security 
which has resulted in an alternative security model in the PG. This study has come up 
with a model on the basis of the mixed approaches of a cooperative-security 
(liberalism) framework and Realpolitik (realism). This model has been designed as a 
pyramid, with three sides consisting of `the policies of the littoral Arab states', `the 
policies of ultra-regional powers' and `Iran's policies', and the base of the pyramid 
which interacts with all three sides is the `geopolitics of the PG'. It emphasises the 
need for interaction and cooperation as well as a balance of interests between the three 
sides of the pyramid, and geometrically reacts so that in any instance of an attempt by 
any of the three regional and/or non regional elements to change the base of the 
pyramid in its favour, the model will be destabilised and regional instability will be 
the result. In other words, in a balance of power based on geopolitics (including 
military power, arms races, or cultural/nationalist issues) if any party tries to ruin the 
balance (i. e., if there is too much movement of the vertex which means the picture of 
vertex will not be seen on the base `geopolitics' any more) history will repeat itself. 
If one of the countries involved gains too much weight, the other two would feel 
threatened and try to compensate. 
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The Pyramid security model could be a solution to the very volatile situation in the 
PG, because in addressing major security issues this model is based on the 
geopolitical realities, as well as the political and economic concerns, of all regional 
and ultra-regional parties. It is also able to avoid the typical problems that arise for 
models based on a competition for power between states with conflicting national 
interests and agendas, like Russell' S, 12 as it does not base a balance of power on such 
confrontational bases. It was observed that this security model would be able to 
manage relations between states and create a regulation of power, which would mean 
the rule of `law' and not `the powers'. It would be a system with legitimacy and 
authority, as none of, the actors would perceive itself to be outside the prevailing 
order. It would also create interdependence among the regional states themselves 
which would promote security, instead of reliance on the security umbrella of non- 
regional powers. Such a security model can also assure that the gains it aims to 
achieve are mutual gains for all participants, and is thereby able to assure that it would 
be in the interests of all relevant parties to remain in the system. Therefore, the model 
is also immune to any significant internal changes to the littoral states. The 
importance of this model stems not just from the role that states have in its 
architecture and their effect on its functionality, but also that some consideration is 
given to the role of people (even sub-national groups), their interactions, as well as 
their satisfaction. Its emphasis on reforms will encourage positive competition among 
all littoral states to upgrade their weight in this security framework via greater civil 
development, rather than military power or territorial size. This is true for ultra- 
regional players too; in particular, by contributing towards the region's development 
they can upgrade their role in this region. 
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Learning from international political system's behaviour towards the PG states like 
Iran's pre and post-revolution regimes and more specifically Iraq during its two 
invasions of its neighbours in the 1980s and 1990s, one significant result is the 
recognition of the important impact of the international system and the necessity of 
achieving a fair political system in international relations to assure security and 
stability in any region in the world, including the PG. The international communities' 
behaviour exposed a double standard attitude; for instance in case of Iraq, from 
offering aid to open hostility with a great effect on the regional security for the whole 
of the PG. There appears no basis for such a shift in attitude, just the unfortunate fact 
that one single and unique standard does not apply to every country because there is 
not a fair international system. This is why this study introduces a fourth element to 
previous categories of the important, interlocking elements needed to establish a 
workable, legitimate and authoritative security model in the PG. An appropriate 
international political environment with a proper international security system's 
structure (which is given in the pyramid model by emphasising the relationship of the 
non-regional powers' with the littoral states) was added to other three elements of: an 
inclusive and multilateral approach; a balance of power, preferably through arms 
control negotiations among all three regional key players; and domestic developments 
and reforms in the littoral states. Such stress is also important because many scholars 
such as Kraig perceive an external contribution to improve the security situation 
within the region important, owing to the fragility of domestic politics and 
interregional relations in the PG. 13 
The final conclusion of this study is that the entire situation with its suspicions and 
mistrust among all regional and ultra-regional states, combined with neglecting other 
parties' interests and security concerns, has resulted in a daily escalation of the crises 
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in this most geostrategic region in the world. The people of the region in particular are 
the greatest losers in such an unstable and critical situation. The littoral states' 
regimes do not benefit from such circumstances either. All these factors, combined 
with the global loss of energy security and increases in the price of energy, and the 
more recent issue of the spread and growing process of terrorism from the radical 
religious militants, should press all the different parties, both regional and non- 
regional, to support and assist the establishment of comprehensive security 
cooperation in this narrow but vital waterway for global peace, security and 
prosperity. As long as security rather than diplomacy is the priority in foreign policy 
of external as well as internal players of the PG and the general aim is for maximum 
security and political regimes' survival, security tools (especially military capabilities) 
are the major necessity for following their foreign policy goals, stability and 
prosperity will not occur in this region. 
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Geographical features of the Persian Gulf 
The PG is a semi-enclosed sea in the inferior folds of southern Zagros Mountains that is situated 
between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. It is approximately 90,000 square nautical miles (233,100 
square km) in size, and has 97 percent of its periphery occupied by land. This waterway is joined to the 
Gulf of Oman, the northernmost arm of the Indian Ocean, by the Strait of Hormuz. The length of the 
PG from the Arvand Rud to the Strait of Hormuz is approximately 600 nautical miles (970 km); its 
maximum width is about 136 nautical miles (220 km). The narrowest part of the Gulf is in the Strait of 
Hormuz, the only outlet to the Indian Ocean, which measures 49 nautical miles (80 km) in width. 
The Gulf is a relatively shallow basin with an average depth of less than 40 meters and a maximum 
depth of 90 meters. The deeper waters run along the Iranian coast and off the Musandam peninsula. 
Scattered throughout the Gulf, particularly along the Arabian shore, are numerous islands. These 
islands contribute to the irregular configuration of the coastline and complicate efforts at establishing 
offshore boundaries. Three of these islands, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, are of strategic 
importance because of their position relative to the shipping lanes within the PG at the approach to the 
Strait of Hormuz. 
The PG has seven littoral states: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and 
Oman. There is one island state in the waterway: Bahrain. Coastline measurements within the Gulf 
vary from 635 nautical miles (1027 km) for Iran, approximately 371 nautical miles (600 km) for United 
Arab of Emirates and 269 nautical miles (435 km) for Saudi Arabia to 10 nautical miles (16 km) for 
Iraq. Oman's only gulf coastline is on the Musandam Peninsula, which borders the Strait of Hormuz on 
the south. ' 
There are two large islands in the PG, these being Jazire-ye Qeshm, off the Iranian coast, on the 
northern side of the Strait of Hormuz, and Bahrain, on the western side of Qatar, a large projection in 
the south-western corner of the Gulf. Those islands of the Persian littoral are rocky, volcanic origin and 
steep slope, same as the coast of which they are formed from; those near the Arabian littoral are merely 
sand islets and shoal islands, though some are geologically similar to Hormuz. 
The head of the Gulf is the low alluvial land of the deltas of the Tigris, Euphrates, Karun and other 
rivers. The north-western end of the Gulf is probably silting up, owning to the large amount of 
alluvium deposited by the great rivers debouching there. The depths in the Gulf of Oman and in the PG 
are generally great off the high coast, but less off the low coasts. 
Apart from its physical dimensions, the PG has been important for its unique historical and geographic 
location. It has been a valuable waterway since the beginning of history and as the venue of the 
collision of great civilizations of the ancient east; it has a-background of several millenniums. 2 Sir 
Arnold T. Wilson (1928) also expressed the PG as the greatest interest arm of the sea to the scientists in 
different fields, the merchants and the statesmen and appreciated its significances as: 
The Persian Gulf, [... ] following the custom of master mariners for three centuries, has a place 
in the written history of mankind older than that of any other inland sea; its story can be 
traced, though not continuously, from the very earliest historic times; its central position on 
one of the main highways between East and West has from the dawn of civilization invested it 
with peculiar importance: it was the scene of great events, which determined the trend of 
development of the human race, while the Mediterranean was probably still unfurrowed by the 
keels of ships. The mass of literature on the subject in half a score of languages, of which a 
proportion only is included in our bibliography, bears eloquent testimony to the continuous 
interest of Europe in the subject from the earliest times. 3 
Throughout history the PG that enroute the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, has been viewed as 
an old and important crossroads of trade and communication. The PG is an area with the richest and 
longest running seafaring tradition of any world region, c. 5,000 years in age. 
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1 Different measures about geographic size of the Persian Gulf are quoted in various texts. The quoted 
scales are chose from the most frequented. 
2 Institute of political and international studies, 'Selected Persian Gulf documents', vol. 1, p. 5. 
3 Sir Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 1. 
4 CAIS, 'In search of ancient seafarers in the Persian Gulf'. http: //home. btconnect. com/CAIS/ 
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Appendix-2 
Historical Position of the Persia: Gulf in World Politics; 
British Dominance 
(A) 
Increasing British involvement in India beginning in the late eighteenth century quickened British interest in the 
PG region as a means of protecting the sea routes to India. British primary commercial interests in the PG 
merged with political interests in restraining the PG due to Napoleon's European conquests and his expedition to 
Egypt, and also the possibility of another invasion of northern India by Afghanistan in 1798. 
In the nineteenth century the PG remained strategically vital for defence of India and the British Eastern Empire, 
a situation that continued until the WWII. With the eviction of the Dutch and the French from the area, as well as 
the decline of the influence of Iran, the British became the unchallenged power in the PG, which had become one 
of the most important geopolitical arenas. 
When combining the significant and outstanding position of the PG in world politics, with the geostrategic 
situation of Iran, especially as the southern and western neighbour to two prominent powers, Russia and the 
British (Indian Empire) respectively, as well as Iran's traditional territorial domination in the south of the PG 
through obscure political and administrative formation until the end of nineteenth century, conditions appears 
ideal for Britain's domination over Iran and the PG. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Germany and Russia, too, in their turn, had begun to take an interest in 
gaining access to the PG. Early in the twentieth century, shortly before the beginning of the WWI, upon the 
confirmation of the existence of oil on the coasts of the PG, the major powers' interests in the region heightened, 
and Britain became even more determined to broaden her influence in Iran and the PG. 
Britain's policy towards Iran in nineteenth century is described by Kelly (1968) with the words of John 
Malcolm, 1807, as: 
Persia and Turkey may both be considered as barrier Powers to British India, and the destruction of 
either by a European Power would endanger India so far that it would expose it to the early invasion of 
such Power; and consequently is the policy of England to aid and support those states, or to endeavour 
to create and strengthen others to effect the same object! 
After the Treaty of Turkmanchai, Kelly alleges that Sir John Malcolm in 1826, on the eve of the denouement of 
the Russia and Persian war, stated "that the establishment of a Russian ascendancy at Tehran would have an 
unsettling effect upon British rule in India. " Kelly adds that "Sea power alone, in Malcolm's view, would not 
suffice to protect India from invasion. India's front line of defence lay in Persia. It was imperative that Britain 
should preserve Persia's independence against Russia". z 
To dominate the region it was necessary to weaken regional powers, therefore, Britain started defining territories 
and boundaries within the Arab tribes, giving them territorial statehood. This was applied along with a policy of 
disconnecting the traditional ties in the region. This policy caused great harm to the sovereignty of Iran by 
separating as many islands and coastal districts from her as were possible. (Details of relevant documents in 
Appendix-2-B) So the British moved forces in to the PG under the guise of fighting the slave trade and maritime 
piracy engaged in by the tribes of the lower Gulf. 3 According to Drysdale and Blake, Britain's interest during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a dominant power in India affirm that "Britain also signed treaties with the 
small shaykhdoms on the Indian Ocean and Gulf coasts of Arabia excluding rival power and agreeing to the 
suppression of slavery and piracy. "4 
Britain gradually brought the southern half of the PG under her control and by the mid-nineteenth century 
entered into various forms of treaties and agreements with the coastal Arab tribes. In 1853, Britain signed the 
Perpetual Maritime Truce, formalising the temporary truces of 1820 and 1835. The sheikhs agreed to stop 
disrupting British shipping and to recognise Britain as the dominant power in the PG which meant an acceptance 
of Britain's protection that was to last until 1967. These sheikhdoms thus became known as the Trucial States. 
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Thereby as Ellahi notes, Britain extended her authority over the region's trade and shipping routes too; an 
opportunity for the Eastern-India Company to extirpate the native competitor's fleets that caused dissolution of 
economic system of the PG as well as developing public poverty. 5 
Accordingly by the diplomacy of protege treaties, military power, and interference in internal affairs of Iran as 
the only nation state existing in the PG during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain could effectively 
eliminate the opportunity for any regional or non regional powers or states to dominate this strategic waterway. 
Napoleon's plan for a vast eastern empire in India was frustrated by the closing of the PG to the French naval 
forces during his wars in the late eighteenth century and his further diplomatic efforts through the subsequent 
century were annihilated; Russia was prevented from access to the warm waters of the PG via her 1907 
agreement with Britain at the expense of Iran. In the second half of the nineteenth century fear of the Ottoman 
Empire expansion against Europe led to European and British policies that operated at Iran's expense, keeping it 
in various disputes. 
From the evidence of all existing official documents and texts in the West and East, Iran's efforts at establishing 
power in the PG were totally unacceptable to and annulled by Britain. Nashat has referred to Lurans Lugheart in 
his Political History of the Persian Gulf, stating that, "Britain to weaken Iran authority in the Persian Gulf was 
encouraging Arab Sheikhs apparently or inapparently, e. g. Bahrain, to anarchy and disobey Iran government for 
independence. In this regard Britain sorely used to refuse every action, measure even proposal of Iran for 
establishing navy in sake of security in the Gulf. "6 Nashat also notes that: 
Britain was not able to develop her influence towards Sheikhdoms of the southern coast of the Persian 
Gulf unless to deficiency the great powers from interference in their affairs. By 1820 Britain could 
defeat every great state in this connection except Iran. Lack of Iran navy in the Persian Gulf was a 
perfect pretext for Britain to abandon her, even temporary, from lordship of the Gulf. This goal was 
achieved by various political scenes that were made by Britain for involving Iran in the Gulf region or 
her neighbourhood states problems. 7 
As Ramazani remarks, one final attempt came in 1865 when Nasereddin Shah Qajar tried to form a navy and 
asked British help, but the plan was rejected due to suspicions regarding Iran's intentions. 8 
Early in the twentieth century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of independent local 
schools and nationalisms, together with the confirmation of the existence of oil on the coasts of the PG, resulted 
in extra attention paid by Britain to the regions, and an increased desire to broaden-her influence in the PG. In 
this regard the first oil exploration concession of any lasting significance in the region was obtained by William 
Knox D'Arcy from the Iranian government on the 21st of May 1901. It covered the entire country, excluding the five northern Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan and Khorasan on behalf of Russian 
reservation that was to last for 60 years. Iranian oil production remained surely and exclusively in control of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, eventually British Petroleum, until 1951. 
Britain by establishing the colonial force called the 'South Persian Rifles' in southern Iran, was preparing to 
exploit the vast oil reserves in the area with her figurehead governments in Arab territories and the islands of the PG. To protect her influence in the region Britain, through the unsuccessful treaty of 1919 or via various 
conspiracies which later become disclosed, conserved her influence in the PG until a few years after WWII, 
when Iranian oil was nationalised .9 Thereby once again the British became the unchallenged power in the PG and according to Drysdale and Blake `oil exploration and monopoly control placed the oil companies in a strong 
position vis-ä-vis individual Middle Eastern government [... ] The Iranian crisis of 1951-54 illustrated the weakness of individual governments in the face of a united front of companies. "10 Although by the nationalisation of Iranian oil under the leadership of Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh caused Britain's hand of influence to be cut off from Iran oil sources for a period as it is explained and added by Drysdale and Blake, 
The crisis was resolved after a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)- supported coup d etat brought a more compliant Iranian government to power. Although Iran retained ownership of all oil fields and refineries, after 1954 the oil was produced by a new joint production company called the Consortium. Significantly, 
the Consortium included all the seven majors for the first time [includes British oil companies] 
yi 
Since WWII a serious fraying of the British hold on the PG began to emerge. Three main reasons caused the decline of the $ritish influence in the PG: 
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" The rising movement of nationalism and anti-imperialism in the ME that was started with the 
nationalisation of Iranian oil subject to the leadership of the Prime Minister Mosadegh in 1951. 
" The rapid decline of the British Empire. 
" The new international political situation and Britain's new general policy for not getting involved 
directly in the international political scene. 
Britain sensed that her presence in the PG could only stimulate further anti-Western emotions, and so to prevent 
any local or international movements or activities against the status quo, it decided to leave voluntarily. 
Since the mid nineteenth century Britain could manage security and stability in the PG via her military forces. In 
January 1968, Britain announced her intentions of withdrawing from the region in the next three years. By 1971, 
some countries in the PG had gained independence, including the United Arab Emirates. Britain was looking for 
the settlement of various territorial and maritime boundary disputes within littoral states of the region to 
guarantee the status quo of the PG after her departure. 
Unlike the Portuguese and other Europeans, Britain was following a long term policy of attendance and 
dominance towards the PG. The Portuguese had the worst kind of colonialism as Wilson, referring this case also 
912 Although the British to their rule in Bahrain mentions "the Portuguese factor was tortured and crucified. 
advent in the PG was initially for trade reasons, their purpose of domination on this waterway latter was exactly 
planned as a clever policy. 13 
The continuity of Britain's incomparable and forcible position in the PG was due to the intelligent and cunning 
policy of manipulative exploitation that was implemented with maximum economic and security consequences. 
The most important components of this policy were: 
" Knowledge about international current issues and complexities to display the object of colonialism as 
justifiable, e. g. eradicating acts of piracy and slave trading. 
" Awareness, recognition and apprising the difficulties and dissensions within states and groups of 
inhabitants in the region in order to `divide and rule'. 
" To misuse the weak and divergent elements of the littoral states for separating as many islands and 
coastal districts as possible from them, specifically Iran. 
" Exploitation of regional crises and simultaneously defeating foreign forces in a united front with 
regional rulers to further Britain's interests. 
" Dividing the region into many small states, with many border disputes; under this situation they could 
remain dependent on Britain, and eventually establishment of any further influential and united forces 
through these states against their creative power would be impossible. 
From 1600 to 1971, Britain could continue her direct interference in the geostrategic region of the PG and since 
then, however indirectly, has been playing a significant role in the Arab states' policies. Because of Britain's 
long-term policy and agenda in her dominant states, the regional networks that were established during her 
presence in those countries have been very strong. 
(B) 
One important document in Iran's Foreign Ministry, dated 1968, confirmed Britain's underplot to obtain, by 
theft or bribery, a very important report about different records of Iran's sovereignty over the PG islands and 
even some areas in the southern shore. In a 'very confidential and important' letter of Mohammad Reza Amir 
Teimour [from Iran Embassy in London] to Ardeshir Zahedi, Foregin Minister on 30 Shahrivar 1347 (21 
September 1968) is mentioned that, 
This report which was written more than 80 years ago by Brigadier Haji Ahmad Khan Kababi, the then 
ruler of Lengah Port (Bandar Lengah) is very significant because there were documentary evidence 
signed by Arab sheikhs confirming Iran sovereignty right over the four islands. (... ) while these sorts of 
documents were against Britain's policy and interest, is very likely that the originals and appendixes 
were stolen. 
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In the letter of Amir Teimour it is also mentioned that, 
Documents in British Foreign Ministry show that the authorities in the British Embassy in Tehran, by 
different tricks have stolen or obtained the report by bribery then sent it to London. But this report is not 
among released documents in the British archive (it seems they have hidden the report). " 
During 1904-1971 Britain's emphasis on appertaining the islands to the sheikhdoms more than the sheikhdoms 
themselves's was aimed not just at deterring any Russian influence in the region or restricting Iran's influence as 
a regional power, but also "with the islands under the influence of Britain's Trucial protectorates, Britain 
exercised more control over them. "16 
Moreover, it seems that Britain, as the guardian of the PG sheikhdoms, was not disposed towards a clear, 
documented and permanent solution between Iran and the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, and so the 
dossier of disputes were left open. For instance, records of separate meetings between the Shah and Ardeshir 
Zahedi, Iranian Foreign Minister with Sheikh Saghar Ben Mohammad at Ghasemi the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah 
and Abu Khater, his councillor in December 1969 in Tehran, illustrates Britain's reluctance and unclear policy in 
this regard. '? According to these documents, sheikh Saghar and Abu Khater confirmed to Abbas Aram after this 
meeting that Britain had given no formula but asked the sheik himself to solve this problem with Iran. '8 Whilst, 
as Iran's Court Minister Alam indicates in his confidential diary for 18 February 1969: 
British Ambassador (Sir Denis Wright) ... told me very confidentially that the case of Tunb 
Island is 
practically settled and will definitely be given to Iran, for we have told the Shaikh of Ras al-Kheimeh 
that if you don't come to some sort of arrangement with Iran - as these islands are situated above the 
median line (of the Persian Gulf) - Iran will lawfully, and if that was not possible, will forcefully take 
these islands, and the Shaikh agreed to make a deal over them. 19 
Other documents in the Iranian Foreign Ministry show that in Sheikh Saghar's meeting with Aram and Ardeshir 
Zahedi in Hesarak, Tehran, in 5 January 1970 (the next day after Saghar's negotiation with the Shah) he 
submitted a list of the Sheikhdom's economic and armament needs from Iran. 20 As it is mentioned in these 
documents, in this meeting they studied sheikh Saghar's major concerns and possible solutions for the political 
pressures of the other Arabs over any agreement with Iran, in return for the islands seizure. 21 However, 
eventually after the islands were seized, Ras al-Khaimah announced its disagreement with Iran's action. 
Although, some months later, as Mojtahed-Zadeh mentioned regarding Iran's chief negotiator, Amir Khosro 
Afshar (then Iran's ambassador in London), the Saudi Arabians intervened and requested him to meet sheikh 
Saghar and ask his financial requirements. Amir Khosro Afshar who had unsuccessful meetings with the sheikh 
and also his successor before the islands were repossessed by Iran, explained: 
I met Shaikh Saqar in the Iranian Embassy in London and told him that we were prepared to extend- 
financial assistance to Ras al-Kheima provided that he officially renounced his opposition to the 
reassertion of Iranian sovereignty on the two Tunbs. He said he saw no sense in not doing so, but such 
an official declaration would put his life in jeopardy with the fanatics. 22 
In general, the British policy in the whole process was implemented despite London's being complete awareness 
of Iran's assertion about its historical right to the three islands, as well as its national and regional security 
concerns; 23 also the political pressures of the other Arab countries over any agreement of the sheikhs with Iran 
about the islands in return of financial supports from Tehran. 24 
However, on one hand, in spite of Britain's trend of attaching islands to the Sheikhdom of emirates, London was 
not much deprecated of Iran's possession over them. Iran was acting as a barrier to any possible regional 
disputes after Britain's departure from the PG which could be of the Soviet Union's interest. Besides, the Shah 
policy had indicated that by possessing the islands, Iran was not looking to make problems for the West*(because 
of the strategic location of islands in the PG regarding oil supply to world markets), but it had proved its will and 
military power to stand against the spread of Communism in the region with the newly independent Arab 
states 25 
On the other hand, Britain's main objectives in the PG before its departure - creating the states of Bahrain and Qatar and also the UAE via uniting the seven of the Trucial sheikhdoms - were dependent on dealing with 
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Tehran. 6 Hence, during 1968 to 1971, Iran and Britain successfully negotiated a set of deals, of Iran giving up 
its claims to Bahrain and recognising it as a dependent state as well as the dependent states of Qatar and the 
UAE, in return for the repossession of the Tunbs islands and signing the MOU about Abu Musa. Despite the 
importance of the Iran-Sharjah understanding, as a result of long negotiations between Iran and Britain, the 
general issue of sovereignty of Abu Musa was left unclear, and they left no evidence of such package agreements 
between Iran and Britain. Consequently, another Iran-Arab potential dispute was left for after Britain's departure 
from the region. 27 
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The Major Powers and Oil-Consumers; 
A History of Anglo-American Presence in the Persian Gulf 
Britain 
In the early twentieth century the strategic importance of the PG became increasingly apparent as oil 
was discovered in Iran and the oil industry developed. The dominant position of Britain in the world's 
coal industry and their control of a world wide logistic infrastructure based on coal was overthrown by 
oil and its rapid improvements in the technology of transportation. As Paul says, 
During World War I (... ) strategists for all the major powers increasingly perceived oil as a 
key military asset, (... ) [and] that oil would assume a rapidly-growing importance in the 
civilian economy, making it a vital element in national and imperial economic strength and a 
source of untold wealth to those who controlled it. ' 
Hence after WWI oil as an influential factor from geopolitics point of view persuaded main powers 
including Britain and the US to obtain oil concessions in the ME especially in Iran. Iran during post 
war years enjoyed a position of increased strategic importance regarding Britain as the British adopted 
the mandate for Mesopotamia (now Iraq). WWI also elevated Britain's dependence on the oil reserves 
of the area; therefore its Middle Eastern policy was restated. During the post war years, British national 
defence was a great concern, since a country very much dependent on its sea power must guarantee its 
future supplies of oil. Britain who had become increasingly dependent upon the US for all supplies 
required by the British Navy and by military and commercial enterprises, at that time realised the 
necessity of ensuring its own permanent reserves. 2 Through the oil quest in the ME and particularly in 
Iran, Britain tried for exclusive control over oil fields. 
Besides the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, after WWI, the British government, in order to secure 
its oil and other commercial benefits and preferential rights in Iran attempted to sign the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement in August of 1919, which was refused by Iranian parliament (Majlis). As Chubin and Zabih 
affirm, "During the immediate postwar years to 1953, the major objective of Iran's foreign policy was 
to liquidate the consequences of wartime occupation by the Soviet Union and Great Britain. " The 
Iranian government, wishing to put an end to the Anglo-Russian economic domination of Iran sought 
to involve American oil interests as a way of enlisting US support for Iran's security and stability. 
British policy in Iran consisted of political, commercial and financial concerns. All the different 
methods the British government used in Iran were aimed at keeping the Iranian government radically 
dependent upon British assistance, thereby enabling Britain to block all other parties interested in that 
part of the ME. 
A century-long hatred of British and Russian occupants of Iranian territory and the emergence of the 
US as the major creditor nation in the world at the end of WWI, with a substantial amount of capital 
available for investment abroad, gave hope to Iranians that close cooperation with such an "altruistic 
power" would guarantee independent sources of capital and enable Iran to exercise full sovereignty 
over its territory. 
Beside the withdrawal of Russia from a controlling position in the five Northern provinces of Iran, two 
other major factors contributed to the concentration on oil in post war Iran-American relations: the rise 
of giant American oil companies with the capital and inclination to expand into the ME, and the 
production levels achieved by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in southern Iran, indicating untapped oil 
reserves in the remainder of Iran. 
In the early 1920s, the American oil industry concerns were about an imminent domestic oil shortage 
and the possibility that the major sources of petroleum outside North America would soon be locked up 
by foreign interests, primarily by British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell. This fear was associated 
with anger over the behaviour of the British appeared to be unbeatable due to America's wartime effort 
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and seemed to be doing everything in their power to consolidate their foreign petroleum supply 
positions at the expense of US nationals. 
Between 1919 and 1924 the US `Open Door' policy was once more active, and directed towards the 
expansion of American interests abroad with a minimum amount of political and military 
commitment. 4 The major US oil companies, who believed critical global oil shortages were impending 
and sought access to new non domestic sources, were persuaded by the American government to enter 
the Iranian oil market. 
Also as Drysdale and Blake affirm, "the concession in neighbouring Iraq was more significant. It was 
here that the pattern of creating joint production companies to save costs, reduce mutually destructive 
competition, and orchestrate supplies was first established. "S These US companies as they add, with the 
support of the US State Department persuaded the British to expand the Turkish Petroleum Company 
TPC's6 membership, which in 1928 allowed the admittance of several US companies, e. g. Exxon, 
Mobil, and Gulf. Official reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, in 1975 indicate 
that: 
In 1943, the British controlled 81% of ME oil production as compared with 14% under 
American control. Roughly the same disparity existed in Middle East refinery capacity, where 
the giant Abadan refinery in Iran helped to give the United Kingdom 85% of the region's 
refinery capacity as compared with 8% under American control. 7 
After the end of WWII, the Anglo-American relationship changed; the US was rising as a superpower 
and the British Empire was beginning to fall. After six years of global war, Britain, economically 
exhausted, withdrew from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the cause of Britain's participation in Iran 
and the PG. 
In spite of the post war displacement of British by the US in the leadership of world politics, because of 
mutual interests, America and Britain utilised a "special relationship", in Cold War politics. As Andrew 
Dorman affirms about British security policy in Europe after 1945 until 1989, 
Within this transformation four inter-linked assumptions remained consistent throughout the 
period and revolved around maintaining the balance of power in Europe. These were the 
hostility of the Soviet Union, the maintenance of the 'special relationship' with the United 
States, the preservation of NATO and the creation and maintenance of an independent 
strategic nuclear deterrent 8 
As he adds, 
Despite (... ) concentration upon the Soviet threat since 1945 Britain's management of the 
problem has continuously been undermined by financial insecurity. With a requirement to 
deter the Soviet Union the support of the United States was a paramount consideration for 
Britain as America remained the single power capable of matching the Soviet Union. As a 
result, the British Government sought to foster its relations with the United States by 
advancing the idea of an Anglo-American Alliance. 9 
Britain accepted its role as a junior partner of the US, instead of being the owner of a world empire. As 
James Gump reviews the Saki Dockrill's book, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice 
Between Europe and the World, "Britain tried to maintain its power and influence in the post war world 
while facing escalating economic and diplomatic pressures. " Regarding the decision to withdraw from 
East of Suez in the late 1960s, he mentions that Dockrill wrote that, "The East of Suez decision 
epitomised Britain's changing relations with the world between 1945 and 1968, (... ) so that their 
country could find a "new place on the world stage" (... ) and marked the beginning of Britain's 
transformation into a modern, medium-sized world power. "10 
The connected foreign policies of two countries were very obvious in the PG. In the first period of the 
middle of the twentieth century, Britain's goal was containing Iran and the Arab Sheikhdoms of the PG 
as a safety area between rival Russia and the British India. Meanwhile, by the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement of 1907 Britain could keep Russia out of this region and guaranteed Indian trade by sea and 
Indian Territory from any Russian invasion by sending British soldiers from eastern side of the PG. 
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Furthermore, Iran was an important case for the US and Britain's mutual interests, especially as Chubin 
affirms, "Iran was located at the very core of the Cold War in the Middle East "II, and Britain had a 
long presence in the Iranian oil industry. 
With Eisenhower's Cold War policies (particularly containing USSR from Iran, PG and US oil 
holdings in Arab countries in this region), also America's "special relationship" with Britain and the 
US' need to involve American oil companies in Iran, Britain experienced her new role as a 'Shadow 
Global Power'. 
The downfall of the Iranian Prime Minister Mosadegh, who nationalised the Anglo- Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC) in 1953 by the British idea and US action, was a good example of this new position. 
The US policy coordination with Britain resulted in the 1954 Consortium Agreement which founded 
the International Consortium and enabled the AIOC to return to Iran. As Chubin and Zabih express, 
"the American takeover of nearly 40 percent of the former British petroleum operation in Iran meant 
that American economic and commercial interests had begun to be entrenched in the country. "12 
Following the indication of the post war displacement of British by US interests and presence in the 
ME, Britain's military withdrawal from the region in 1971 provided the opportunity for the US, who 
had important strategic interests but a limited role in the PG, to fill the vacuum in this geopolitical 
waterway. 
The United States of America 
Since the first American expedition in the PG in 1943-4 which resulted with an estimated minimum of 
25 billion barrels of available oil in this region, from the US administration and American associations' 
point of view the world supply of oil was switched from America, as the biggest oil producer in the 
world in the first half of the twentieth century, to the ME. 
Although the US government had helped the oil industry in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and 
was involved in other countries oil affairs, by the 1950s, the only area in the PG that American oil 
companies did not have a major influence in was Iran. 
On the other hand the US officials were concerned that the loss of Iranian oil would harm the European 
Recovery. Program as outlined in the Marshall Plan, which was also used by Washington to take control 
of European energy markets and to open access to raw materials in Europe's colonial holdings. In 
addition to this was the fact that as a result of post-war recovery and changing their energy source from 
coal to oil countries in Western Europe also Japan as American's Allies were requiring much more oil. 
In 1951, the Iranian parliament passed an oil nationalisation bill proposed by Dr. Mohammad 
Mosadegh, the Prime Minister, as a symbol of freedom from foreign influence. Mosadegh argued that 
Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves. But British Petroleum accused Mosadegh of 
violating the company's legal rights and leaded a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil that threw the 
country into financial crisis. 
The Mosadegh government hoped that the US would continue to deal with Iran and prevent economic 
collapse, but the President Truman administration put its relations with Britain first and participated in 
an international boycott of Iranian oil. Nonetheless, Truman refused a secret plan proposed by Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill to overthrow Mosadegh, fearful that such actions would open the door to 
new Soviet influence, but his successor, Dwight Eisenhower put a similar plan into effect. 
The crisis was resolved after the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS) orchestrated a coup d'etat that toppled the democratically elected government of 
Mosadegh and brought a more obedient Iranian government to power. 13 
It is believed that WWII to wide extent, was a conflict between the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union 
and about oil in the ME. 14 Since America's involvement in the attempt to return the Shah to the throne 
is mostly comprehended in the framework of oil and the Cold War, Chubin's affirmation is noticeable 
that, 
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A major restatement of US policy after the restoration "of the Shah in 1954 reiterated the 
priorities: to keep Iran independent and free from Soviet domination and `communist control'. 
Because of its location and resources, it was assumed that Iran was a target of Soviet pressure; 
the US objective therefore became the establishment of 'A strong stable government in Iran 
capable of maintaining internal security and providing some resistance to external 
aggression'. 15 
According to a statement of policy by the National Security Council (NSC) about the US policy toward 
Iran, from the 2d of January, 1954 Iran was regarded as a "continuing objective of Soviet expansion". 
The implications of the loss of Iran, particularly by subversion, were mentioned would, 
a. Be a major threat to the security of the entire Middle East, as well as Pakistan and India. b. 
Increase the Soviet Union's oil resources for war (... ). c. Damage United States prestige in 
nearby countries (... ) [where Pakistan and Turkey too would eventually fall under Soviet 
control]. d. Permit the communists to deny Iranian oil to the free world, or alternatively to use 
Iranian oil as a weapon of economic warfare. e. Have serious psychological impact elsewhere 
in the free world. 16 
To implement this policy and prevent any Soviet aggression towards Iran, Eisenhower urged Iran's 
invigoration by economic and military aid. To the NSC the most effective instrument for maintaininI 
Iran's orientation toward the West was the Shah and the Army was his only real source of power. ' 
Washington, by granting only short term emergency assistance to the government successor of 
Mosadegh from September 1953, put pressure for an early oil settlement dispute favourable to the US 
and Britain. '8 
After the resumption of diplomatic relations of Iran with Britain under the US pressure and the London 
request, an oil agreement was signed in August 1954.19 So Iran oil was produced by a new joint 
production company known as the Consortium, despite the Iran ownership of all her oil fields and 
installations. Noticeably, the Consortium contained all the seven sisters for the first time; and American 
and British oil interests regained their concessions after the change of government. Therefore as Etaat 
notes, `oil as an effective element in geopolitics could play a negative role for Iran to give up from its 
long struggle for nationalization. "20 Ramazani in this regard also remarks that: 
The deal, anyway, gave the United States 'a new and malleable form of influence over the 
Iranian government and over the Middle Eastern politics in general. (... ) Several years [later] 
the Shah said that 'its most important result was the termination, once and for all, of the 
British monopolistic hold over Iran's oil industry. '21 
The US policy to prevent Soviet Union aggression towards Iran facilitated the oil flowing to the West 
once more. This was also aided by British involvement in the consortium, and by offering American oil 
companies special privileges to prevent any effective prosecution of the antitrust suit of the Justice 
Department, the reluctant American oil companies were induced to sign on to the consortium 
agreement. Such increased American presence in Iran limited Soviet ambitions for interfering in Iran's 
affairs, kept Russia out of this region and guaranteed the security of oil flows from the PG. 
In addition to the increasing commercial role of America, Arab nationalist challenges during 1950s 
posed a threat to the complex mechanism of British control over the tribal-dynastic sheikhdoms of the 
PG, and the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula contributed in the 1960s to the gradual erosion of the 
British position. Therefore, by the mid 1960s, the US had the control of ME oil, and US oil 
corporations dominated the world economic stage. The US strategy in the ME to protect its interests as 
a unique award from the WWII has been successively enlarged by all heads of US administrations 
since then 22 
British withdrawal from the region, growing Western dependence on PG and ME imported oil, and as 
Richman affirms, "US policy toward the Middle East (... ) to ultimately control the oil; to strengthen, 
where possible, key allies to do the United States' bidding; and to keep other powers - not Lust the Soviet Union but also Great Britain and France - away, if not dependent on the United States" made 
the three most important traditional objectives of US policy in the ME possible. 
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These objectives were as follows: guarding stable access by the industrialised world to the region's vast 
oil resources, containing the Soviet and any other powers influence and access to those sources and 
defending Israel's security have been followed by various American political leaders conforming to US 
interests in different international situations. Along with the growing Western dependence on the 
region's oil, there have been three major turning points of US security and military policy in the PG to 
safeguard US interests during the last three decades and each has been more aggressive than the 
previous one. 
US Energy Security Policy: America Moves in the Persian Gulf 
The Nixon Doctrine 
Although the emerging power vacuum in the PG provided the opportunity for the US to follow her 
strategic interests, but Washington was not keen to play a bigger and direct role for regional security 
there. 
The US limited military presence until 1968 and difficulties of defending the PG because of its long 
distance from the United States, also Washington's preoccupation with the Vietnam War were good 
reasons of implementing the Nixon Doctrine. As well in the US regional strategy against the Soviet 
Union, according to General Hussein Fardust, a special friend of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who 
reorganised and modernised Shah's secret service (SAVAK), 
Iran's oil resources, its strategic importance in the Persian Gulf as well as its geographical 
proximity to the Soviet Union were the main reasons for its vital role in the US regional 
strategy (... ) Iran was close enough to be used as a base from where the Americans could 
conduct espionage activities in attempts to weaken the Soviet Union. 24 
The Shah of Iran objection with non-region states to fill the power vacuum in the PG and his long- 
standing wish to play a more active role in the region, also the old rivalry between the two major oil 
countries of the ME - Iran and Saudi Arabia - coincided with Britain policy and the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine in this region. Britain tried to solve many disputes of littoral states in the PG before her 
military withdraw, to leave the region security responsibility to them. The Nixon Doctrine called for 
regional powers with financial potentials to act as representatives of Washington, which could decrease 
US expenditures for preservation of its strategic interests in the region including Indian Ocean. 
The combination of Iran's raising military power with the wealth of Saudi Arabia as the richest oil- 
bearing region, enhanced by rising oil prices, was realised as a valuable means for Britain and 
American policy in the region. 
As stated by the Nixon Doctrine, this policy which was coordinated with British government, counted 
on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the bases for regional stability and defenders of Western interests. 25 The 
US strategy which was referred to as the 'twin-pillar' policy, warranted within the President Richard 
Nixon visit to Tehran in May 1972, where Iran was the cornerstone. 26 
So Iran as the PG's policeman became the military pillar and Saudi Arabia became the financial pillar; 
both that were assisted by the US in the modernisation of their armed forces, shared American anxieties 
regarding future Soviet expansion in the region as well as Iraqi activity especially after the coup d'etat 
of the Ba'th Party and its growing ties to the Soviet Union. The US Navy also preserved an 'over the 
horizon' presence, to support these countries in essential situation. 
Like Timothy Lomperis observation, "even in the Cold War regional balances of power were important 
to the global balance of poweri27, in the Nixon Doctrine "it was imperative that the regional balance of 
power be maintained. "2" Therefore the US sought to balance between two competing rivalries for dominance in the PG. 
As Daniel Yergin states both, Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the two largest exporters of crude oil in the 1960s and 1970s wanted to be the leader both in the region and among oil producers: 
The global battle of production intensified the long-standing rivalry between the two key oil 
countries of the Middle East- Iran and Saudi Arabia. The swell of output around the world 
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put the major companies in a political quandary. They had to try to balance supply against 
demand, (... ). Thus, the Persian Gulf became the stabilizer; the control mechanism for 
balancing supply and demand (... ). Their competition over levels of oil production 
underscored the fundamental jealousy and suspicion between the two countries. For output 
translated into wealth; and wealth in turn meant power, influence, and respect 29 
Since the American oil companies were afraid of losing their concessions in either country, the US did 
not want to appear to favour one side over the other. As Yergin notes, `The question of how to allocate 
production between Saudi Arabia and Iran was not, (... ) a mater of economics (... ). Rather, it was a 
strategic and political decision". Although the leaders of the two countries had their own advantage to 
overcome this riddle, but as he marks, "Iran was potentially the dominant power in the region, and the 
Shah did have to be placated, if not always satisfied. "3° 
During 1970s some events in the region cracked the Nixon Doctrine and US administration 
implemented a more aggressive policy towards the PG. The 1973 oil embargo of Arab members of 
OPEC, as a direct result of the Arab-Israeli war, 31 on one hand underscored the strategic importance of 
the region and its oil reserves; on the other hand it caused serious re-evaluation of US policy 
precedence in the PG. 
Western Europe (except Britain) and Japan economic vulnerability to OPEC oil production caused 
great effort to strengthen their relations with the PG states which possess strategic resources of oil. The 
1973 oil crisis32 affected Western Europe and Japan- industrial countries without energy resources- 
but not Britain and the US which even profited out of it 33 They benefited especially from armament 
transactions with the region and faced a great opportunity for oil production in both countries. 34 
As oil revenues grew, arms sales became the major help of recycling the profits of petrodollars back to 
the main arms sellers" and it conformed to US and Britain policy to strengthen the regional powers for 
preserving PG security. 
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war on the other hand came to US reassessment of its strategy in the Indian 
Ocean and deduced that it could not rely much on allied support. Furthermore as Randy Bell expresses 
"the [1973] oil embargo underscored the strategic importance of the region. Oil and economic matters 
were placed on an equal footing with strategic interests. "36 
The US naval escalation with enhanced suspicions of a raising Soviet military presence in the region 
began since 1971, when decreasing activities in Vietnam paved the way to send modern ships into the 
Indian Ocean. Hence, US armed forces by an agreement with Britain were to expand massively their 
base on a British territory in the Indian Ocean, ' Diego Garcia. The 1973 oil embargo illustrated the 
vulnerability of the sea-routes and how easily oil shipments and constant access to it might be 
obstructed in some other crisis. Therefore the US implemented intense plans of its navy to expand base 
support facilities on the island of Diego Garcia (near the Strait of Hormuz), also as a base for possible 
air strikes against regional hostiles. As Paul Rogers states, "Diego Garcia was to become one of the 
US's most powerful overseas bases, full of supplies for use in a future conflict in the Middle East. "37 
Under such circumstances the US was even prepared to invade Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the state of 
Abu Dhabi to seize their oilfields following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. 38 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo was comprehended additional proof of the value of Iran as an American 
regional ally. However, in 1979 along with other incidents in the region, the Nixon Doctrine came to its 
end and a more hostile and forceful US policy towards the PG was taken. 
The Carter Doctrine 
With the fall of the Shah in February 1979, the US could not anymore count on allies in the region. While the broader Northern Tier concept39 was broken-down, and the military-political Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), 40 as a small branch of NATO, with withdraw announcement of Iran and 
similar action of Pakistan in March 1979, became extinct. Therefore a more active and visible US 
policy was implemented by replacing the Carter Doctrine with the Nixon Doctrine, which the former 
one relied on US military power to protect its so called `vital interests' in the PG area. 
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Situations in 1979 justified the more aggressive formulation of the Carter Doctrine to safeguard US 
interests in the PG. The second oil crisis of 1979 that occurred in response to the Camp David Accords 
of Egypt-Israel and mainly due to the Iranian revolution heightened the importance of oil in the foreign 
policy place. In December 1979, the USSR invasion to Afghanistan, also turbulence in Saudi Arabia 
almost the same time, and Iraq invasion to Iran in September 1980 terrified the US administration of 
the threat of tumble into the whole PG. Therefore with the evolution in the region's geopolitics, the 
Carter Doctrine of January 1980 warned that, "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, " and 
pledged to defend that interest by "any means necessary, including military force. " 
The security weak points of the Nixon policy for protecting US strategic interests in the ME were: 
1- The general vulnerability of the US economy and foreign policy from two oil shocks of the 
1970s; 
2- Lack of knowledge of US allies' society's issues, circumstances and sensitivities also their 
domestic policies to focus foresight plan to deter any national crisis; as well the absence of 
effective leverage for any outside aggressions, especially from the USSR to control the PG; 
3- Lack of knowledge of the limits of ultra regional powers' capacities to dominate the region, 
e. g., occurrence of Iran Revolution and the Soviet's forces withdrawal from Afghanistan later 
in 1989! 1 
The oil crisis of 1970s that caused recessions, high rates of inflation and reduced growth rates in oil 
importing countries, expanded the scope of national security to include non-military issues like 
resources and international economics. The 1970s oil shocks developed the concept of 'energy 
security' 42 Since the geopolitical importance of oil became obvious the US tried to, as Judd Peak 
expresses, "tie oil market security to geopolitical circumstances. Thus, began a strengthening of 
economic and political ties with oil exporters. In addition, it began a reassessment of the Nixon 
Doctrine. "ý3 
From security point of view, under Carter Administration a new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 
(RDJTF) was formed with a potentiality to interfere directly in the area. This was Washington's policy 
during 1980s to protect US historical strategic interests in the ME concentrated upon two enduring 
issues, the security of Israel and the preservation of a promising relationship with PG oil-exporting 
countries. However, as Moynihan also notes the US dilemma was how to balance its two incompatible 
goals of assuring Israel's security and at the same time securing its interest in maintaining access to 
ME, particularly PG oil supplies; an Arab-Israeli peace offer was the US' solution. 4 In addition, the 
US aid to Tel Aviv doubled in 1980 to reinforce Israel, and great amounts of armament were sent to 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the PG to make a joint deployment against Islamic Iran. They 
were advised to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
The Reagan Administration 
When the Reagan administration took office, consolidated the security framework designed by Carter 
but blamed its fluctuating foreign policy and debilitated defence capability, therefore stressed on the 
need to balance change. As MacDonald states Reagan, who from beginning of his entrance to the 
White House was facing, 
a continuing window of vulnerability with the Soviet Union, a Camp David peace process that 
was losing momentum, and a US credibility problem in the Gulf that had worsened since the 
abortive attempt to rescue the American hostages, (... ) moved strongly to rebuild the United 
States' conventional and nuclear strength to improve the global strategic balance. In the 
Middle East, the United States moved to improve its credibility by identifying the Soviet 
Union as the greatest threat, projecting a strong commitment to friendly governments, and 
taking a hard line on terrorism. The thrust of the new policy became known as 'strategic 
consensus'. As Secretary of State Alexander Haig explained, the emphasis on the Soviet 
Union as the "common threat" was directed at the strengthening of security partnerships 
throughout the Middle East, from Israel and Egypt to the Gulf states, presumably, stronger 
partnerships would enable the United States to increase its military presence throughout the 
region. 4s 
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However, the idea of `strategic consensus' was not acceptable to the Arab states of the PG, as domestic 
and regional concerns especially the threats of Israel was more important to them than external Soviets 
threats. As well the consolidation of the GCC had more priority to them as a common front against Iran 
and an institution for maximising security cooperation and dealing with region's problems in political 
and economic aspects. The GCC states reluctance to accept more uncover alignment with Washington 
was also thru the great resistance of their traditional societies. 
The main challenges to US interests were the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, 
instability caused by the Iran-Iraq war in the region with its resultant attacks on oil shipping and 
possibility of invigorating Islamic revolution by Iran through the PG. Reagan responses to these 
challenges were strengthening the RDJTF, providing security assistance to US friends in the area, 
reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers and deploying a major force of warships in the PG. 
The Reagan decision to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers and increase the American naval force during Iran- 
Iraq war was implemented with the pretext to protect the tankers and defend free navigation and to 
prevent the Soviet Union which was hiring tankers to Kuwait, from its powerful presence in the PG. 
But in reality the US intention of its reflagging policy - as was explained by Alexander Haig - was 
to increase US military presence throughout the region. Meanwhile, as some analysts like Richman 
believe, provoking the Iranians to respond by military means to the US reflagging and escorting oil 
tankers of one of it's enemies, could pave the way for more intensive military presence of the US b1 
flaming the war with justified intervention of US forces in the region of main global oil reserves. 6 
Some others like Barry Rubin state that, 
The US policy aimed at avoiding direct involvement in the Gulf was based both on the desire 
to avoid entanglement in the Iran-Iraq war and the fact that the local Arab states rejected- 
and might be damaged- by an increased US presence. 47 
Despite emphasises of the Reagan administration on necessity of a US military presence in the PG to 
protect the free flow of oil but there was no sever evidence for such concerning danger. As Former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated, "The odd aspect of the crisis is that nothing significantly 
new has happened. (... ) The best evidence that there is no new threat is that ship insurance rates for the 
Gulf have not changed appreciably in 1987. " Yet despite this lack of urgency, "America thus risks 
being drawn into an expanded military role that cannot be decisive. "48 As well according to Rubin, 
Despite the numerous attacks, mainly by Iraqi planes most often against Iranian-flag boats, oil 
prices generally fell and there was still so much petroleum available that OPEC was hard- 
pressed to hold down production. (... ) A bloody Iran-Iraq war remained indecisive but 
showed no sign of spreading or endangering the Persian Gulf's oil exports. 49 
The US reflagging Kuwaiti tankers policy did not greatly contribute to provide such suitable 
circumstances for oil flow and market since US warships ignored attacks on non-US flag ships. S° But 
as Richman affirms, 
Although the Reagan policy appears pro-Iraq at first glance, 'Iran stands to gain the most from 
keeping the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz open. Iran (... ) sends its oil through the gulf and 
needs oil revenues to fight the war. Iraq does neither 5' 
Reagan administration concerns were an exaggerated fear of a Soviet domination, an interest in 
establishing ties to Iran because of its strategic importance especially in regard to the risk of Soviet 
intervention in the region, and possibility of Iran triumph in war with Iraq as a chance of spreading 
Islamic revolution. Washington found particularly discomfit its incapacity to release seven US citizens 
held hostage by members of Hezbollah group in Lebanon that had links with Iran. Eventually Reagan 
administration came to arms transfer as a solution to start relation with Iran and release the hostages. 
US arms sales to Iran as well the opportunity of dismissing other countries from selling arms to Iran, 
that could overset the military balance between Iran and Iraq, was comprehended by the Arab states of 
the PG as a possible threat from Iran to intimidate their monarchies, as well a shifted policy of the US in favour of Iran so not anymore reliable for the Arabs. 
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The partial arms sale to Iran by Washington during 1985-1986 compare to extensive covert arms, 
technology and intelligence help of the US to Iraq within the eight year imposed war, benefited the 
West by arms sales to all countries in the region. This process encouraged growth of militarism in the 
region by seeking security through more arms purchases via non-fighter Arab states in the PG. 
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the military and economic capability of the two major regional power = Iran and Iraq - was 
gradually diminish. Therefore by increasing US military presence in the PG and weakening the 
regional powers' potentialities, Washington supposed could guarantee the access to its two most 
important traditional objectives of her policy in the ME, preserve oil flow with affordable price and 
security of Israel. 
Iran victories in regaining nearly all the territory lost to Iraq after its invasion and even holding some 
Iraqi territory, worried the pro-Iraq tilt Reagan administration as well the littoral Arab states wishing to 
enlist the superpowers' help in finalising the war. 
The necessity to end the war, the need to preserve US reliability with friendly Arab states in the PG 
because of the 'Iran-Contra' issue and the risk of destabilising situation in this region for long-term 
interests of the West resulted in the US reflagging policy and the US leading peace efforts in the UN. 
Reagan, who believed in military force as the only way to bring things under control in the PG, 
completed the aggressive process of previous turning points of US security policy in this region. This 
process was started after WWII from encouraging Britain to keep its forces in the region to develop the 
US military forces as a dominant power. 
As even after Iran's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 and official end of the Iran- 
Iraq War - despite the expectation of withdrawal of all foreign forces - the US comprehended this 
waterway as a region of the US `vital interest' and decided to keep some of its naval forces. Saghafi- 
Ameri observes this policy as a reflection of US long-term strategy for a permanent presence of 
American naval force to stabilise itself as the premier power in the world. According to him this policy 
was not taken to prevent the Soviet threats anymore but to preserve security of the southern littoral 
states of the PG that were all dependent on the West military support 53 
The Bush and Clinton Administrations 
With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and glasnost, end of the Cold War because of deletion a 
rivalry superpower from international scene also the crisis of Iraq invasion to Kuwait in 1990, the US 
security policy found the great opportunity to be stabilised in the region. 
Under such great geopolitical changes of region security, the George H. W. Bush administration 
originated a multinational military coalition that included Western allies and most ME states and a 
large-scale deployment of troops and materiel began entering the region. In early 1991, the allied forces 
succeeded in pushing Iraq back beyond its border with Operation Desert Storm. Such circumstances 
paved the way for the "Bush doctrine" and his "new world order" on the basis of the US hegemony; 
and provided the possibility of US control and access to oil reserves of the southern littoral states of the 
PG. Whilst with industrial countries' growing dependence on imported oil from this region, 
Washington with applying a unipolar security system in the PG could enjoy a powerful leverage to 
control its rivalries through its leading role on oil distribution. 
Therefore the US continued its military superiority in the region to prevent any other countries gaining 
control over the region and its mass energy resources; also to maintain its military access to the geo- 
strategic region of the PG to be able to control events in many other significant regions of the world. It 
could also impart geopolitical consequences of growing demand for abundant and low price oil and 
natural gas of the PG as a critical prerequisite for Japan and Western industrial growth and increasingly 
for the industrial growth of Asia and much of the developing world. 
The continuance of US military presence, as well, could encourage the GCC countries of their external 
security concerns as well as their developing economic cooperation with the US. The development of 
economic cooperation of the US with the GCC states was mainly designed to guarantee Washington's 
traditional interests - the protection of the flow of oil and the security of Israel - as a new method in 
changing geopolitical circumstances of the post-Cold War. 
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Although the US military presence in the PG was intended to protect southern littoral monarchies 
security from Iran and Iraq, many of these countries were mainly afraid from each other. They also 
faced serious internal problems, including the fall of oil revenues as the high level of oil price 
fluctuation with impact on the region's cradle-to-grave welfare states, also internal security concerns 
with mostly a firm anti-American motivation. 
Consequently for most of the GCC countries blessed with oil riches, viz. Bahrain, Oman, Dubai within 
the UAE, and Qatar, how to sustain a high standard of living at a time of declining oil revenue would 
create serious internal security threats. Budget deficiency because of reducing these countries oil 
reserves within the next 20 to 30 years - like much of the Middle Eastern and North African countries 
- growing populations, and high expectations of an increasingly educated public are among their 
significant concerns. For the survival of the current governments and their domestic stability as the 
West's overriding strategic interest and the regional stability, the economic diversification of the GCC 
took shape at the end of the twentieth century. 
Preserving promising political and economic ties with the GCC is the main technique of the US to 
control the flow of oil from the PG, while oil has dominated the economies of the GCC and formed 
their political systems. This objective was reached through increasing bilateral investment and trade 
between the GCC and the US with the intent to foster economic diversification; since from Washington 
point of view "national security is increasingly defined by economic security. " 9%54 
But the GCC states that lacked the managerial and technical potentiality and ability for operating 
different manufacturing industries will remain mere consumer of Western products. The major 
economic activities are concerned on trade and investment and their prerequisites, so at a time of 
declining oil revenue they will be depend on the West even more than before. A dilemma that raises 
internal security threats however in favour of the US. Washington would not welcome any domestic 
security dangers although it seems this has been missed from the US estimation. 
Both the US and the GCC noted that as these economic initiatives become more expanded and deeply 
rooted, the economic ties between them should become more stabilised and such stable economic 
relations will lead to stable political relations. According to Kemp and Harkavy, 
As the GCC countries become richer, and as they diversify and enlarge their economies, they 
will not only become more important to the world economy, but also more interdependent 
with it. GCC capital will increasingly fund development schemes in the West as well as the 
ME itself. The GCC will have a major incentive to invest in the stability of the world markets 
and economy. 55 
Such political and economic interaction and interdependence of the GCC with the world as they reveal, 
may also ultimately embrace political values closer to those of the United States and the West. 
At that point a relationship more akin to relationships between the United States and the 
countries of Western Europe, Canada, and Israel may emerge, in which case the relationship 
between the West and the GCC will become even closer than it is today. 56 
Clinton's regional foreign policy for reducing threats to PG oil was supporting a regional balance of 
power by sustaining Saudi Arabia, and continuing to follow a dual containment policy aimed at Iran 
and Iraq as the two regional powers. To guarantee regional stability in the ME, along with relying on 
regional security alliances, Clinton decreased US military presence in the region. 
This policy - with relying on Saudi Arabia and the GCC in the PG and Egypt and Turkey as the 
regional powers near to Israel with emphasising on the peace process - as Peak explains did "allow 
the United States to take a less visible role in Middle East affairs (... ) also guarantee the authority of 
Saudi Arabia as the new regional stabilizer. " While as he explains, 
the authority of Saudi Arabia and the other GCC nations would be enhanced through 
increased economic ties with the region (... ); the US (... ) [was] able to maintain a low-key 
position in Middle East affairs while at the same time influencing regional geopolitics. 
Contrastingly, the security of Israel will be maintained through reliance on the peace 
process. 57 
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In general this policy has eventuated to the Greater Middle East (GME)58 (12*) initiative by the US 
which its main goal is recognition of Israel by region's countries. Whilst by creating economic 
adherences between the countries in this region, including and with Israel, their economic security as a 
necessity of national security would depend on each others situation. According to this plan under such 
circumstances some countries, like Iran, that do not recognise Israel would get isolated from the 
region's economic net working, and consequently regional political cooperation. 
On the other hand for the era after oil, control of the most likely energy source would be a significant 
element in the US energy security policy. Since nuclear energy seems to be the best replacement for oil 
in the next century, 59 the West prefers to have its exclusivity. The US contrariness with obtaining 
nuclear technology, including mastering the fuel cycle of especially independent countries and 
antipathetic to US unilateralism, e. g. Iran relies on this matter too. Access to uranium enrichment 
specifically within native technology is not just the fear of contingency of obtaining nuclear weapons 
by these countries but lack of knowledge of. the West from their progress in fuel cycling and 
independency from the West in the future. 
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Appendix-4 
Persian Gulf Oil and Gas 
Introduction 
The PG, a 600-mile-long body of water which separates Iran from the Arabian Peninsula, is one of the 
most strategic waterways in the world due to its importance in world oil and natural gas reserves and 
transportation. 
The Energy Information Administration's International Energy Outlook 2003 (IE02003) shows 
continuing strong growth for worldwide energy demand over the next 24 years. Total world energy 
consumption is expected to expand by 58 percent between 2001 and 2025, from 404 quadrillion British 
thermal units (Btu) in 2001 to 640 quadrillion Btu in 2025. (See Table Appendix-4-1 and Figure 
Appendix-4-1)' 
Accordingly the consumption of every primary energy source will increase over the next quarter of 
century forecast horizon. (See Figure Appendix-4-2) Much of the enlargement in future energy demand 
in the reference case is projected to be for fossil fuels, viz. oil, natural gas, and coal, as it is prospected 
that fossil fuel prices will remain comparatively low, and that the cost of producing energy from other 
fuels will not be competitive. 
World oil demand is projected to grow to 119 million barrels per day by 2025 in the IE02003 reference 
case. Over the forecast period, oil remains the fuel of choice in the transportation sector worldwide, and 
almost three-quarters of the projected increase in oil demand from 2001 to 2025 comes from the 
transportation sector, particularly in developing countries that currently have a lower proportion of 
transportation fuels in their energy mix. 
Table Appendix-4-1 
World Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, 1990-2025 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Energy Consumption (Million Metric Tons Carbon 
(Quadrillion Btu) Equivalent) 
Region 1990 2001 2010 2025 1990 2001 2010 2025 [ 
___ __ _ Industrialized Countries 182.8 211.5 240.1 288.3 2,844 3,179 3,572 4,346 
EE/FSU 76.3 53.3 65.9 82.3 1,337 856 1,038 1,267 
Developing Countries 89.3 139.2 174.7 269.6 1,691 2,487 3,075 4,749 
Asia 52.5 85.0 110.1 174.6 1,089 1,640 2,075 3,263 
Middle East 13.1 20.8 25.0 36.0 231 354 420 601 
Africa 9.3 12.4 14.4 20.0 179 230 261 361 7- F 
Central and South 
America 14 
F 
4 20 9 25 2 39 0 192 263 523 . . . . 319 
Total World 348.4 403.9 480.6 640.1 5,872 6,522 7,685 10,361 
Sources: 1990 and 2001: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2001, 
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Figure Appendix-4-2 
World Energy Consumption by Energy 
Source, 1970.2025 
Quadrillion Btu 
1970 1980 1990 2001 2010 2025 
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
International Energy Annual 2001, DOE. EIA-0219(2001) 
(Washington, DC. February 2003), web site www. eia. doe. govl 
iea1. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global 
Energy Markets (2003). 
0 
Oil and natural gas are the world's most important commodities of today's industrial society, i. e. the 
fuel for the engine of modern capitalism. Oil and gas make up 65 to 70 percent of all the energy 
consumed by the three largest economies in the world, viz. the U. S. A, Japan, and the European Union. 
And many of the industrialising countries of the Developing World, such as South Korea, China3, 
Brazil, and Mexico, have faced rising their oil and gas consumption rapidly. 
According to Al-e Aqa (2001) the Director of Petroleum Engineering and Development Co. (PEDEC) 
one of the subsidiaries of the National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC), "The basic reference forecasts for world 
oil demand are all indicative of an increasing trend in the next 20 years. This is much pronounced in 
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[Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries'] member nations themselves (... )", 4 where demand 
for energy is expected to more than double over the next quarter century. (See Figure Appendix-4-3) 
Figure Appendix-4-3 
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Sources. History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
International Energy Annual 2001. DOEIEIA"0219i200I) 
(Washington. DC. February 2003), web site wnnv. eia. doe. govl 
ieal. Projections: EIA. System for the Analysis of Global 
Energy Markets (20031. 
In the developing world, oil consumption is projected to increase for all end uses. Natural gas is 
projected to be the fastest growing primary energy source worldwide, maintaining growth of 2.8 
percent annually over the 2001-2025 periods, nearly twice the rate of growth for coal use. Natural gas 
consumption is projected to rise from 90 trillion cubic feet in 2001 to 176 trillion cubic feet in 2025, 
primarily to fuel electricity generation. ' Oil and gas are not just the source of 62 percent of the energy 
used in the world, they are the source of the production of many goods and products, e. g. all military 
arsenals, rely on oil to carry on their terror, political violence or defending reasons. 6 Beside, its 
importance to the global economy is growing as Pierre Shammas (2001), the president of APS Energy 
Group stresses: 
The Middle East is by far the biggest oil reservoir in the world and its importance to the global 
economy is growing. This regions capacity to meet world oil demand will be crucial to the 
global economy for as long as energy remains the main engine for growth (... ) the Middle 
East today accounts for more than 65 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, compared 
with less than 56 percent at the beginning of the 1980s. Its reserves to production (R/P) ratio 
averages more than 87 years. The world's R/P ratio for oil has declined to about 40 years (... ) 
the importance of the Middle East will have grown considerably by 2005. It will account for 
39 percent of the world's output capacity. ' 
Oil and Gas Reserves, Production and Capacity 
In 2002, the eight PG countries, viz. Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab of Emirates, produced about one-quarter of the world's oil, while holding nearly two-thirds (674 
billion barrels) of the world's crude oil reserves. 8 Besides oil, the PG region also has huge reserves 
(1,923 trillion cubic feet Tcf) of natural gas, accounting for 41% of total proven world gas reserves. 9 
According to EIA (Energy Information Administration's) International Energy Outlook 2002, at the 
end of 2002, PG countries maintained about 22.3 million bbl/d of oil production capacity, or 32% of 
the world total. And more significantly, they normally maintain an overwhelming share (around 90%) 
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of the world's excess oil production capacity; that means in the event of an oil supply disruption this oil 
can be brought online to compensate the world market. 10 
In 2002, PG countries had estimated net oil exports of 15.5 million bbl/d of oil (See Figure Appendix- 
4-4). Saudi Arabia exported the most oil of any PG country in 2002, with an estimated 7.0 million 
bbl/d (45% of the total), Iran around 2.3 million bbl/d (15%), followed by the United Arab Emirates 
(2.1 million bbl/d - 13%), Kuwait (1.7 million bbl/d - 11%), Iraq (1.6 million bbl/d - 10%), Qatar 
(0.8 million bbl/d - 5%), and Bahrain (0.01 million bbl/d - 0/1%). Figure Appendix-4-5 also 
determines small changes of oil exports from the PG during 1997 relating to 2002 estimates. According 
to the Energy Information Administration's International Energy Outlook 2002, PG oil production is 
expected to reach about 30.7 million bbl/d by 2010, and 42.9 million bbl/d by 2020, compared to about 
21.7 million bbl/d in 2000. This would increase PG oil production capacity to 35% of the world total 
by 2020, up from 28% in 2000.1' (See Figure Appendix-4-6) 
Persian Gulf Exports by Country - 2002 
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There are different plans extensive development of existing offshore fields of littoral states of the PG 
for raising offshore production capacity. Main offshore PG oil fields, viz. Khafji and Hout, both that 
are linked to Saudi Arabia's Safaniyah. the world's largest offshore oilfield, with estimated reserves of 
19 billion barrels. The Doroud l&2, Salman, Abuzar, Foroozan, and Sirri fields contain the mass of 
Iran's offshore output, all of which is exported. 12 
Iran and Qatar are containing the world's second and third-largest natural gas (see Figure Appendix-4- 
7) reserves (behind Russia), respectively. Saudi Arabia since 2000 has worked out an age long offshore 
PG border dispute with Kuwait. This scheme eventuated development of the huge (13-Tcf) Dorra gas 
field, which lies in waters standing Iranian, Saudi, and Kuwaiti territories. Most of Qatar's gas is 
placed in the North Dome Field that contains 380 Tcf of in-place and 239 Tcf of recoverable reserves, 
making it the largest known non-associated gas field in the world. 13 
Another major PG offshore gas project is Iran's huge South Pars field. The South Pars gas field is the 
world largest and is jointly shared with Qatar. Available estimates show that South Pars contains 280 to 
500 Tcf of gas, of which a large fraction will be recoverable, and by lower estimate over 17 billion 
barrels of liquids. " According to Iran Petroleum sources "about 50 percent of Iran's natural gas fields 
have not been developed yet which points out the fact that Iran has the potential to produce even more 
natural gas. "15 Of course Iran faces a dilemma for exploration and exporting its natural gas. Iran's oil 
industry is old and need major investment for modernisation as well as of its existing gas pipelines. 
Beside, the demand for energy and also replacing petroleum with gas for domestic consumption in Iran 
is growing. Far distance location of gas fields in the south of Iran with major natural gas consumers in 
the north of the country, also the Unites States' threat to impose sanction on foreign companies that 
deal with Iran's energy industry, have made Iran's dilemma in its gas projects. 16 
Oil Flows 
Roughly 25 percent of the world's oil production comes from the PG, a figure still expected to increase 
rather than decrease in the future. Most crude oil is transported by tankers along a few well-defined 
ocean routes. Start point of about 80 percent of all tanker passages are in the ME, mainly in the PG. 
From more than 100 inter oceanic straits and waterways in the whole world with less than 25 miles (40 
kilometres) wide and various and vital global activities, there are only four extraordinary important 
ones, viz. Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, Gibraltar, and Bosporus and Dardanelles, that act as natural 
gateways in to the ME and North Africa. With concerning the Suez Canal five out of six of the world's 
main strategic straits are located in the ME with important geopolitical effects on local, regional and 
global scales. " 
The importance of these waterways are related to the basis of volume of oil cargoes, numbers of ships, 
alternative routes, intensity of military use, and geographic vulnerability, i. e. length, width, and depth. 
These oil shipment routes are long, vulnerable lifelines to both producers and consumers of oil and gas. 
The importance of accessibility and dependability of the vital oil transportation routes that link 
producing and consuming regions together is such that it bulks large in the great powers' global 
strategies and plans. 
Pipelines are very important for oil transportation too. Regardless their advantages, e. g. shorter tanker 
journey and cross strategic bottlenecks, they are expensive to build, inflexible, and extremely 
vulnerable to subversion. Numerous closures, especially as a result of complex payments of transit 
fees, political disagreements or the misfortune to pass through a major war zone, have underscored 
their unreliability and reduced their usefulness. 
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Figure Appendix-4-7 
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Although the Arab oil producers in the PG have been trying to diversify their export routs and expand 
their own ports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but still international waterways specifically the 
Hormuz, look more reliable. (See Figure D) 
Persian Gui Oil Exports by Route - 2002 
(Million Barrels per Day) 
Figure D (Repeated) 
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The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the PG to the Indian Ocean, bounded by Iran to the north and 
Oman's Musundam peninsula to the south, is about 100 nautical miles (182 km) long and 49 nautical 
miles (80 km) at its smallest width. The narrowest part of the strait - 21 nautical miles (34 km) - lies 
between the Iranian island of Larak and the Omani islet of Greater Quoin. 19 
After the British withdrawal in 1971 Iran found herself the best choice in the region to protect the Strait 
of Hormuz against any foreign threats as well as guaranteeing the safety of shipping through this strait. 
This was mainly because of Iran possession several strategic islands at the entrance of the PG, viz. the 
islands of Hormuz, Larak, Qeshm, Hengam, Greater Tunb and Abu-Musa. 20 
The shortest route of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz was between the Little Quoin and the Musandam 
Peninsula until 1979. Since then Oman because of security reasons asked for shipping lanes beyond the 
Quoin. The new shipping lanes with one mile wide each and keep by a protective zone of same mileage 
are also within Oman's territorial waters. Oman therefore accepted the responsibility for the safety of 
shipping via these lanes. 
According to EIA in 2002,21 the great majority (about 88 percent) of oil exported from the PG transited 
by tanker via the Strait of Hormuz. As yet the world's most important oil `chokepoint', accounting for 
transit of about two-fifths of all world traded oil, the 13.6 million bbl/d of oil that transit the Strait of 
Hormuz goes all over the world, eastwards to Asia (especially Japan, China, and India) and westwards 
(via the Suez Canal, the Egypt's Sumed pipeline, or around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa) to 
Western Europe and the United States. (See Figures Appendix-4-8 & E) In the late 1970s, more than 
half of the oil involved in international trade and two thirds of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) oil transferred from Hormuz at the rate of nearly 18 million barrels per day. 22 
Although there are some beliefs that for some reasons the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not be 
as upheaval as sometimes described, but such situation would require use of longer alternate routes (if 
available) at increased transportation costs. 
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Figure Appendix-4-8 
Flow Map of World Crude Oil, Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, 1994 
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Figure E (Repeated) 
This flow map of world crude oil illustrates well the global importance of the PG region for 
petroleum. And it shows the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz as a chokepoint. US/DOE - 
EIA (Energy Information Administration 23 
Bab al-. %fandab 
The oil traffic heading westwards by tanker from the PG towards the Suez Canal or Sumed pipeline 
complex in Egypt should pass through the Bab al-Mandab. 24 To the extent, therefore, that the Suez 
Canal is important, so is Bab al-Mandab. Located between Djibouti and Eritrea in Africa, and Yemen 
on the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab al-Mandab links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian 
Sea. Although Bab al-Mandab is too wide and deep to be physically blocked, but as Drysdale and 
Blake (1985) have noted "Bab al- Mandab is located in a region of political turmoil (... ) the 
combination of superpower and local rivalries in the vicinity raises the remote but real possibility that 
shipping could be deterred from using the strait during some future conflict because of the risk of being 
491 
caught up in a war zone. "25 Any closure of the Bab al-Mandab "could keep tankers from the Persian 
Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline complex, diverting them around the southern 
tip of Africa. This would add greatly to transit time and cost, and effectively tie up spare tanker 
capacity. "26 
Other Export Routes 
Other export routes of oil from the PG besides the Strait of Hormuz are mostly the Saudi 4.8 million- 
bb/d capacity East-West pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, Iraq's Kirkuk oil region to the 
Turkish port of Ceyhan, Syria to a variety of destinations, and by truck to Jordan. In 2002, only 1.9-2.2 
million bbl/d (12%-14%) of oil was exported via these routes. 
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according to NIOC, hold an estimated 400 million barrels of liquids (oil, natural gas condensates, etc. ) 
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13 Ibid. 
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Before WWII, as Drysdale and Blake, point out, 
Control of the region's oil by a cartel of foreign companies was complete and encompassed 
every phase of operations. (... ) Consequently, they were able to create an economic world 
almost divorced from geographic realities. Working together, they orchestrated production 
regionally, adjusting output in the individual countries in accordance with their global needs. 
The only map that really mattered to them was the concession map because they could so 
easily ignore boundary lines on the political map. ' 
Challenges by the oil-producing countries to own and control their all oil, and the activities of US 
private enterprise which acquired an interest in the region's oil during the 1950s, undermined the major 
companies' absolute control over the region's oil resources in the early 1970s. During the 1950s one of 
the two ME crises that were accelerated over the control of oil and its distribution was the Iranian 
government decision of oil nationalisation. 2 The Iranian tension demonstrated the vulnerable position 
of individual Middle Eastern governments confronting a united front of giant companies who had 
exclusive control on all stages of oil operations including optional set of the oil price. Establishment of 
OPEC in 1960 was one of devices responded to the attempts by the oil-importers industrial countries. 
The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 4 which had started life as a group of 
five oil-producing, developing countries, sought to assert its member countries' legitimate rights in an 
international oil market dominated by the `Seven Sisters' multinational companies. The need for 
cooperation between these countries became apparent when, in 1959, the oil companies unilaterally 
reduced the posted price for the ME and Venezuela crude and in August 1960 posted another reduction 
for the ME crude. 
OPEC is an international organisation of eleven developing countries which are heavily reliant on oil 
revenues as their main source of income. According to the official Web site of OPEC, "OPEC's 
objective is to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure 
fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum 
to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry, " It stresses "Since 
oil revenues are so vital for the economic development of these nations, they aim to bring stability and 
harmony to the oil market by adjusting their oil output to help ensure a balance between supply and 
demand. i5 
OPEC rose to international prominence during 1960, as its member countries took control of their 
domestic petroleum industries and acquired a major say in the pricing of crude oil in world markets. 
They started to learn, as Drysdale and Blake express, that "singly they were weak, [and] together they 
might be strong.. . in the 1970s did OPEC emerge as a quasi-cartel with control over pricing and 
output "6 
The evolution of energy during 1970s fundamentally affected the nature of the world politics. Almost 
70 years after oil was discovered in the ME, OPEC members, as the principal oil-exporting countries, 
for a brief few years appeared to show their power in international scene and effecting world oil 
market. Some developments in the early 1980s undermined their power however as OPEC faced a 
surplus in world market and agreed for the first time ever to limit oil production, reducing official 
prices, and establishing production quotas. After that, production, price and oil marketing have been 
unstable in the oil market and control of the market continued to slip from their hand. 
The fluctuation of oil prices, specifically its continuance increase, has triggered concerns in many 
countries about the potential risk to global growth and has had negative impact on financial and goods 
markets too. In such circumstances demand for oil decreased and caused a drop in prices. 
The experiences of the price increases of the 1970s and 1980s had demonstrated some major 
consequences among the main energy consumers, viz. reducing oil consumption, using energy more 
efficiently, endeavouring to diversify energy sources and investment for explore and exploit the new oil 
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resources. Although such process could reduce the major energy consumers' dependency on OPEC 
exports and consequently cause a shake out in world oil prices, the world's major oil consumers have 
remained dependent on the ME for their oil. Kemp and Harkavy (1997) state the growth of world 
demand for energy especially oil by the year 2010 and conclude that, 
The exact quantity of oil that will have to come from the Persian Gulf will depend on the rate 
of world economic growth, the availability of alternative sources, capacity constraints on 
further production, and price. Low-price oil and high-growth but inefficient economies will 
lead to increased demands for Persian Gulf oil because, at the margin. Low prices make Gulf 
supplies more cost effective than the more expensive oil from other regions. Whatever the 
final numbers, two dramatic points stand out in all the authoritative projections: There is no 
realistic alternative to Persian Gulf oil to meet increased world supply in this period. [And] 
The Asian countries will require increasing quantities of oil from the Persian Gulf. (... ) .7 
The primary obstacles to increased access to oil in different part of the world are mentioned by them as 
"political, economic, and logistical rather than geological, and (... ) to questions of sovereignty and 
regional stability. "8 Krapels in response to the question of "will OPEC be OPEC in the 1990s? " 
mentions the oil policies of all countries as "political security veto" and explains that: 
When an oil-exporting or - importing state is under an imminent security threat, oil policy is 
totally subordinated to foreign policy. This was true for OECD [the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development] countries in the 1970s as it has been for Persian 
Gulf OPEC members in the 1980s. In the case of the crisis in the Gulf, US foreign policy was 
being driven by US need for oil. Under more tranquil national security conditions, however, 
OPEC oil policy has been dominated by members' financial conditions: When all OPEC 
members are rich beyond their expectations (as occurred in 1973-1975 and again in 1979- 
1981), their willingness to cut production jointly to support prices goes up; and when all 
OPEC countries are poor beyond their expectations or face a calamitous price decline, as they 
did in 1986, they again may all be willing to cut production to restore higher prices. 
However, the control of oil prices is not just in OPEC's hands. There are many factors beyond the 
prices as OPEC President Purnomo Yusgiantoro described of the high cost of oil as a "burning issue". 
He said in a statement released after the Amsterdam meeting of OPEC oil ministers on May 22,2004 
that the price rises were the result of a combination of factors, including "geopolitical tensions in some 
regions". 10 OPEC believes that any price fall would be limited by other factors beyond OPEC's control, 
notably strong demand from the fast-growing economies of China and the US, the storage of oil by 
major petroleum importers like the US, heightened tensions in Iraq and elsewhere in the ME, and 
bottlenecks in US refineries. " 
OPEC has not acted completely coordinated as a powerful cartel but as Drysdale and Blake affirm 
"despite major differences and tensions among its members, (... ) [and] the inherent contradictions 
within OPEC (... ) by political tensions, the organization's longevity is in itself a major achievement. " 
As they have observed, "As long as the world's demand for oil was growing or stable and the OPEC 
countries' revenues were generally adequate for their needs, OPEC functioned reasonably well, (... ) 
when demand began to fall, the divergent interests of its members threatened to destroy it. [As] the 
OPEC countries' needs differ radically. " 2 
Iran and OPEC 
The economy of Iran as one of the four main establisher of OPEC and the second largest oil producer 
of this organisation relies heavily on oil export revenues. 13 The oil income covers about 80% of Iran's 
total export earnings and 40%-50% of government budget, therefore, the oil factor is very influential on 
the Iranian domestic and foreign policy. 
While during the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry under the Prime Minister Mosadegh's 
leadership the opposition was looking for Iran's political dependence, and the Shah intended to gain 
additional oil income mainly for the military modernisation as a means of strengthening his power. 
Hence, oil strikes against the Shah's regime as a significant tool worked very effectively and paved the 
way for the collapse of his power in 1979.14 The oil factor after the Islamic Revolution also has played 
a significant role on the Tehran domestic and especially foreign policy. Revolutionary Iran has turned 
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her traditional main energy interaction with the West to the East mainly as a response to dismiss the US 
hostile policy of Iran's containment. 
Despite the different strategies of oil policy of Iran's current and previous regimes in the interest of 
enhancing the national security from their unique point of views, since the establishment of OPEC Iran 
has tried to cooperate with the OPEC members to gain the most advantages from it. According to 
Ramazani Iran before and after revolution has always "sought to occupy a leading place in the 
international oil market "15, but even, its participation in different groups in the OPEC to achieve its 
goals of production level and price, specifically most often in battle with Saudi Arabia has not made 
Tehran act unilaterally. Moreover Tehran oil policies in OPEC have mostly been economic rather than 
security based. In this respect OPEC decisions in 1971 and 1982-83 are good examples of such 
commitment. 
In 1971 the leading role of Iran out of the other OPEC oil producers in the region against main Western 
oil companies, along with an agreement with the other two major oil producers in the PG, viz. Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq, to increase the price of PG crude oil, resulted in an annual raise of 2.5% to offset 
inflation in the West. Also the OPEC decisions of 1982 and 1983 to fix a formal limit on the level of all 
its members' oil production and to decrease oil prices from $34 to $29 per barrel could control 
worldwide surplus of oil, achieving the real cost of oil and so stabilise the demand for oil. 16 
As Ramazani also remarks, despite the concerns of the GCC especially Saudi Arabia about Iran's 
revolution impact on their domestic political situations as well as OPEC policies, Iran never posed any 
threat to the GCC states. In addition, despite various problems and crises, OPEC members managed to 
cooperate, regardless of the form of government, differences over price and production levels, or 
ideological antagonism, "as oil states they had to sink or swim together. Dependent for survival on 
their oil revenues, the Gulf states had no other alternative but to compromise, even when they did not 
seem to be doing so. "17 In this regard President Khatami, while addressing the 1350, OPEC oil 
ministers gathering in Isfahan on March 2005, emphasised the most important concerns of Iran as 
keeping OPEC strong, cooperative and responsible to its commitments to the energy world market and 
the security of both consumers and producers from Iran's point of view: 
Today, no country, international or regional organization, is entitled to heed its own interests 
alone (... ) The important goal is boosting harmony and cooperation, keeping in mind OPEC's 
status regulating the international oil market. [other] necessity is heeding OPEC's 
responsibility in meeting the international oil market's demands. OPEC is constantly 
responsible for safeguarding the security of the oil market and for adopting effective policies 
aimed at strengthening the relations among OPEC member states, while safeguarding the 
interests of the producers and the consumers alike, (... ) through holding constant dialogues. 
(... ) Yet, security for energy market does not simply mean security for the consumers, (... ) 
The security and political stability of the producer countries and their easy access to modern 
technology at reasonable cost can rationalize the international market, (... ) In recent months 
we have witnessed critical conditions of the international oil markets and under such 
conditions, OPEC, aware of the current worrying conditions, spotting the roots of the problem 
as the US presence in the region, and not necessarily purely economic reasons, has managed 
to cool down and stabilize the market resorting to logical and timely policy making. OPEC 
has once again proved that it has a global approach beyond any other concern and adopts its 
policies keeping in mind the international community's interests, rather than the oil 
producers', or its own concerns. [While] certain major world powers that are the main 
consumers of "this vital substance" regard oil as one of the major involved factors in their 
military, political, and economic calculations against the producer nations. 18 
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Saudi Arabia as the largest country amongst the PG states occupies eighty percent of the Arabian 
Peninsula and has borders with all other Arab states in the PG region. (See Figure Appendix-6-1) Its 
area is about 2,000,000 square kilometres while most of the country's boundaries with the United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, and Yemen are undefined, so the exact size of the country remains unknown. Almost 
half of the total country is uninhabitable desert. 
Figure Appendix-6-1 
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The modern Saudi state was founded by King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud in 1902 by capturing Riyadh and 
later extending the country's territory to Al-Hasa, Al-Qatif, the rest of Najd, and the I lijaz during 1913 
and 1926. This expansion which was lead by religious fighters, engaged different military and political 
activities against local powers as well as the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire. Abdul Aziz Ihn 
Saud in 1927 took the title, King of Najd, and signed the Treaty of Jeddah with the United Kingdom. 
By this treaty Britain recognised the independence of Abdul Aziz's domain and his Kingdom, whilst in 
1915, Saudi Arabia was established as an official protectorate of the British government according to a 
treaty between Ibn Saud and the United Kingdom. ' 
Political Ideology 
Saudi Arabia is a tribal monarchy, and its constitutional organisation is established on Salafi or 
Wahhabi Islamic law. The leading members of the royal family choose the king from among 
themselves with the subsequent approval of the Ulema (religious leaders). 
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The Saudi political ideology strongly bears the imprint of the eighteenth-century Muslim reformer, 
Mohammad Abdul-Wahhab, who followed ultra strict and conservative Hanbali School of (Sunni) 
Islamic jurisprudence. The adaptation of Wahhabism doctrine by the Saudi, family since 1745 not just 
created a new political entity, but empowered both, to expand their control beyond their original bases 
in Najd region and to strengthen their influence of leadership and political ideology over other bedouin 
tribes from the PG to the Red Sea. 
The ultra conservative interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia has been with the Wahhabis from their 
beginning and it is still very much alive; the major element appearing often as the most conservative 
state amongst the GCC. In this regard as David Long explains, 
The Saudi regime was initially quite militant, waging war against its neighbors in the pursuit 
of good against evil. Over the years, it has lost some of its revolutionary fervor, but not its 
fundamentalist principles. Ironically, they are the same principles espoused by contemporary 
Sunni Muslim fundamentalist revolutionaries seeking to justify violent opposition to secular 
governments of Muslim and non-Muslim states alike. For the latter, the act of political 
violence and terrorism is raised to a religious obligation, jihad. 2 
However as Long notes, Wahhabism as a movement was to some extent a nation-building one and 
played a significant role in Saudi Arabia's political geographical evolution. It has also served as 
ideological glue, with the capacity to keep the state of Saudi Arabia from collapsing during the near 
250 years of its history. 3 
Besides, the role of Islam and the geographic situation of the Muslims' most holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina in Saudi Arabia as important legitimating elements for Saudi family to rule the country, 
according to Drysdale and Blake the Saudi family itself has been a major instrument of national 
integration. The Al-Saud has strength national integration by kinship with potentially troublesome, 
clans, who were co-opted or neutralised via a coordinated system of marriage and patronage 
connections. 4 
The Koran and the Sunna are the Saudis' constitution which is interpreted by the Ulama and as 
Ghassan Salamd explains, "Islam is (... ) the Saudi political system [which] (... ) determines domestic 
legislation as well as foreign policy. " 5 The political process for taking major decisions in Saudi Arabia 
is not election but consultation of the king with traditionally significant groups such as important 
members of the royal family who occupy the key posts in the Council of Ministers, 
6 the Mama and 
also tribal sheikhs and elites. The king must preserve a consensus of these groups and also other 
important elements in Saudi society, although the final decisions are usually taken by the king. An 
informal traditional gathering 'majlis' or public audience is for people to meet the authorities and royal 
family members, to petition them directly, raise and discuss issues but it doesn't relate to the decision- 
making process of the state. 
However, rentier system and modernisation process in Saudi Arabia has led to the formation of a new 
middle class of mainly newly-educated technocrats who are developing their own independent interests 
and looking for an influential role in major constitutional decisions via reforms in this country. 8 
(B) 
Limited Reforms; a Strategic Solution for Saudi Regime 
The debilitating influence on the monarchy of pressures for political changes and reforms, along with 
development, has actually entered a period of turbulence in Saudi Arabia. Despite massive social 
changes since the mid-1960s which took place particularly due to the pressure of the Free Princes 
group, political developments only occurred after the late 1980s and early 1990s Islamic activists' wide 
criticism of the regime. 9 In general, regional and international events during the 1990s had great 
political and economic impact on Saudi Arabia as well as on the other GCC countries. 
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From an economic outlook, besides Saudi's serious challenges, it had to pay for the Operation 
Desert 
Storm of Western troops for Kuwait freedom from the Iraqi invasion. But this operation had major 
political costs for the regime, viz. citizens' demands for political participation in return for removing 
the social financial cushion and pressure for socio-political changes, while as Ehteshami remarks, the 
conservatives were asking for "an end to what they perceived to be Westernisation and an emphatic 
endorsement of the traditions of the Kingdom" and the liberal forces were requiring "more openness in 
the political and social life of the country. " 10 
The end of the Cold War, which was accompanied by new regional and international challenges, 
including the Kuwait crisis, enforced the Riyadh-Washington relationship much further änd in a bold 
manner. It also justified the massive American military build up inside Saudi Arabia with the high 
expenses of Desert Storm where more than 500,000 US military members were deployed to the PG. 
However, in addition to political demands, it was simultaneously concomitant with the massive 
criticism from the people. Moynihan notes that many GCC people were sensitive to being grateful for 
US security umbrella while as they believe, "the US actually made a financial profit on Desert Storm, 
and that Gulf treasuries pay the bill for Operation Southern Watch and for the modernization of Gulf 
military establishments. " According to Bronson, Saudi fighters like Usama bin Ladin, who returned 
home from Afghanistan, were aggravated by the Saudi government's policy of asking foreign forces 
rather than their own citizens and soldiers, especially those who were well-trained and experienced: 
This anger as he also mentions, "led to roiling domestic dissent inside Saudi Arabia, which targeted 
both the Saudi royal family and their American supporters. "12 
However, Saudi Arabia like other ME and GCC countries was affected by the 1990s' developments 
which came after the end of the Cold War, viz. the collapse of the Soviet Union, the eastern European 
political developments, the intensified global concerns in democratic actions and human rights, plus the 
IT revolution and the influence of mass communication systems as principle tools of spreading the idea 
for changes. 
Regionally, demands for socio-political developments in the kingdom were reinforced by the political 
reform plans in not just several GCC countries, e. g. Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, but also in 
revolutionary Islamic Iran. Due to the importance of Islam as the official religion of the kingdom and 
the only source of legislation, also a major element of political development for reformists and 
opposition groups, Iran's exercise of its own kind of social pluralism with public free debates - so- 
called religious democracy - since the 1990s was quite attractive and effective on the Saudi traditional 
society with its autocratic system. 
Undeniably, as Nonneman argues, the legitimacy of the GCC regimes from traditional sources and the 
distribution of rent have given rulers enough leverage to `open up' without too much risk. This is 
caused by the fact that as he explains, 
The ruling families have not imposed an overarching ideological model on their societies but 
merely maintained a principle of social pluralism, 'Opening up', therefore does not mean the 
dissolution of an entire system which is intricately linked to a regime and its revolutionary 
project. 13 
Therefore the Al-Saud realised that the slow opening up and the reform process which displaying a 
move away from authoritarian rule and transition towards democracy could not be harmful but would 
also extend the rulers' legitimacy. In this respect, to respond to demands for socio-economic changes 
regarding extending the domain of Islamic law, economic reforms in a series of limited reforms have 
been announced by King Fahd since the 1990s. However, as Nonneman remarked, those countries 
which have merely selectively appropriated democratic features without further democratisation, will 
end up in a 'grey zone'. The argument of Daniel Bromberg that was referenced by Nonneman that, 
"liberalisation may not bring democratisation but rather a state of liberalised autocracy. " 14 
Consequently the traditional autocracy of Saudi has remained basically intact despite rapid 
development and economic difficulties as well as a disregard for fundamental political reforms in the 
kingdom. However, under new regional circumstances, especially in Iraq since the overthrow of 
Saddam's regime, and also the global trends for democracy, it is impossible for Al-Saud to rely much 
on its traditional strategies to keep social peace in an area of turbulence. As it is true about all the 
members of the GCC, parallel to modernisation and development process two major threats have 
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confronted the kingdom; the traditionally discriminated and oppressed Shiites who form about 10 
percent of the population, and the growing anti-government religious militancy, specifically Sunni 
radical Muslims, in Saudi Arabia. 
The Saudi Arabia Shiite minority, mostly concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province, formerly al- 
Hasa, were involved in several anti-regime violent riots in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, in 
the 1980s against the backdrop of the eight-year Iran- Iraq War, during 1990-1991 of the Kuwait crisis 
and the uprising of the Iraqi Shiites against Saddam Hussein. 
In a Saudi society that is a mosaic of religious faiths with 90 percent Sunnis (mainly Hanbali 
muwahhidun -Wahhabis or Salafis-, and Hanafi and Shafei), the regime's divide-and rule policy has 
been successful to isolate Shiites. Since 1979 and especially after the Kuwait crisis the regime tried to 
neutralise the Shiite threat by reconciling with them through 'political concessions' in return for the 
cessation of anti-Saudi propaganda. 'S This policy was perceived by Saudi political opposition groups as 
"a 'masterly stroke' by King Fahd to ease pressure on the regime at a time of increasing calls for 
reform from the Sunni mainstream. "16 This was confirmed when all political opposition groups inside 
and outside the kingdom by 1997 were suppressed whether by government repression or via different 
kinds of pressure in collusion with Western governments and institutions, respectively. 17 
In general, the goal of Shiite opposition movements in Saudi Arabia has not been to overthrow the Al- 
Saud and the system of government, but the removal of all different kinds of discrimination against 
them. Hence, since 1988 the Saudi Shiites have chosen democratic ways to achieve their socio-political 
demands. The Shiite community does not seem to pose the internal security threat that was a concern in 
the early 1980s, although, by new developments in Iraq after Saddam and greater sectarian tensions in 
the region, the Saudi regime is under more pressure for greater tolerance. However, in the case of a 
great succession of Shiites power in Iraq, and also Al-Saud delaying in producing a proper reaction to 
the Shiites demands for reforms, they might become a serious threat to the regime. In this light, 
something which came as surprising news to the Western media, in 2005 Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi 
Ambassador to the US, and, for 25 years, formerly head of the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate, 
for the first time acknowledged publicly that the Shiites in Saudi Arabia "have suffered social and 
political alienation and discrimination. " He also challenged the two most alarmist arguments that have 
been made by Arab leaders concerning the prospects of a Shiite resurgence in the ME after the fall of 
Saddam's regime. King Abdullah of Jordan's statement of concern about the emergence of an ominous 
'Shiite crescent', dominated by Iran, and also Egypt's President Hosni Mobarak's statement that the 
real problem is that many Shiites owe their loyalties to Iran rather than to their, own countries. 
According to Prince Turki, Riyadh has recognised the problem and is trying to resolve it; thus, "King 
Abdullah has extended his hand to them (the Shiites) and brought them more into the fold. The effort 
will continue and may take some time. Things like that often do. "18 
However, since the opposition in Saudi Arabia has always been fragmented and there is serious doubt 
about any changes in the foreseeable future, 19 analysts mainly consider religious militancy the most 
dangerous threat to stability in Saudi Arabia. 
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The Republic of Iraq is located on the ancient land of Mesopotamia, the north western end of the 
Zagros mountain range and the eastern part of the Syrian Desert. It covers an estimated area of 437,072 
square kilometres with the capital of Baghdad. 
Iraq inherited 1,472 kilometres of the old Ottoman-Persian frontier, which extended some 1888 
kilometres from the PG to Mount Ararat. Approximately 700 of the 1472 kilometres pass through the 
region known as Kurdistan. ) 
It is bounded by Turkey to the north and north-east, Iran to the east, Syria and the Arabian Desert to the 
west, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the south and south-east, and Jordan to the west. Large parts of 
country consist of desert, but the domain between the two major rivers of Tigris and Euphrates is 
fertile. In terms of access to sea, Iraq is the most geographically disadvantaged state in the PG because 
its only access to free waters is a short 19 km coastline at the northern end of this waterway guarded by 
Iran and Kuwait. (See figure 8-2) 
Population 
With a population of almost 27 million in 2006, Iraq has the second largest population amongst the PG 
States (after Iran which has a population of about 70 million); a high proportion of Iraqis live in 
extreme poverty. 
According to demographic information from the 2006 edition of the CIA's The World Facibook, ethnic 
groups in Iraq are Arab, with 75-80% of population; Kurdish with 15-20%; and Turkoman, Assyrian, 
Persians or other makin up the remaining 5%. 
Islam is the religion of 97% of the population (Shi'ite, 70-75%; Sunni 22-27%) and Christianity or 
other religions make up remaining 3%. The Shiite sect encompass (60-65%), mostly Arab, while the 
Sunni sect (32 - 37%) is composed of both Arabs and Kurds. 
Arabic is the official language and is spoken by 75 percent of Iraq's population, while Kurdish, 
Turkish, and Farsi are spoken among the rest of population. 
Economy 
Iraq's economy has been based on oil and gas, agriculture, animal husbandry and manufacturing. Since 
the 1950s, the state-controlled economy was dominated by the oil sector, which provides around 95 
percent of foreign exchanges earnings. Prior to the war with Iran, Iraq had a diverse economy, sound 
economic development policies, a well developed middle class, strong socio-economic links between 
the rural and urban communities, good resources other than petroleum, e. g. water, mineral resources 
and agriculture, and was perceived by other Arab states as a potential important regional actor. 3 
Iraq was a predominantly agricultural country with half of the population being occupied on the land. 
However, since 1980 its economic foundation, the agriculture sector combined with oil and oil-related 
industries, has been devastated as a result of its invasions of Iran and Kuwait and later by the US 
invasion in 2003. Iraq has the world's second-largest proven oil reserves (112.5bn barrels end-1997) 
after Saudi Arabia, and with Iran, was formerly the second-largest OPEC producer. Its share of OPEC 
oil export revenues in 1980 with 3.740 million bpd, made it second place after Saudi Arabia, while in 
1970 it was placed in the eighth position. (Figure 7-4) 
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In the 1980s the financial problems arising from the 8-year war with Iran, especially damage to its oil 
export facilities and its loss of at least $100 billion, billions of dollars of war debts, along with the costs 
of reconstruction, led the government to follow a stringent economic policy. This serious financial 
crisis along with low oil prices motivated Baghdad, from an economic point of view, to invade Kuwait. 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was followed by international economic boycotts and that 
vast damage from the military action of the US-led Coalition forces, from January 1991 seriously 
diminished the economic foundations and activity of the country. By 1999, its per capita output and 
living standards were among the lowest in the world. The sanctions continued as a part of US strategy 
to force a collapse of Saddam's regime, and in 2003 another invsion of the US-led Coalition resulted in 
the termination of much of the country's major economic administrative structures. Attacks on 
fundamental economic resources, specifically oil pipelines and infrastructure, have postponed Iraq's 
export plans. 4 
Political History 
Baghdad, the metropolise of the Abbasid Caliphate, was the cultural and commercial hub of the Arab 
and Islamic world for five centuries. On February 10,1258, Baghdad was demolished by the Mongols 
and was later occupied by the Ottoman Turks in 1534. Until 1918, Iraq was the part of the Ottoman 
Empire known as the provinces of Baghdad (Arab Sunni dominated), Mosul (Kurdish dominated) and 
Basra (Arab Shiite dominated). With the defeat of Turkey, the World War I Iraq was captured by 
Britain, like many other areas during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In 1920, Iraq was declared 
a League of Nations mandate under the United Kingdom administration. In 1921, Britain imported a 
constitutional monarchy into Iraq and placed Amir Faisal ibn Hussain (a member of the Arab 
Hashemite dynasty) as the King of Iraq. 
Since the Uqair Conference in 1922 which was held by Sir Percy Cox of the British Political Resident 
in the PG to settle borders disputes between the territories under the British occupation, the modern 
Iraq has been displeased with its insufficient borders outlet to the PG by comparison with Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. The new border arrangements, which were designed on purpose in order for Britain to 
control the ME and to limit Iraq's power in the region, remained a source of instability and anti-British 
sentiments in Iraq. Moreover, the state structure and imposed borders which had ignored affiliations 
and ethnicity of the people who lived in the regions of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, presented 
successive the Iraqi governments with internal conflicts and difficulties unifying effective political 
control and institutionalising the legitimacy of a central government. 5 
In 1932, Iraq became formally independent; however, it suffered great instability during 1936 to 1941, 
including seven coups and could not evolve as a completely developed nation-state. In 1941, the British 
invaded Iraq in response to an anti-British and pro-Nazi coup by former Prime Minister Rashid Ali. 
This caused the Anglo-Iraqi War and subsequent military occupation until 1947. The reinstallation of 
the Hashemite monarchy, which was "increasingly remote from popular sentimentsi6 as "its 
association with the British and its non-Mesopotamian and Sunni origins" 7 lasted until the bloody 
revolution of 1958. The basic causes for the revolt as Majid Khadduri has described them, 
were the impatience of the young generation with the slowness of reform; the disenchantment 
with the way the country was being ruled; the growth of Arab nationalism as a radical 
ideology; and the opposition to the Baghdad Pact and the Arab union between Jordan and Iraq 
were seen as deterrents to Arab unity. 8 
Following the 1958 military coup by Brigadier Abdul-Karim Qassim, known as the 14 July Revolution, 
a republic system was announced; however, Iraqis had been ruled by different military successors since 
then, ending with Saddam Hussein. (See, Table Appendix-7-1) 
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Table Appendix-7-1 
Presidents of Republic of Iraq 1958-2003 
Name Born- Died 
Took Office Left Office Party Notes 
Muhammad Najib ar- 
' 1904 -? July 
14,1958 February 8, Military deposed 
Ruba i 1963 
1921 - February 8, April 13, Military / Arab died in Abdul Salam Arif 1966 1963 1966 Socialist Union shower 
Abd ar-Rahman al- 1913 - April 13, April 16, Military 
Bazzaz (acting) 1973 1966 1966 
Abdul Rahman Arif 1916 - 
April 16, July 17,1968 Military 
/ Arab deposed 1966 Socialist Union 
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr 
1914- July 17,1968 July 16,1979 Military / Ba'ath resigned 1982 
Saddam Hussein 1937- July 16,1979 April 9,2003 Ba'ath deposed 2006 
Source: http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/President of Iraq 
The Iraqi revolutionary ideology with anti-monarchical sentiments had an intimidating message for the 
conservative monarchical systems of the PG, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia. Qassim withdrew 
from the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955 with Iran, Turkey, Britain and Pakistan. He established friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union until 1963, when he was overthrown by Colonel Abdul Salam Arif and 
some Ba'thist officers led by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. As Amin remarks, 
Between 1963 and 1968, attempts were made to moderate and stabilise Iraqi politics; the 
appointment of a civilian as prime minister was one indication of this policy. Others were a 
search for accommodation with the Kurds, and the normalisation of relations with Iran and 
Turkey. But the lack of organised civilian support exposed the regime to pressure from the 
military, and in July 1968 a group of Ba'thist officers and Republican guards, led by Hassan 
al-Bakr, overthrew the government. 9 
After the coup, the government and administration of Iraq were composed entirely of members of the 
Ba'th party. The government was led by Major-General Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr (a former prime 
minister) and supreme authority was vested in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The vice- 
president of the RCC, Saddam Hussein, replaced Al-Bakr after his resignation as president in the 
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alleged coup attempt of 1979. Saddam took over leadership of the RCC and executed many prominent 
Ba'thist oppotents in the process. 
Iraq had never accepted the division of the border imposed by Britain; 10 an excuse for ivnading its 
neighbours Iran and Kuwait within a decade. Such dissatisfaction for its insufficient borders outlet to 
the PG, besides extensive and devastating casualties and losses of the two wars within these three 
countries and Iraq's isolation from the world community, " it ultimately ended with the occupation of 
Iraq by the US and British forces in 2003.12 
Political system 
The secular system of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party of Iraq was a republic based on the interim 
constitution of 1968. The government was under one party rule and the absolute personal authority of 
Saddam Hussein. Saddam was president, prime minister, secretary general of the Ba'th Party Regional 
Command, chairman of the RCC and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He was aided by cadres 
in his party, the military and political elite and by the tribal group Takritis. Islam was the state religion, 
and the political economy of the state was based on socialism. 
Despite the presence of an elected body, the 'National Consultative Assembly' with 250 members of 
the legislation process, the RCC had the final decision concerning its draft legislation. However, in the 
last elections which were held on 24 March 1996, the first since 1989, all 689 candidates, including 
'independents' had to be approved, by a government screening committee. and had to be proclaimed 
patrons of the July 1968 coup which brought the Ba'th Socialist Party to power. No opposition 
movements or expressions were permitted; the ethnic parties and the Communists continued to be 
barred in this election. 
This election was supposed to include some democratic ideals, viz. the right of Iraqis to freedom of 
speech, association and movement, institutionalisation of the power of the President via every eight- 
year election, cancellation of the RCC and foundation of a new Shura Council with fifty members as 
the highest body of consultation - half were to be appointed by the President and the other half to be 
elected - but in practice this was an exercise in `democracy' to establish Saddam as President with 
unlimited powers. 3 
Sources of Political Behaviour 
Besides the major influence of the ideological and political goals and concerns of the Ba'th party - as 
the single dominant political organisation during 1968-2003 - and the significant role of Saddam on 
all governmental decisions, Iraq's domestic circumstances also affected this country's political 
behaviour. To understand Iraq's domestic and foreign policy priorities, some elements that influence 
the policy of the Iraqi governments regardless of the ideological position of the ruling elite must be 
acknowledged. As Tim Niblock mentions, 'The historical record shows Iraq (... ) to have been a 
difficult country to govern. Over the 150 years there have been few prolonged periods when conditions 
of internal order and external relations have provided reassurance for those in authority. " 14 These 
elements that influence the Iraqi political behaviour had a continuous impact on the Ba'th government 
assessment of the vulnerabilities of the state as well. These can be listed as: 15 
a) Geographic features and remarkable resources in Iraq as a permanent and significant influence 
on patterns of settlement and human interchange within the state and between Iraq and its 
immediate neighbouring countries. 
b) Pluralism, a result of Iraq's geographic location and human pattern of ethnic and sectarian 
division embodied in various cultural, religious, and linguistic groups with the favour of 
having distinct regional, economic and social dimensions. 
c) The economy's dependence on water and oil 
d) Economical vulnerability, as it is virtually land-locked by two strong non-Arab powers, Iran 
and Turkey. Oil shipments and the distribution rights of the water resources of the Tigris- 
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Euphrates procedure are perhaps the two most important issues, and will continue to remain 
conditional on Iraq's positive relations with its neighbours. 
e) Iraq's geographic and strategic location on the fringe of the Arab world bordering non-Arab 
regional powers (a situation perceived to be fundamental to the strategic depth of the Arab 
nation) and a communication route within the ME and between Europe and Asia - an 
objective of continuous invasions and the home of different indigenous cultures. As Moss 
Helms remarks, "Much of Iraqi political behaviour can be understood and anticipated because 
Iraq is the eastern flank of the Arab world and occupies a frontier position that has aroused 
strategic concerns and invited human interchange for centuries. "6 
On the international scene, Iraq's perception of its internal dynamics and strategic vulnerabilities has 
featured a tendency to minimise them. This has always impacted on its foreign relations. On the 
domestic scene, the most important challenges for government were the constant attempts for political 
legitimacy, via forging internal consolidation of a nation-state arising from Iraq's pluralism into a 
national identity, and the establishment of a stable central governing authority. In this respect, besides 
the successive governments' attempt to establish economic and political coordination and integration of 
the three dominant Iraqi cities - Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra - and increasing the links between rural 
and urban areas, it was concerned mostly with the vulnerability of their domestic affairs to external 
interference. 
As Moss Helms also illustrates, the sense of vulnerability arising from being land-locked, along with 
the strategic importance of the security of its oil and trade routes through the PG and the Arvand Roud, 
had often convinced Iraqis to opt for aggressive solutions, even though they knew that good relations 
between them and their neighbours were "valuable if not imperative. " 17 In this respect, securing water 
supplies from the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates18 in the Arvand Roud was a vital feature of 
Iraq's economy developed by Saddam Hussein. His unsatisfactory settlement of the Algiers 
Declaration of 1975, in which Iraq accepted the thalweg -the midpoint of the main navigational 
channel - of the Arvand Roud as the boundary between itself and Iran, and the situation of the three 
islands of Tunbs and Abu-Musa in the Strait of Hormuz under Iran domination, made one of his bases 
for invading Iran in 1980. Furthermore, the desire for Iraq's broader access to PG waters without any 
barriers once again raised this country's claim over Kuwait in 1990. 
Iraqis' concern about the vulnerability of their oil resources aroused from two major external and 
internal problems. Iraq's dependency on the Hormuz strait for shipping its oil and other products19 
despite constructing pipelines through Syria and Turkey, and domestically locating the state's main oil 
fields and refineries in Mosul and Kirkuk in the Kurdish Autonomous Region and Basra province with 
Shiite domination; regions vulnerable to both internal political unrest and external threat. (See figure 8- 
2) 20 
In sum, regarding all these factors, opinions such as Moss Helm's about the definite failure of any 
policy or treaty of Iraq with any foreign country without addressing these enduring Iraqi concerns, are 
understandable; a requirement for preventing the risk of further disputes and cold or antagonistic 
relations of Iraq with the outside world. 21 
Political Ideology; the Ba'th Party 
To understand Iraq's policy in general and particularly in the PG, it is important to consider some basic ideological objectives of the Ba'th party. In developing the biggest military force in the Arab world, 
and introducing a new brand of pan-Arabism, Iraq was looking forward optimistically to its role as a 
regional power and leader of the Arab world. The high expectation of the Iraqi regime regardless of the 
reality of Iraq's potentialities and position set the regime on a course of wars, boycotts, international isolation and finally the overthrowing of the regime in 2003. 
Basic Ideological Goals 
Supporting Arab consensus, which means Arab unity (regardless of the symbols of personal identity 
such as religion, ethnicity, and language) or Arab nationalism with the idea of unifying the-Arab states 
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into one great and boundless state was central to Ba'thist ideology. The party encouraged the idea that 
the Arab nation extends from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Arabian Peninsula of the PG in the 
east, and its fundamental goal was the abandonment of national boundaries in the ME imposed by the 
Europeans, in favour of a Pan-Arabism and reunite the Arab nation. According to the party's belief the 
boundaries among Arabs were artificial and could disappear with the 'awakening of Arab 
consciousness. '22 Therefore, various unsuccessful formulas for unity between Iraq and Syria, for 
instance, were offered from the early 1940s until the 1970s. The reason for such attempts beyond 
common political ideologies was mutual strategic and economic interests with the main purpose of 
unity as a substitute to superpowers' superiority. However, as Moss Helms mentions, some of the 
difficulties facing the practical implementation of the philosophy of unity are, "unequal geographic 
distribution of resources, competition among leading Arab politicians and their political ideologies, and 
the presence of diverse cultural groups ensure disagreement "23 The advantage to Iraq of such a union 
with Syria was stated by Saddam during his last attempt in 1973-1979: 
As in the past, geographical, political, and strategic requisites continue to push Iraq toward 
unity with Syria. Indeed, the neighbouring territories and close relations established as a 
result; the common river; the complementary economics; the internal strength in the face of 
foreign threats; and the need for sea outlets, particularly in this age of oil-Iraq being one of 
the most. important oil exporting states-all these requisites make Iraq feel the need to 
establish a binding relationship with Syria. Naturally, the best, most useful and guaranteed 
relationship would be that of unity. Indeed, Iraq would benefit from unity at a time when it is 
offering sacrifices for it. Therefore, the sacrifices which Iraq might have to offer for such a 
unity would not diminish the importance of the benefits which such unity would bring 24 
In addition, the party itself quickly divided between supporters of two theories of Arab nationalism 
represented by Aref, a Pan-Arabist, and a more pragmatic parochial nationalism represented by his 
successor al-Bakr, who immediately rejected any kind of Arab unity for the sake of Iraq's national 
interest. 
Beyond the impact of such divisions on the internal politics of Iraq, which was used by Saddam's 
regime to justify the use of extraordinary acts of violence and militarism, it had a great external impact 
as well. Further to Iraq emphasising its superiority and special place in Arab destiny it lost its relations 
with the ruling Pan-Arabist Ba'th party of Syria; this provides a partial explanation of Syria's support 
of Iran during the Iraq-Iran war, as Alaolmolki observes. 25 The new pan-Arabism of Iraq was 
developed under Saddam, with its main message that "due to its heroic and rich history starting with 
ancient Sumer and Babylon and ending with Saddam, Iraq is the natural leader of the Arabs. As a 
result, everything that benefits Iraq will eventually benefit all the Arabs. "26 As Baram observes, 
This message sought to legitimize political maneuvers that clearly contradicted Arab solidarity 
or seemed to detach Iraq from the struggle against Israel. The invasions of Iran and of Kuwait 
are two examples of such maneuvers. It is quite possible that this ideological argumentation 
made it easier for Ba'th party members to stomach the regime's policies, which deviated from 
traditional pan-Arab values. 7 
In this regard, Murden also remarks that the strategy of Saddam for his regime's very survival was his 
exacting and effective ideological arguments, even more so than his sustaining a sense of crisis to 
justify his extreme practices of violence and dictatorship, as well as employing the security apparatus. 
As he explains, "Saddam, (... ), represented a parochial and pragmatic strain in Iraqi 13a'thism in which 
the imperatives of the Iraqi state would become paramount. " Therefore, the Iran-Iraq war paved the 
way for the most practical dictatorship. "Within Iraq, the concentration on power required a direct 
approach to society's resources. Within the region, the regime sought to project its power (... ) [without 
any regard for the Arabs who were] too passive and timid, [from Saddam's point of view]. "28 
Domestically, Saddam's new nationalism employed more than just Islamic rhetoric, he took advantage 
of rich pre-Arab/Islamic historical myths and icons which as Murden notes, 
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involved a crude manipulation of history and of an entire culture, and produced absurd forms 
of art, architecture and archaeology. The cult of Saddam Hussein linked all the themes of 
ideology, and his image dominated Iraqi life (... ) He was portrayed as the symbol of Iraqi 
pride, the war leader; the historic warrior hero. 29 
Murden's perception of Saddam's extraordinary influence on Iraqis' life was proven after his regime 
was overthrown in 2003. As he mentioned in 1995, regardless of people's hatred and fear, his sudden 
disappearance could cause "a gap in the identity, of every Iraqi, and twenty years of state-building and 
ideology would almost immediately collapse. " Consequently, Saddam was the major axis of the nation- 
state process and as Murden affirms, "The new Iraqi nationalism was harnessed to the power of the 
Iraq state. The era of Saddam was presented as one of the re-emergence of Iraqi and, therefore, of Arab 
greatness. v930 
By the end of the Iran-Iraq war the interest in state power, and in fighting Iran, had persuaded the Ba'th 
regime to pursue a pragmatist policy. Saddam shaped Iraq's leading role in the region using an 
aggressive ideology but less revolutionary rhetoric and even establishing relations with the US 31 
Secularism was another ideal proclaimed but not observed by the Ba'th regime. The Ba'th regime 
faced those in the ME, particularly Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, who believed that Islam was a more 
binding and widely shared foundation for unity than Arabism. During the Iraq-Iran war they were 
compelled to introduce some important adjustments by respecting Islam and involving it in politics. To 
demonstrate that the Ba'th regime were not, as was emphasised by Iran, anti-Islamic atheists, Saddam 
changed much of their rhetoric during the Iran-Iraq war, introducing some Islamic principles into the 
Iraqi legal system suddenly before invading Kuwait, and just a day before the Allied bombing began 
Operation Desert Storm, Saddam added the phrase of 'Allah-o Akbar' [God is greater] to the Iraqi 
national flag. 32 As Amatzia Baram explains, besides increasingly harsh punishments in the name of 
Islamic law which assisted the Ba'th authorities to stay in power by "more effectively legitimizing 
them", Islamisation helped the regime to stay afloat by responding to the growing public trend - 
specifically within the Sunni Arab population - in turning to religion. 
33 
Another effective tool which Saddam took advantage of to maintain power at home was the selective 
return to tribal values and affinities. Tribal policies contrary to the Ba'th ideological commitment to 
socialism, modernity and anti-tribalism were applied soon after the Ba'th dominancy in 1968. Since the 
early 1970s, it helped Saddam strengthen his position by recruiting young men from his hometown to 
shape his own preferred kind of internal security system. During the Iraq-Iran War, Saddam realised 
the number of his own tribal men from Tikrit were too small, so he started recruiting young men from 
neighbouring and friendly tribes, mostly Sunni-Arab ones who live mostly north and west of 
Baghdad 34 
By applying all these mechanisms, the Ba'th party dominated the political life of Iraq for 35 years and 
in attempting to face Iraq's challenges, similar to earlier governments, deviated from its ideological 
principles and adopted a pragmatic posture. Although, the Ba'th were not successful in bringing 
stability to Iraq, establishing a system that had few institutional checks on executive power insured an 
unprecedented continuity for more than three decades. The rise of Saddam to power, as Bulloch and 
Morris remark "was based on political cunning, but above all, on an unparalleled ruthlessness. He had 
spent the decade before he ousted Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr eliminating anyone who might be a rival, 
even those who had been lifelong friends". 35 However, two major problems facing every Iraqi 
government were still unsolved during the Ba'th authority; domestically, how to achieve political 
legitimacy by the population and regionally, how to secure good relations with neighbouring countries. 
(B) 
Iran 
Iran was always a serious impediment to Iraq's ambitions in its regional foreign policy, especially in 
the PG. Basically, as Chubin and Zabih explain, 
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Iraq had resorted to three types of techniques in its competitive rivalry with Iran in the PG: 1) 
it has sought to undermine Iran by accusations regarding its intentions; 2) it has pressured all 
the Arab states, including those bordering the Gulf, to support its positions on Gulf issues, 
[including Iran's claim to Bahrain and its conceding of the islands of Tumb [Tomb] and Abu 
Musa to the UAE and Iran's military presence to support Oman in its fight against the Dhofar 
Liberation Front, ]; and 3) it has appealed to all the Arab states in the name of the Gulf's 
'Arabism' to work together against Iran. 36 
From Iraq's point of view, Iran's role as the cornerstone of the twin-pillar security system of the US 
policy in the PG, Iran's repossession of the PG Islands with the tacit full knowledge of the British 
which tacitly acknowledged Iranian hegemony, Iran's attempts to annex Bahrain and its desire to create 
a regional pact with the Arab littoral states excluding Iraq, reinforced the Iraqi fear of isolation and 
ultimately lead it to reject the security arrangements dominated by Iran. 
The Shah attempted to portray Iraq as the "rapacious black ship in the Gulf family", and "an anti- 
religious regime pursuing an anti-Arab policy, deeply involved in subversion and agitation in the 
region. " Frequent accusations which were made were supported by Iraq's alleged failure to aid the 
Arab cause against Israel, its associations with external powers and constant feuding with other Arab 
states. 7 
In different periods of time each country would wait for an opportunity when the balance of power in 
political and military terms was in their favour to solve their border issues by ignoring previous 
agreements. This can be seen when the 1937 Shatt-al-Arab (Iranian call it 'Arvand Roud') treaty was 
unilaterally abrogated by the Shah of Iran in 1969. Iraq had threatened Iran with the forced closure of 
this river, if their instructions - that Iran's vessels should lower flags and carry no navy personnel 
when entering the river - were not met. When it declared the 1937 treaty `null and void', Tehran 
announced Baghdad had violated its provisions and the `change of circumstances' allowed it to 
abrogate and declare 'thalweg', the principle of dividing the river into two equal parts between Iran and 
Iraq. Similarly, after the revolution the resultant internal turmoil in Iran and the support of Arab states 
in the PG encouraged Saddam to abrogate the Algiers Accord of 1975. 
Expecting hostilities from each other, Iran and Iraq searched for and exploited opportunities to act 
against the other. Conflict was usually fuelled by the support of opposition groups on both sides which 
could act as a suitable and effectual leverage for further hostile actions or even for improving mutual 
relations of the two countries: 
a) Until 1975 Algiers accord, Iraq accused Iran of supporting opponents of the regime, including 
Communist and Kurdish groups, and of financing and arming al-Da'wah Islamic Party to assist them in 
committing acts of sabotage and assassinations in Iraq. Iran supported Kurdish rebels in their anti- 
regime struggles of February 1969 which were led by Mulla Mustata al-Barzani. The Kurdish question 
offered a real opportunity to Iran so, together with the US and Israel, Iran offered aid to the Kurds. As 
Chubin and Zabih observe, 
The Kurds, like the Iraqi shi'a [Shiite], opposed any move by the Iraqi government towards an 
Arab union; their attitude thus coincided with Iran's. Secondly, the Kurdish war, by 
weakening the Iraqi government and by preoccupying it, reduced its military and political 
capacity to effectively deal with other issues. 38 
To solve these issues and others, particularly those relating to its isolation, Saddam activated several 
initiatives, including the fifteen-year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union that consolidating ties 
with the socialist block. Saddam went on to attempt to solve the thorny Kurdish problem by offering 
the 11 March 1970 Manifesto to the Kurds. By offering limited autonomy (but much more than Kurds 
have previously been offered anywhere in the ME), Iraq would gain the backing of both Arabs and 
Kurds in the wider region and the approval of the Soviet Union. Also, eliminating the Iranian pressure 
on Iraq made it possible to turn the tables on Iran, in particular to gain leverage in the dispute over the 
Arvand Roud and a freer hand to seek an active role in PG politics. 9 However, the attempt to come to 
an agreement with the Kurdish leader using the March 1970 Manifesto, which offered limited 
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autonomy, a form of self ruling government, cultural and national rights to the Kurds, failed. Despite 
Iraq's effort the Kurds rejected the offered agreement, pushing Baghdad to act forcefully. 
The Kurdish and Shiite populations were always the victims of the tactical manoeuvres of these two 
countries, through both support and pressure. At greatest risk were those of Iranian origins living in 
Iraq, as seen when Saddam expelled thousands of Iranians. This happened on three separate occasions: 
in 1969, when Iran unilaterally abrogated the 1937 agreement; between October and December 1970, 
when Saddam failed to establish an anti-Iranian front against the dispute over the three PG Islands; and 
in 1980, after the attempted assassination of Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on 1 April by an Iraqi 
of Iranian origin. 40 
b) In turn, Iran accused Iraq of supporting and aiding Kurdish, Arab and anti-regime Persian groups in 
Iran, while after the revolution Iraq's support was mainly given to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq. Saddam's 
advantage in using this ill-concealed Marxist Iranian nationalist group was that it had no real chance of 
seizing power in Iran, which according to Cordesman, meant it was an almost perfect "sacrifice pawn", 
"if Iraq wanted to improve its relations with Iran, " and "just as expendable in the future as the Shah 
found the Iraqi Kurds to be in 1975" 41 
Therefore, the opposition groups all had significant variable roles in the relations between Iran and 
Iraq, and consequently had both an impact and were affected by the bilateral and regional 
circumstances. The use of such groups and the inconsistencies of the two countries had made it hard to 
achieve any lasting rapprochement. 
(C) 
Opposition Groups 
By late 1980, some of Iraqi opposition groups merged under Syrian patronage in Damascus to form the 
Democratic National and Patriotic Front with three main factions of the Kurdish Democratic Party, the 
Iraqi Communist party and the Unified Socialist party of Kurdistan. Many covert opposition 
movements within Iraq were largely Shiite in orientation. Among them, the most distinguished Party of 
the Islamic Call (Hizb al-Da'wa al- Islamiya), or Al-Da'wa had financial links to Iranian pre- and post- 
revolutionary governments and close ties with the Iranian clergy. Al-Da'wa, which was formed in the 
late 1950s, had made several attacks against leading members of the Ba'th party. After the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, Al-Da'wa, - which had refused to work with the front in Syria because of the inclusion of the Iraqi Communist party and what it termed nationalistic trends in the front - continued 
its activities with leadership of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. He was the spokesman in Iran 
for the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) which was set up in November 
1982 to mount an Islamic revolution against the Iraqi Ba'th government. 42 
However, a wide range of Iraqi opposition groups were receiving support from Iran e. g., Islamic 
Movement of the Iraqi Kurdistan led by Sheik Ali Abdel Aziz, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led 
by Jalal Talabani, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani and Sunni group of the 
Umma. Even after Saddam's regime collapsed, although all of the groups had agreed to work with the 
US, as The New York Times reported on December 13,2003, key opposition figures, including Barzani 
of the KDP and Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) [based in London and backed by the US], 
were forging ties with Iran, Iraq's neighbour and a longtime foe of the United States. 
(D) 
Methods of Achieving Iraq's Foreign Policy 
The previous sections of this study have shown that in achieving its foreign policy goals Iraq had 
benefited from various elements, such as ideology, diplomacy, military and propaganda methods, as 
well as aiding undeveloped countries, establishing economic partnerships and internal developments. 
Iraq's methods of pursuing its foreign policy objectives can be categorised as follows: 
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1- Iraq used radical ideology to persuade other countries to follow its policy in a bid to change the 
setup of power, expand its ideology and achieve domination of the PG. 
2- Iraq's aggressive and offensive polices achieved security through the insecurity of others. The 
combination of hostile relations with its neighbours and the increased build-up of arms exposed Iraq's 
desire to play a significant role in the region. 
3- The evolution of Iraq's political ideology from radical to pragmatic was seen as a short-term tactical 
advantage increasing Iraq's political manoeuvrability, but its ambitious diplomacy still simmered just 
below the surface. Frustration would increase hostility towards the West and the regime would make a 
radical change in policy. This periodic fluxing meant relationships with both regional and international 
powers were constantly changing leaving Iraq with an unstable policy. This can be seen in Iraq's use of 
a policy of rapprochement and detente in 1975 towards its PG neighbours that by 1980 was no longer 
applied. 3 Initially Iraq established a very anti-Western policy to achieve a more distinctive political 
position and gain a popular following in the Arab world, but the period of reconstruction required 
cooperative and measured diplomacy with the West. After the Iran-Iraq war, the US was one of Iraq's 
biggest trading partners. The Iraqi regime had developed a strong sense of self-belief in its role as the 
shield against all Arab enemies and formed the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), 44 although its 
invasion of Kuwait, a divergent point of Arab interest, meant that Iraq, with its false slogans, was no 
longer trusted by the Arab world. 
4- In 1978 the increase of military strength, improvement of relations with its neighbours and internal 
reconciliation and democratisation projects resulted in Iraq's emergence from isolation into the role of 
regional power. 
5- Iraq's sectarian policy was used in retaliation against unfavourable internal or external events. 
Methods employed included expulsion of Shiite with Iranian origins and use of chemical weapons 
against Kurds. 
6- Supporting the opposition groups of regional neighbours as well as exploiting their internal 
problems. 
7- Iraq's self reliant nature was opposed to the influence of any superpower in the PG calling for 
commercial and economic cooperation and bilateral military agreements among Arab states. 
8- Exploitation of the international political system, particularly through the divisions on issues 
regarding the treatment of Iraq. 
9- Attempts to establish a link between economic cooperation and political interests through ties with 
non-aligned countries, Russia and the EU. For instance, in an effort to remove the sanctions on it, Iraq 
sought to take advantage of the division between the UN's real power brokers using a two-tiered 
strategy: Steadfastness and Diplomatic Activity. In the latter part of strategy Iraq's aim was to 
influence France, Russia and China into lifting the sanctions. These countries were all permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, all had a significant and long-standing interest in Iraq's economy 
and all opposed the seeming Anglo-American domination of the Security Council43 For instance, 
France, which was seeking its own influence in the PG, had found Iraq an important solution. Before 
the revolution, Iran was an American domain and the smaller PG states were still influenced by Britain. 
From 1974-1990, by advancing good relations politically, economically and militarily, France, which 
did not see Iraq as a USSR puppet, lessened Iraq's dependence on Moscow. Also, France preferred 
"Iraq as a secular bulwark against the religious fanaticism of the Iranian revolution which threatened to 
engulf the ME. "46 Although it was cooperating with the coalition for setting up sanctions, France was 
looking for its own role within the region and was opposed to any decisions that threatened the 
territorial integrity of Iraq. Also, during the 1970s Moscow, in addition to its substantial political, 
economic and commercial interest in Iraq, established good relations with the Ba'th regime as a result 
of Iraq's regional isolation and its opposition to US policy. The high point of this relation was a 20 year 
treaty of friendship in 1972; however, the increased oil revenues and Baghdad's attempt since 1975 to diversify its purchases of Western arms, goods and technology lessened Iraq's dependence on the 
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USSR. Although there was cooperation between Moscow and Baghdad, seen when Moscow secured 
the cooperation of the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party, they still held 
differing views concerning the military aid given to Ethiopia, the Soviet policies in Afghanistan and the 
ME conflict, however the two countries still maintained a good relationship. 47 In addition, during the 
Kuwait crisis, the USSR was careful not to join the coalition forces and even with the end of 
Gorbachev's rule Moscow started to distance itself from Washington's policies regarding Iraq. 
Saddam's strategy of forming a gap between the two camps in the UN's Security Council was very 
successful, as three out of five permanent members with the veto in this council were against pressing 
for Iraq's compliance. China never supported the military operation against Iraq, and by the mid-1990s, 
France took a different position from the other two permanent members, the US and Britain, who 
wanted to ensure compliance. In the mid-1990s, these three permanent members of the Security 
Council resisted any military action against Iraq and favoured the removal of sanctions, even when it 
meant abandoning the UN inspection system. 48 
10- By providing more economic aid to developing countries, Iraq hoped to encourage them towards its 
pan-Arab policy and persuade them of Iraq's credibility as the regional power. 
11- Iraq attributed blame for its failures to other countries. For example, the application of sanctions 
provided Iraq with a scapegoat in the form of the Western powers. 
12- Diplomacy provided Iraq with the means to undermine agreements, international decisions and 
regional issues whenever possible. Saddam took advantage of the economic potentiality of the country, 
the internal issues and the humanitarian conditions of Iraq in this regard. For instance, since the 
ceasefire in 1991 the main goal of Iraqi diplomatic efforts was to effect the removal of the sanctions. It 
attempted this not by complying with the terms of the ceasefire but by attracting the interest of its 
Western friends with economic incentives, by attempting to persuade the outside world of the non- 
existence of Iraqi WMDs and by capitalising on the increasing division of the international community. 
Iraq had some success achieving this with some Arab states, China, France, and Russia. Also it sought 
to build-up support from the Arab masses, propagandising the threat of a Western-dominated `new 
world order. 49 
13- The importunate foreign policy continued Iraqi challenges and threats ignoring both regional and 
international agreements and promises, which for Iraq were considered tactical solutions. This attitude 
affected the security of the region. For example, even after the new UN borders, Kuwait was still under 
threat and even after eight years of war so was Iran. 
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Agricultural Policies: The Shah claimed that the Land Reforms, part of the Shah's White Revolution, 
were for the benefit of the working class to liberate them. However Land Reform, as well as 
nationalisation of forests and pasturelands, as many observers including Keddie comment may not have 
initially had economic goals; the specific aim was to abolish feudalism and so reduce landlord power 
and secure direct control over peasants and nomads by the government. ' 
The Shah's plan also was to persuade the landowners to put money into industry rather than 
agriculture. This was because the economic crisis and military expenditures meant that the Shah needed 
more money and had to borrow it from the US. The money was gained for the benefit of the regime 
while the Land Reforms where implemented to answer the pressure from America. The Shah did not 
want to anger the landowners and so the reforms did not affect their social status except in the case of 
the Ulema, who controlled large amounts of waqf (religious endowment) land. These were used to 
maintain religious intuitions, help the needy and provide an income for the Ulema. Through his reforms 
the Shah was able to restrict the religious leaders' financial independence, although it caused acrimony 
between the Ulema and the regime. 
Also the land reform caused a drastic decline in agricultural production during the 1960s and 1970s. 
This was because the land reform did not supply essential capital for the peasants who had obtained 
lands. This increased the need to import goods and consequently also Iran's dependence on Western 
nations. According to Abrahamian, as the result of such process, "Iran, which in the early 1960s had 
been a net exporter of food, by the mid 1970s, was spending as much as $1 billion a year on imported 
agricultural products"3 
The growth of agricultural output was slower than population growth, despite the official statistics on 
an annual rise of 4 percent a year in agricultural growth. As Keddie argues, a more plausible estimate 
would be 2-2.5 percent per year, with the rate of population 3 percent, and the growth in food 
consumption about 12 percent. 4 This situation, together with Iran's declining oil revenues could have 
had a great socio-economic impact during an economic recession. There were other major effects of the 
Land Reforms such as: an increase in mechanisation, rising unemployment and very low income for 
agricultural labourers. In addition, alongside the rise in rural population, there was the enforced 
migration of millions of landless peasants from rural areas into the cities, especially Tehran, Tabriz, 
Isfehan, Mashhad - cities without the housing, amenities, or even jobs to cope with them. As Hussain 
notes, 
In 1967-8, out of a population of 26.8m., 62 per cent lived in rural areas. In 1972/3, when the 
population had increased to 31m., 57 per cent lived in rural areas, and within the same five 
years the active agricultural population had gone down from 49 to 40 per cent. Despite a 
government forecast of a considerable increase in farm employment a decline in fact took 
place. In 1972-3 approximately 16 per cent of the whole population moved from one place to 
another, and over half of that percentage moved from rural to urban areas. 5 
However this massive movement of mainly young people, from a very religious and political culture in 
the country, actually assisted the ultimate down fall of the regime. This was because in the end the 
strength of the revolution came from the urban areas where the political culture of the masses was 
Islamic so they could easily lend their support to Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. 6 
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Oil Policy: Oil was one of the most significant components in the Shah's political and economic 
policies. Through it he was able to manage domestic problems, finance his plans of rapid 
modernisation and support development particularly in the military sector, and so develop Iran into a 
regional, economic and military power during 1970s. However the way the increasing oil income was 
dealt with in his strategy resulted in loosing the opportunity of continued and systematic development, 
emphasising the economic and cultural differences between the rich Westernised social classes and the 
poorer traditional bazaar classes. The policies favoured the big, rich industries and urban populations 
over the smaller, poor agricultural populations, which led to rapid urban migration as well as excessive 
inflation, profits and corruption, while the government and a few private hands held the majority of the 
wealth. The evidence for such an analysis is the following: 
The general economic strategy of the Shah was dependent largely on oil income. Therefore, by 
emphasising the necessity of increasing oil prices in the OPEC since 1973 and his arrogant declarations 
that Iran would quickly become one of the world's five great powers with high income, he persistently 
insisted on an accelerated rate for achieving the original goals of the Five Year Development Plan 
(1973-1978). His ambitious plans were pursed, despite warnings by some economic planners about the 
limitation of Iran's absorptive capacity and the pernicious consequences of a sudden economic 
expansion which could have serious results regarding inflation, shortages and overheating the 
economy. As Keddie observes, 
Governmental strategy towards the economy since the 1960s included rapid development of 
import substitution industries, especially large enterprises that used much modern and labor- 
saving technology. Despite a few showy 'crackdowns, ' mainly on retailers or vulnerable 
targets, extremely large profits were encouraged for both domestic and foreign companies, 
while less was done for those on the bottom rungs of the economic scale. (... ) The regime's 
race for greater size, military strength, and modernity, with its concomitants of 
unemployment, waste, corruption, and poverty, affected both agriculture and industry. In both 
spheres heavy inputs of foreign capital, personnel, and imports were favored by official 
policies. 
The other consequence of the Shah's economic strategy which emphasised the importance of big 
industry and agriculture was excessive migration to the big cities. This resulted in a deficiency of day- 
to-day needs and made life extremely difficult. Also, offering low-interest loans to the private sectors 
resulted in an increase in investments and thereby rises in aggregate demand and demand for labour. 
The migration process of hundreds of thousands of workers accelerated to fill the gap in unskilled 
labour. Skilled labour came from the Western countries, especially the US, receiving higher payments 
than their Iranian counterparts. This was a matter that intensified the cultural tensions between 
Westerners and Iranians. 
Since the aggregate demand was exceeded supply, a sum of imports rose from 2.57 billion in 1972 to 
$14.2 billion in 1977 s Another consequence of the Shah's economic strategy, such receiving imports 
specifically from the West, not just increased Iran's dependence on the West, but also caused further 
inflation. 
However, oil wealth worked as a rentier system (similar to the GCC) for the Shah's regime (and latter 
to the IRI), to gain support from people. However, owing to a decline in oil revenues the regime failed 
to keep such support. Of course, according to many such as Mohsen Milani, this was not the reason for 
the revolution but, as he explains, "All available data substantiate the claim that a majority of the 
population benefited from the oil boom, though not equally". His argument is that: 
The economic expansion, which increased expectations, 
followed by a period of economic 
contraction, intensified discontent among many groups. The Shah's regime pursued policies 
that created a rift between the state and the industrialists and the bazaar merchants and 
shopkeepers. Despite this situation, had it not been for the coincidence of the economic crisis 
with the looming political crisis ahead, the Shah's regime would have been financially capable 
of weathering the storm. 9 
The increased öit revenues meant that the Shah had turned Iran into a consumer market for America 
who could take economic advantage of and would benefit from Iran in three main areas; armaments, oil 
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and the banking system. Americans justified the phenomenal prices they charged for goods by 
comparing them with the prices Iran charged for oil. Iran effectively bailed out several American arms 
manufacturers by placing huge advance orders. They were also offered the sale of some light bombers 
from America, which were not even off the drawing board yet. Also the dozen major US banks in Iran 
practically led the foreign banking system and by charging 10 per cent interest received an income of 
$220m per year. Other income was accelerated through money transfers and loan arrangements. 
America benefited from these arrangements however, after the Shah led the rise in OPEC oil prices the 
major US business interests became more closely tied and even dependent on the Shah's regime. 10 
The transformation of Iran into a consumer society did not lead to equal income distribution, for while 
Americans were making profit the Iranian bureaucrats, military officials and members of the royal 
family were becoming more corrupt. Furthermore, the new class of exploiter and consumer increased 
Iranian imports but left the Iranian industries idle. Such economic development within a capitalist 
framework led to profits being concentrated in a tiny minority of the population and wages, even for 
the best-paid workers, rapidly eroded via unchecked inflation, which coincided with the creation of 
industrial elite. " 
A major part of the oil revenues were allocated to the Shah's ambition to strengthened his armed 
forces; an appropriate method to recycle petrodollars to the Western countries which were facing the 
economic drain/lost caused by the OPEC price rise. After the British withdrawal from the PG, 
Washington and London both were happy to see Iran become the policeman of the PG. By choosing 
Iran as the military pillar of Nixon's security arrangement in the PG, Western countries were able to 
sell billions of dollars of military equipment to Iran each year. 
The Shah's modernisation was unlike what was successfully experienced in other societies. In England 
the process was mostly peaceful and gradual because there was already some democracy ingrained into 
the culture. In contrast, in France the bloody revolution was the prelude to the creation of democratic 
institutions. However, in both countries the old and new classes shared the political power and 
modernisation enjoyed the support of the business class and was reinforced by the democratic ideology 
that calmed the disagreeable effects of such a transformation. 12 
While in places, such as Russia and China, where democracy had been absent or not fully developed 
modernisation was launched with relative success through socialist revolution. However in both these 
countries, as well as in Iran, modernisation was brought about by the state not the social/middle classes. 
However in comparison the Pahlavi state was not creative enough to develop a legitimising ideology 
that would support modernisation and the intense changes it brought about. Instead it ignored or took 
control of the existing democratic institutions (such as Majles and the labour unions) and as the regime 
estranged more social forces, particularly the Bazaaries (the traditional middle class of bazaar), the 
Ulema (clergy) and the landed upper class, the state sunk deeper into isolation, which forced it to 
depend on repression and foreign help to survive. 13 
(B) 
Opposition Groups 
The Shah, with its dictatorial character and no tolerance which had alienated all different social groups 
and classes with the possible exception of the upper layer of bourgeoisie, perceived the opposition 
groups as a threat to its regime. Their demands of expecting the regime to observe the constitution, free 
political prisoners, and respect freedom and human rights were ignored and they were even severely 
oppressed by the regime, especially in the post-1953 coup d'etat. 
SAVAK had the main responsibility for identifying and destroying all who opposed the Shah's 
dictatorship in any way. It had headquarters in London, Geneva and Washington and developed ties 
with the intelligence agencies from America, Britain and Israel. They were particularly suspicious of 
groups of intellectuals, students and religious clerics both at home and abroad. 14 Under such 
circumstances and despite the activities of the opposition groups, the Shah's regime was stable and was 
able to control the discontent for a time. However it could not last long; via a strong revolutionary 
movement started in 1978 the regime was overthrown within months and the Shah had to face the real 
impact of his oppressive policy. As Ervand Abrahamian's notes, 
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The 1953 coup brought down an iron curtain on Iranian politics. It cut the opposition leaders 
from their followers, the militants from the general public, and the political parties from their 
social bases (... ) The iron curtain may have hidden the social tensions and the organized 
oppositions, but it certainly did not succeed in eliminating them. On the contrary, (... ) the 
twenty-five-year repression produced a new intelligentsia that formulated ideas far more 
radical than those of the Tudeh and the National Front. Moreover, the new generation helped 
ss 
shape the uncompromising character of the revolution that eventually destroyed the monarchy. 




The only significant Islamic armed group struggling the Shah's regime was Fadaiyan-e Islam (devotees 
of Islam). It was founded in 1946 by Navab Safavi who believed that Iran had to be ruled by laws 
based on the Koran and the Sharia, so Western civilisation was considered to have corrupted Iran. 
They believed that the only solution to Iran's problems was militant opposition of the government. The 
group was an effective political power with a strong military element and was capable of challenging 
the authorities. 
The aim of the Fadaiyan-e Islam in general was to purge Iran of Western influences by attacking those 
who were developing the ideas of imperialism. This led to the assassination of some political figures, 
such as, General Razmara, Prime Minister Abdolhosein Hajzhir, Hossein Ala (who survived the 
attempt) and Major General Bakhtiar as well as a number of intellectuals like the historian Ahmad 
Kasravi. The support base for the Fadaiyan-e Islam was found among the masses and lower classes. 16 
On 18th December 1955, after the government banning of the Fadaiyan-e Islam, Navab Safavi was 
sentenced to death and the group went underground. However it returned in 1965 when Hassan All 
Mansoor was assassinated but this time the SAVAK were successful in brutally eliminating the 
organisation. It is believed that the adoption of a military strategy rather than a cultural and political 
one was the cause of the Fadaiyan-e Islam failure. 17 
After the assassination of Mansour and the unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Shah the strict 
militant atmosphere was intensified, particularly in regard to restricting the freedom of citizens. This 
focus was aimed at controlling the discontents however other secular groups carried on the armed 
struggle against the regime. 
The opposition groups, with secular backgrounds, included the National Front, the Tudeh and the 
Fadaiyan-e Khalq. These groups simply wanted a more liberal form of government that would allow 
them to participate in the political system; they were not interested in replacing it with an Islamic 
system. 18 Even the Mujahedin-e Khalq with religious backgrounds and demand for overthrowing the 
regime was not looking for an Islamic system. However, the regime had alienated these groups by 
centralising power and ceasing to act in accordance with the institutionalised rules, which resulted in 
parties being replaced by movements as an alternative form of political organisation. 19 
The National Front 
The National Front was the major secular nationalist organisation. It is believed that because of its 
devotion to Iranian nationalism and the legacy of Mosadegh the SAVAK considered it a threat to the 
Shah's regime. The most damaging event for the National Front was when Mehdi Bazargan and his 
associates split from the National Front in 1961 to form Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran (the Liberation 
Movement of Iran) because of this the National Front lost many of its ties to the cleric community. 
However among the many groups affiliated with the National Front, the Liberation Movement was to 
have the most important part in the Islamic revolution. According to Abrahamian this was because of 
its close relations established mainly with Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and partly because of Bazargan's 
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and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani's abilities to recruit young professionals and technocrats into the 
opposition. The group was well-known in the liberal opposition, which was based in the urban middle 
class, held fairly secular views and who wanted the Shah to obey the Iranian Constitution of 1906 
rather than have the Islamic clerics rule. 20 
As a result of the 1961 split the National Front retained membership from a small fraction of the 
middle class and became a harmless, reformist group under the watchful eye of the SAVAK. This 
continued during the 60s and the 70s and they remained loyal to the 1906 Constitution until 1978 near 
the end of the revolution. 
The National Front in exile was also split into rival Islamic and secular groups. Both organisations 
claimed that they represented the line of Mosadegh and both where ideologically more radical than 
their Iranian counterparts. Both groups also helped to establish the Confederation of Iranian Students, 
in the US and Western Europe, through connections with Bazargan and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini in 
Iraq and the distribution of revolutionary literature in the US and Europe. This also served as a link 
between the guerrillas and the radical groups in the ME. 21 
The clergy were divided, some followed the liberal secularists and many allied themselves also with 
the Marxists and Communists. However Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile, could unite all 
the opposition groups under his leadership (with the exception of the `atheistic Marxists'); including 
the clerical and secular, the liberal and the radical. According to Abrahamian he achieved this by 
avoiding mention of any specifics that separated the various groups. 22 
The Tudeh Party 
Although the Persian Social Democratic Party was created in 1904 it was not until 1917, following 
Bolsheviks victory in Russia that Marxist ideology spread to Iran and was popularised by the Tudeh 
party. However soon after its establishment in 1930 Reza Shah declared the party illegal and most of its 
founders were either jailed or killed. 23 
After the coup d'etat 1953 many Tudeh members were killed or jailed by the Mohhamad Reza Shah's 
regime. Also the party's strength declined dramatically after the Tudeh's attempted military coup in 
1953 when the party's secret network within the armed forces was discovered and dismantled. By the 
late 1950s the party was but a shadow of its former self. The popularity of the Tudeh party declined 
during the 1960s and 1970s. This is because of its occasional engagement with the Shah's regime and 
the SAVAK's infiltration of two high-ranking positions in the party. However, despite these issues the 
Tudeh party was recognised as a pioneer of Marxism and remained a powerful force in the leftist 
movement and the lefts main agenda coordinator. Inside Iran, after the 1953 coup and the crushing of 
the June Uprising in 1963 questions were raised about the visibility of peaceful coexistence with the 
Shah. This notion led to a division in its members into two underground organisations of Marxists. 
Both groups experimented with guerrilla warfare, inspired by the guerrilla movement in Latin America. 24 
Owing to a lack of influence and communication with the majority of people particularly in the rural 
places the Tudeh party failed to influence the revolution. In 1978 they attempted to create an alliance 
with the Ulema because they believed that the Islamic revolution was fulfilling their own goals; with 
talk of the "oppressed" compared to the "exploited. " However, Noureddin Kianouri, the party's leader, 
was simply paying lip-service to the revolution while the Tudeh party continued their ideological aims 
and subversive activities against the Islamic Republic. 25 
The Fadaiyan-e-Khalq 
The Fadaiyan-e-Khalq mostly came from the Tudeh party and from the Marxist National Front. 
Militant students had formed small groups in secret. Three of these groups whose major theorists . were Bijan Jazani, Hamid Ashraf and Mas'ud Ahmadizadeh, merged in 1970-71 and became the Fadaiyan-e- 
Khalq. 
The Fadaiyan-e-Khalq members were children of secular-minded teachers, civil servants, professionals, 
and other groups of the modern middle class. They relied on guerrilla tactics, as Abrahamian expresses, 
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because the regime's bloody suppression of the uprising in 1963 had taught them that violence was the 
only way to oppose the regime. They hoped to create a central armed struggle based on the model of 
Che Guevara and Regis Debray. 26 
The group's hasty first guerrilla operation in February 1971, of attacking the gendarmerie post in 
Siahkal village, marked the beginning of the urban guerrilla war against the Pahlavi regime. In 
response the government arrested oppositionists and outlawed the Confederation of Iranian Students 
abroad, followed by assassinations and bombings. The heavy toll of this period led some members to 
conclude that the losses of such activities far out weighed the gains. In the meantime, ideological 
conflicts which had arisen within the Fadaiyan-e Khalq in the late 1976 caused the minority turned 
toward the Tudeh party. This revelation caused an ideological and strategic split within the organisation 
one faction focused on the education of the masses and the building of a secret party while the other 
faction continued to rely on guerrilla warfare. This split resulted in less effective opposition of the 
regime. By 1977 most of its members had been killed or jailed and its constituency was limited to only 
a small percentage of the young. However both factions kept their weapons, which was useful during 
the Revolution. The main cause of the group's failure, according to Asaf Hussain, was that they lacked 
"grass roots influence. " This is because most of its members were middle class and as such could not 
communicate with the masses whose political culture was Islamic. When Islamic forces organised the 
masses for revolution, the Fadaiyan-e-Khalq focused on isolated targets in different cities. 27 
The Mujahedin-e-Khalq 
The Mujahedin-e-Khalq came mostly from the religious arm of the National Front, especially the 
Liberation Movement, which had been led by Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani since 
1961. Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saied Mohsen and Ali-Asghar Badizadegan, from Tehran University 
founded the People's Mujahedin Organisation of Iran in 1965. Most of the Mujahedin were children of 
religious-minded bazaaris, Ulema, merchants and other members of the traditional middle class and 
came mainly from the physical sciences. The Mujahedin were also influenced by the writings of Ali 
Shariati, however they combined their new interpretation of Marxism with Shiism. The interpretation 
of the leaders of this group was that, true Shiism opposed not only dictatorship but also capitalism, 
imperialism, and conservative clericalism. 28 In addition, the Mujahedin were inspired by Castro's 
victory in Cuba in 1959, which led them to rely on armed methods to oppose the regime, which they 
considered was corrupt and oppressive. 29 Furthermore since they had lost their hope for political 
participation they believed armed struggle was the only way to change the regime and would encourage 
the people to oppose the Shah. 30 
Similarly to the Fadaiyan-e-Khalq, the Mujahedin set up secret discussion groups in reaction to the 
government's brutality in 1963. Following the events in Siahkal in 1971, the Mujahedin publicly 
declared its existence and pledged open war against the regime. The Mujahedin's activities included 
the production of radical literature, the bombing of government buildings, the robbing of banks and the 
assassination of prominent members of the regime as well as some Americans. They also conducted 
anti-Western attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Following several acts of violence from 1971 the 
Mujahedin suffered heavy losses because of arrests and executions. Although, they received some 
support from the pro-Khomeini clerics in the early 1970s, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini never explicitly 
supported the group. He said "it [was] not time for armed struggle, and you... will lose much of your 
resources and will not... accomplish much. 9931 
In 1975, at the climax of its popularity, the Mujahedin suffered a split in its ranks marking the 
beginning of the end. In 1978 the Marxist faction re-named itself Peykar and the Muslim members, 
who believed they needed Shiism to gain support from the masses, regained the leadership of the 
Mujahedin. By 1978 both factions had either been jailed or killed, neither of the two Mujahedin 
organisations posed a serious threat to the Shah's regime. 32 
Since the political culture was Islamic the Mujahedin lacked grass-roots influence of the masses. This 
was combined with leadership derived from secularised middle-class intellectuals with no relationship 
with mass-based political parties. Also, the adoption of strategies of leftist leaders in Latin-America focused on armed action and ignored the potential or exploration of non-violent political channels. All 
these factors resulted in the failure of this leftist guerrilla movement. 33 
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Before any military operation could be carried out against the Shah's regime the SAVAK arrested the 
entire leadership and 90 percent of its cadres in a raid. All but one of its leaders was executed. Other 
members were imprisoned for many years, with the last group, including' Masoud Rajavi, being 
released just before Grand Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran in January 1979 sa 
Both Marxist Fadaiyan-e-Khalq and Mujahedin-e-Khalq were admired by the strongest oppositional 
group abroad; the Confederation of Iranian Students, which was influenced greatly by leftist views and 
the Tudeh party. 
Unarmed Opposition 
A growing number of oppositionists voiced their views in Islamic terms and many opposition groups 
had ties with the Islamic opposition. 
Mehdi Bazargan, Ali Shariati, and Jalal Al-Ahmad were the most important intellectuals who effected 
the development of Shiite political thought from the 1960s onwards. They all shared the one belief that 
Shiism was capable of neutralising the Western influences in Iran via a liberating and progressive 
ideology. Their idea was a combination of Iranian nationalism, Shiism and some Western ideas, which 
won over many of the educated people. It also convinced many that Shiism is a progressive religion 
and managed to establish peace between Shiism and the secular intelligentsia. 35 Most Importantly since 
early 1970 Grand Ayatollah Khomeini by a series of lectures in Najaf and later in his publications 
could develop and spread belief that Islam required an Islamic government. 
There were two major groups in the religious opposition: The first was made up of those with 
traditional religious educations and functions and included Ayatollahs Khomeini, Shariatmadari, and 
Taleqani. The second group had, had Western or Western-style educations and attempted to combine 
traditional and the modern ideas under an Islamic banner. Bazargan, Shariati, and Bani Sadr were 
among the members of the second group. 36 
Meanwhile the communication network of liberal members, e. g. Hassan Habibi, Hassan Ayat, H. 
Payman, K. Sami, organised the mobilisation of the Islamic orientated intelligentsia. 37 
In addition, some of the groups, which were more ignored by the regime, actually played a specific role 
in the process of the revolution. These groups included the bazaaries, women, the sub-proletariat and 
the students abroad. 
Even after the significant shift of economic power to the modern sector the bazaaries were neither 
cowed nor reduced in number. The participation of women in the revolution in various ways exceeded 
anything before seen in Iran. The Muslim Students Association was the major active group abroad. 
They honoured both Mosadegh and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and were in contact with the National 
Front and other Islamic groups. They were led by Islamic oriented lay leaders. Sub-proletariat's were 
immigrants to cities living in the slums they had been literally and culturallly uprooted. They had closer 
ties to the bazaar than the modern 
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tarts of society and believed their only solution for a better life was 
forceful action against the regime. 
(C) 
Imperial Iran during 1960s-1970s 
Iran's Challenges after Britain's Departure from the PG 
The complex new situation which emerged in the wake of Britain's departure from the PG forced Iran 
to take a particular course in order to achieve its long and short term objectives. Its priorities were, as 
Sepehr Zabih remarks: to solve its territorial disputes with regard to new Sheikhdoms; to prevent an 
extra-regional power to fill the vacuum of power that Britain's departure would create; to place the 
security responsibility mainly in the hands of littoral states; and also to recognise the entanglement of 
Sheikhdoms in non-PG political issues should not become destabilising to the southern littoral states. 9 
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Iran's PG Security Policy 
Problems: 
In order for a feasible collective security arrangement to be possible, Iran felt that security should be 
provided by the littoral states regardless of the impacts of regional politics in the PG. However, this 
policy faced a number of problems. The littoral states are a very diverse group of countries who are 
rarely in agreement with, and sometimes feared, one another; Iran thus had different policies depending 
on which littoral state it was dealing with. Its policy towards other PG states had also been very varied; 
one of the reasons for this was the impact of Iraq and Egypt's socio-political issues on the PG states' 
society and policy. 40 
Following the assumption of the Arab sheikdoms' sovereignty and the ensuing territorial disputes, Iran 
was also forced to take different policies on each dispute and thus found it difficult to normalise its 
relations with them. Further, the PG states' different stances towards the Cold War had a propensity to 
intensify regional rivalries, for instance between Iran and Egypt and possibly Iran and Iraq. Iran 
determined its regional policies according to its interests and its preoccupation with the Soviet threat 
and mostly chose moderate, conservative and pro-Western countries as its allies cooperating with 
Turkey, Pakistan and even Iraq as a result. However, by the late 1950s, after the revolution in Iraq and 
the rise of Arab nationalism Iran became concerned to what it saw as a worrying spread of radicalism 
spearheaded by ambitious countries in the region and feared that the US might not intervene. The US's 
attitude between 1958-1963 towards Iraq and Yemen with whom good relations were sought, displayed 
a sense of preferring a tolerant to an interventionist approach in dealing with extremism. Thus US 
regional policies diverged from those of Iran between 1965-1969, since the Shah's regional policies in 
this period were clearly conservative, vehemently against change and strongly opposed to radicalism 41 
Another problem was presented by the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The lack of progress in 
resolving this conflict and the continuation of a 'no-war, no-peace' attitude towards it both increased 
the prospect of radicalisation in the ME as a whole, and gave PG countries in particular an influential 
role in negotiating an outcome to the conflict. While the latter may have been positive to such 
countries, in that it may have given them a hand in shaping a peaceful settlement, the lack of any 
progress towards it threatened to undermine their regimes and provide incentives for extremism at 
home. As Chubin remarks, Iran saw "a greater danger to its security resulting from no progress in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict than from any putative threat a settlement acceptable to both sides may have. "42 
However, the most important problem from Iran's point of view was that presented by Iraq. Iraq's short 
19km coastline always provided it with a source of insecurity and gave it a permanently hostile stance 
towards its neighbours. Of concern was also its mostly pro-Soviet attitude which together with disputes 
over Arvand Roud, the Kurdish insurgency, and their differing views about the disputed three islands 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict, meant that Iraq-Iran relations were tense and precarious with both sides 
accusing one another of bringing the superpowers into the regional dispute. Further, because both sides 
were pessimistic about the prospects of a peaceful reconciliation between them, they both pursued 
policies of strategic self-reliance and military autonomy made possible by revenues incurred from oil 
exports. 43 
Solutions: 
Addressing the divergence between Iran and the US' regional security concerns and that between 
CENTO and the threats from regional sources, Iran devised two responses. The first of these was to 
strengthen relations with its non-Arab neighbours by offering them military assistance and by 
institutionalising cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey in the Regional Cooperation for Development 
organisation (RCD). The second was to improve its relation with Saudi Arabia based upon Islamic 
solidarity to contain Nasser in Yemen. 44 
As to the Iraq threat, Iran learnt that on the one hand it could not count much on Arab disunity and 
disharmony and on the other the risk of Iraq's total isolation may increase Baghdad's dependence on its 
superpower protector. However, these issues did not have the intended consequences until late winter 
1975 when the Algiers accord meant that Iraq had accepted the median line thalweg in the Arvand 
Roud and that Iran would end its support to the Kurdish insurgency, thereby effectively ending it. As 
Zabih remarks, the Iran-Iraq rapprochement was perhaps beneficial to the West, including Israel, in that 
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it robbed the USSR of its influence in the Ba'thist regime. It also perhaps purposefully prevented India, 
whose geo-strategic influence was a growing cause for concern, from having a foothold in Iraq 
45 
Regarding the southern littoral states, once the territorial disputes regarding Bahrain and the three 
islands were resolved, Iran attempted to establish relations with them in a way that would be 
compatible with its overall regional policy. Iran's policy towards inter-Arab disputes involving one or 
the other major Arab littoral state was unflinchingly opposed to the use of force. It displayed this in its 
attitude towards the Kuwait-Iraq quarrel 46 However, regarding the Dhoffar rebellion in Oman, Iran 
offered the Sultan military assistance, (since it had become apparent that the Arabs were not going to 
get involved in the issue) in an effort to contain an internal upheaval that threatened regional security. 
In short, Iran's policy at this time was to maintain the PG's security at all costs, despite recognising 
that it should not provoke its Arab neighbours or their superpower allies. 47 
Despite Chubin's earlier emphasis on Iran's security concerns regarding Arab-Israeli no-war, no-peace 
situation, he remarks that Iran also benefited from the Arab-Israeli conflict in that it assumed a primary 
diplomatic role for Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The conflict also occupied these countries' attention to such 
an extent that Iran was able to carry on with its agenda in the PG pretty much unfettered - Nasser's 
defeat in the 1967 war had further relieved Iran of a regional rival and removed another limitation to 
Iran's relationship with Arab states. 48 Iran's regional relations also benefited from other advantageous 
circumstances. The many rivalries and the lack of a homogenous mind-set on the part of the Arab states 
and particularly the wide distrust of Iraq among the sheikhdoms turned out to be beneficial in that 
relations with Iran were valued by the smaller PG states, partly due to its role as balancer, though also 
partly due to the states leaders' ambivalence to whom to commit themselves to. 49 
As Chubin also points out, Iran's policy was to engender as much as it possibly could an environment 
that was conducive to stability and moderation. Recognising the relationship between regional rivalries 
and outside powers' intervention, it did so firstly by balancing between India and Pakistan in the East 
and by trying to play-up the benefits of dealing with a moderate PG to the West. Secondly, it did so by 
isolating the PG region from external rivalries also separating issues of regional security from issues 
regarding central strategic balance and then attempting to make it self militarily autonomous. The latter 
was carried out in an effort to be able to deal unilaterally with a regional threat, though it would not 
have been able to do so under a fully fledged attack from the USSR and so was still partly dependent 
on the West. 50 5 
The divergence between Iran and the US' notion of regional security that was evident between 1965 
and 1969 was brought to an end by the advent of Nixon's twin-pillar doctrine. This signaled a change 
in US policy towards one that placed more importance to a geopolitical perspective, keeping the 
USSR's regional allies in check and deny it from having an increasing influence in the Third World in 
general, a strategy which was to help Iran achieve its major foreign policy objectives. 5' To this end, 
Iran expanded its relations with Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and was thereby able to further reduce 
its political and economic dependence of the US. 52 
Consequently, during the period between the 1960s and the end of the 1970s, a suitable international 
environment made it possible for Iran to achieve its foreign policy goals. It solved its major territorial 
and boundary disputes with its PG neighbours and prevented any extra-regional power from filling the 
power vacuum that was left in the wake of Britain's departure. Further, the PG states' reluctance to 
establish a collective security arrangement, as well as Nixon's Twin-Pillar doctrine, meant that Iran 
steadily built up its military and naval capabilities and was thus able to stabilise itself as a regional 
power. Iran's naval and military build-up as well as its detente and realistic policy was to a level that 
made it possible to convince both regional and extra-regional players. of Iran's new role as the sole 
guardian of PG security. This resulted in security and stability in the PG being assured without the 
presence of foreign forces. 
(D) 
Islamic Republic Iran's Economic Problems 
Over the first decade after the revolution IRI was confronted with several major economic difficulties: 
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(a) According to various sources the human cost of the war was estimated at about a million casualties 
including both lives and injuries. The government had to pay disabled veterans, widows and orphans, 
look after the numerous homeless citizens and between 3 and 6 million refugees from Iranian cities, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The cost also stretched to the complete devastation of numerous parts of the 
infrastructure estimated between $450 and $650 billion in damages. 
(b) There were millions unemployed and domestic production had collapsed, in particular the 
productive capacity of the non-oil industry, which was significantly reduced. Unemployment ranged 
from 14 to 40% and income per capita declined by half. 
(c) Although, the state held a sense of achievement and independence for a while, for unlike Iraq they 
had fought the war with their own resources, ultimately the economy was in a mess and the population, 
which had almost doubled in the last decade, 53 was exhausted. Furthermore 70% of Iran's revenues 
were going directly into the war and Iran was extremely vulnerable to international sanctions because 
of the necessity to import 60% of its needs from abroad because of the pre-revolutionary structure of 
Iranian industry. In 1988, the industrial sector was operating at barely 40% of its capacity. 
d) The private sector declined but the public sector nearly tripled with the monopolisation of foreign 
trade, full nationalisation of the oil industry, disintegration of private agro industries, and the seizure of 
some former elite properties. In consequence of this decline a trend of capital flight and brain drain 
occurred as the rich took their money out of the state and the many elite skilled people left entirely. 
e) The government's non-military expenses were four times the amount directed into capital formation 
and development projects. The private capital had been repelled away from the productive sectors and 
towards the more profitable speculative activities because of the political insecurity and the legal 
system's unpredictability. 
f) Reliance on oil revenues became greater as the productive sector declined and the war's expenses 
increased. However at this time both the Iranian production of oil and international prices of oil fell. So 
the state had to resort to deficit spending, but to protect the poor and avoid a backlash from the 
population the government started rationing, subsidising and price controlling. 
g) The regime implemented an austerity plan to control imports and consumption. In 1986 it had cut 
the budget and foreign expenditures by one-third. The regime used a series of improvised strategies to 
regain economic control and resist Western pressure by diversifying sources of trade and getting 
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